The Doctrine of *Amalavijñāna in Paramārtha (499-569), and Later Authors to Approximately 800 C.E. by RADICH, Michael
Title The Doctrine of *Amalavijñāna in Paramārtha (499-569),and Later Authors to Approximately 800 C.E.
Author(s)RADICH, Michael
CitationZINBUN (2009), 41: 45-174
Issue Date2009-03
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/134689
Right© Copyright March 2009, Institute for Research in HumanitiesKyoto University.




 'The Doctrine of *Amalavijnana in Paramar 





   Like other ideas in his corpus, Paramartha's2 (Ch. 
amoluoshi 1i71V,Lp , or *amalavijnana, "taintless
Zhendi An, 499-569) notion of 
consciousness", occupies an
2
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Conventions: In citing the Taisho (I) and Xuzangjing (X) Chinese canons, I give the number of 
the text, followed by the volume, page, register and line nos., thus: T1616:31.863b05. Through-
out, I regularly repunctuate citations from Chinese canonical texts without notice. I have aimed 
for this repunctuation to show clearly my interpretation of each passage. 
For purposes of argument, I will throughout this paper use "Paramartha" (abbreviation: P) to 
refer indifferently to the historical person and also to the corpus attributed to him. In so doing, 
I am eliding important problems in determining authorship of these texts. I have in preparation 
a study in which I attempt to use methods of computer-assisted statistical analysis to examine 
this problem of authorship.
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important place in the common understanding of the development of East Asian 
Buddhist thought. In particular, it is frequently linked to claims about the "sinification",3 
or "making Chinese", of Buddhist ideas. It has also often been interpreted as an attempt 
to forge links between Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha thought, that is, to bring about a 
synthesis between two major strands of Mahayana Buddhist doctrine. For these rea-
sons, an accurate understanding of  *amalavijnana is important to our understanding of 
Buddhist doctrinal history. Towards this end, this paper studies primary sources for the 
doctrine of *amalavijn"ana in detail, first in Paramartha's extant corpus, and then in oth-
er sources to the close of the eighth century.
   In Sections 2 and 3, I present a full analysis and translation of all passages in 
Paramartha's extant corpus mentioning *amalavijnana, containing in total 
approximately twenty instances of the concept.' I interpret each passage in relation to its 
context, and with full reference to available Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan parallels. I 
also present an analysis of the generally neglected Abhidharmakoga passage in which 
the word amalavijnana occurs for the only known time in Sanskrit, and its relation to 
Paramartha's concept.
   In Section 4, I present an analysis of what is said by more than twenty-five authors, 
in several dozen texts, in about the first twn and a half centuries after Paramartha, 
comparing this evidence carefully with what is learnt about *amalavijnana from 
examination of Paramartha's extant works. I proceed in three main steps, examining in 
turn: (1) claims about *amalavijnana that are found only in later authors, and are not 
matched in Paramartha's works; (2) areas of overlap between later authors and 
Paramartha; and (3) aspects of Paramartha's doctrine that are never repeated in later 
works.
   Finally, in Section 5, I summarise the conclusions of this study. My main 
contentions will be as follows. (1) The neglected Abhidharmakogabhasya passage 
surrounding the mention of the word amalavijnana does have some clear relations with 
Paramartha's idea of *amalavijnana, especially as found in the Jueding zang lun. (2) In 
Paramartha's own works, we find not one but two largely distinct doctrines of 
*amalavijnana; one featuring in Jueding zang lun alone, and the other in the remaining
3 
4
See n. 490. 
This count is approximate because there are, in one or two places, textual problems and 
variant terms that may or may not constitute separate instances.
46
"The Doctrine of  *Amalavijnana in Paramartha (499-569),and Later Authors to Approximately 800 C•E."
works where the concept occurs. Of these two versions of the doctrine, it is likely that 
the Jueding zang lun is closer to the original doctrine. (3) There is relatively little overlap 
between Paramartha's own attested doctrine(s) of *amalavijnana, and characterisations 
of the doctrine in later authors — even when those authors purport to be describing the 
doctrine as Paramartha taught it. (4) This suggests that Paramartha's ideas may 
sometimes have been misunderstood and misrepresented by the tradition. Later authors 
may thus not be very reliable sources of information about Paramartha's thought, and 
due to over-reliance upon them, our understanding of Paramartha's though may not be 
entirely accurate.
2. Paramartha's concept of *amalavijnana in the primary sources
   To my knowledge, there exists no complete study of Paramartha's concept of 
*amalavijnana.5 In this section of this study, I will analyse all the instances of the term 
in Paramartha's corpus. We will first examine the passages in which the concept occurs 
one by one. I will then attempt to summarise the doctrine of *amalavijnana as it appears 
in these sources into a synthetic, general picture.
5 There is certainly no such study in any Western language. By "complete study", I mean a study 
that takes full account of all the instances of this term in P's corpus. Some Japanese and 
Chinese studies do survey nearly all of the sources I will treat below, but typically do not suffi-
ciently put passages in context; and I believe every scholar except YOSHIMURA misses at least 
some instances of the term. Few scholars have studied P's texts against their parallels in 
reference to this question. Perhaps the closest study of primary passages is IWATA (1972[al), 
which presents nearly all of the primary passages in which the term amalavijnana appears in 
P's extant corpus, and identifies parallel terms in Indic texts. However, IWATA does not mention 
the four instances of the term in SWXL. Further, his work is largely restricted to translating 
single sentences and identifying Sanskrit parallels, and he pays far too little attention to the 
larger conceptual contexts. IwATA has further studied *amalavijnana extensively, and often re-
dundantly, in a long series of other articles, listed in my bibliography. These articles typically 
do not add anything not already said in this 1972 article. YOSHIMURA (2007a) surveys all perti-
nent passages, but only briefly, in preparation for consideration of later Shelun doctrines. 
Other important studies include relevant portions of KATSUMATL,• Yinshun; Lu Cheng's essay on 
*amalavijnana collected in Lu Cheng foxue lunzhu xuanji; and comments by Shengkai in his 
Shelun xuepai yanjiu. See also DI 6, 486-488, 539, 753-754; Mou 350-351, 355; FUi&um 1, 338, 
341-344; YE 15, 247, 253-255, 474; HAKAMAYA 10-13, 17. The most important Western language 
studies of *amalavijnana to date are undoubtedly FRAUWALLNER; and GIMELLO, 277 ff. ("The Ear-
ly Chinese Appropriation of Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha Buddhism"). See also IA VALLEE 
POUSSIN (1928-1929), 109-113; DEMIEVILLE (1952), 56 ff.; LIEBENTHAL 369 ff.; RUEGG 439-444 
("L'Amalavijnana"); BUSWELL (1995), 77, 92-104; LUSTHAUS 369 ff; p. 379-380 n. 46; LAI, 76; PAUL 
108, 145, 149; several pieces by YOSHIMURA (2002, 2007a, forthcoming).
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  The term f 171-, 7 *amalavijnana is not found in any parallels to the Paramartha 
texts in which it appears. However, there are extant Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese paral-
lels to passages in which the term appears, which sometimes even make it possible to 
identify terms to which it corresponds. These provide valuable clues to the meaning of 
the term and its context, and I have attempted to make full use of them.'
2.1 Amalavijnana in AKBh
   It has seldom been observed in secondary literature on *amalavijnana' that the 
term amalavijniana$ is in fact attested in Sanskrit — though not in the sense Paramartha 




In utilising parallels to interpret P's Chinese, I have tried to bear in mind two principles, which 
pull in opposite directions. (1) P most likely usually had before him a Sanskrit text that said 
something very similar to other versions of the text, and was trying to convey at least one plau-
sible meaning of that text. Where possible, then, his Chinese must therefore be interpreted in 
a sense reconcilable with parallels. (2) As we shall see, it is also clear that P did at times depart 
from his source text in various ways, and this is corroborated by a general examination of his 
entire corpus. Therefore, where P's text cannot plausibly be reconciled with parallels without 
doing violence to it, we must translate P, and not the parallels. 
See, however, HAKAMAYA 13, 23 n. 51. 
Throughout this paper, I use the asterisk that denotes reconstruction in referring to the term 
*amalavijniana as the presumed equivalent of P's amoluoshi etc. By contrast, in reference to 
this sole attested Sanskrit instance of the term in AKBh, the asterisk is obviously unnecessary. 
I am grateful to MUROJI Yoshihito and OTAKE Susumu for reminding me that it is also necessary 
consider the possibility that the term P had in mind in coining amoluoshi was not 
*amalavijnana, but *nirmalajfiana, as has been argued by IWATA (see esp. 1971) (see also n. 
17). There are some good grounds for this argument. First, it is odd that a purified jfiana, 
proper to the Buddhas, would be called vi jn"ana rather than simply jilana. Second, as IWATA 
points out, there are passages in which a nirmalam jnanam is discussed, where that concept 
seems to correspond quite well with what we see of *amalavijnana in P. See e.g. BBh: asaktam 
anavaran am suvisuddham nirmalam jnanam, WOGIHARA 405; XZ Fi.'l :,fY~ i ;ri.ffa > 
T1579:30.574b13; like *amalavijnana, this nirmalam jn"anam is associated with afrayaparavrtti. 
So too MSA 14.28: l'fi }ffFi 'Lt / i.;,ntylJ t / 1ftt:' etc., T1604:31.625b08-09, lokottaram 
anuttaram/ nirvikalpam malapetain jnanam, LEvi (1907, 1911) 1, 93 and 2, 167; this /liana is 
also associated with afrayaparavrtti (14.29, T1604:31.625b14, LEvi 1, 94 and 2, 168), is visuddha 
(14.32, T1604:31.625c05, LEvi 1, 942, 168) etc. I will examine this possibility further in future 
work on the background of P's concept (see n. 490). For the present, though I am sure this 
idea of nirmalam jn"anam is certainly part of the background to the concept, I will assume that 
since the present AKBh passage provides us with a form that corresponds more exactly to the 
Chinese transcription amoluo, and because ski for Plana would be unusual, *amalavijnana is 
the most likely reconstruction.
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amoluoshi [17*NM.
   The term occurs in Abhidharmakosa (AKBh) 5.28 ff. and the accompanying Bhasya 
(AKBh) .9 The context is a discussion of when "latent tendencies" (anusaya) attach to 
dharmas, how many attach to each dharma, of what kind they are, etc. AK here distin-
guishes between sixteen kinds of consciousness. The first fifteen kinds are associated 
with the three "realms" (dhatu: kama, rupa, arupya); the sixteenth, however, is "pure", 
or "free of outflows" (anasrava). Paramartha uses several translations for this last "pure 
consciousness".
   The centre of gravity in this passage as a whole is this concept of "consciousness 
without outflows" (i.e. *anasravavijnana).10 Only in verses does Vasubandhu refer to this 
concept by the term amalavijnana, and also by the epithet amala (twice, with vijnana 
elided). In the prose Bh, by contrast, he consistently uses anasrava. It is thus likely that 
he uses amala etc. metri causa. For Vasubandhu, the rare term amalavijnana was thus 
most likely a nonce coinage, a mere poetic equivalent to *anasravavijnana.
Thus, the term amalavijnana itself occurs only once in Vasubandhu's Sanskrit:
duhkhahetudrgabhyasapraheyalh kamadhatujah 
svakatrayaikarupaptamalavijn"anagocarah. (5.29)
"The [dharmas] produced in the kamadhatu that are to be abandoned by insight into [the 
Truths of] Suffering and the Origin [of Suffering]/ 
are the objects (gocara) of three [kinds of consciousness proper to] their own realm; of one [kind 
of consciousness] obtained in the rupadhatu; and of pure consciousness (amalavijnnana)."11
Paramartha translates: / / / ,;;,tjQpt~.12
9 PrADiAN 301-303; LA VALLEE POUSSIN (hereafter VP) 4, 67-69. LA VALLEE POUSSIN (1980) 4, 67 n. 3,
  points out that the discussion here follows *Mahavibhasa T1545: 27. 449a23 ff. 
10 This emphasis is exceptionally clear when we note that the discussion in the *Mahavibhasa,
upon which this AKBh passage is based, speaks only of *anasravavijnana (,!;,iin 
Xuanzang's [XZ] translation). See e.g. T1545:27.449a29, 449b08, 449b14, 449b20, 449c01, 
449c10, 449c18 etc. The idea of *anasravavijnana was thus, presumably, a firmly established 
piece of Vaibhasika doctrine by the time of AKBh.




Strikingly, Paramartha does not translate  amalavijnana fi71p, although it is the pre-
sumed underlying term for his own notion of *amalavijnana. The term he does use, 
wugoushi  ?,t, only ever appears this once in Paramartha's corpus!'
   In 30ab, this "pure consciousness" is identified merely by the epithet amala (with 
vijnana elided); Paramartha translates jingshi i A.14 Paramartha uses this term twice in 
SWXL<1> and SBKL<2> to discuss *amalavijnana. He also uses a closely related locu-
tion15 in JDZL<4>.
   In a summary verse that concludes the discussion, the "pure consciousness" is 
again called amala; here, Paramartha translates wuliu~,more usually his translation 
for anasrava.16 This translation is far from arbitrary, but rather reflects the real centre of 
gravity of the concept at issue. Aside from the exceptional (probably metri causa) in-
stances of amala etc., Skt. too usually calls the same "pure consciousness" anasrava 
(with "consciousness" elided but comprehensible from context). In one instance, 
Paramartha translates wuliushi ,T,%JLpA.17 Elsewhere, Paramartha translates several 
times ,,.,,sii ,,C', for which we might expect Skt. *anasravacitta.18
13 This suggests that wugoushi and *amalavijnana may have been distinct for P himself. Yet
wugoushi was taken quite regularly as an unproblematic equivalent for P's *amalavijnana by 
later scholastics in East Asia; see n. 191. 
The combination ,T, pi does appear once before P, in the ,T, a q R a Aksayamatinirdesa 
T397(12) by the Liu Song piJ5 translators from Liangzhou 7 JH, Zhiyan WE and Baoyun 
(active c. 427 C.E.): gr. L r i':.t p   T1~T .®T ~  T397:13.190b19. However, this is 
properly to be punctuated 7frArp, 414= ,i'i.ffA, as l[ ( ... as is clear from comparison 
with BRAARVIG's Skt. reconstruction, ya vimalacittata vijn"ananisritate manasikarddsarnsrstis tac 
chrlam, and Tib. sems dri ma med pa ... rnam par shes pa la ... mi gnas pa dang ... yid la byed 
pa dang ma dres pa; BRAARVIG 1, 140.
14 svakadharatrayordhvaikamalana,n rupadhatujah; 1 -E, _E—y a  fs~, 
T1559:29.260a17-18, PRADHAN 32, VP 4, 68.
15 C,CAhio MA*. . T1584:30.1031a08-09; see the end of JDZL<4> below. 
16 T1559:29.260b07, PRADHAN 303, VP 4, 69. (T1559:29.175c25, 176a04, 209c03, 226c09; HIRAKAWA 2,
463.) P also uses wuliu for amala elsewhere in AKBh, and also for nirmala; T1559:29.284c21, 
HIRAKAWA 2, 463.
17 The very term wuliu for anasrava itself is one of the most striking hallmarks of P's translation 
  style; it occurs approximately 430 times in his corpus, and otherwise only once each in two 
  texts (T398, T659) before or contemporaneous with him. It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
  wuliushi is extremely rare, occurring, outside the present passage, only ever in a single 
  passage of P's MSgBh (where it appears four times): T1595:31.168c24-169a12.
18 T1559:29.260a17, 260a20, 260a23, 260b03, 260b05, 260b17. P had also translated 1,1;,i,L•C' for
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   In this AKBh passage, then, the single instance of amalavijnana clearly does not 
mean precisely what *amalavijnana = amoluoshi comes to mean in other passages in 
Paramartha. Neither is the concept of "consciousness without outflows", whose discus-
sion forms the larger context, identical to Paramartha's *amalavijnana. This may be 
why scholars have tended to disregard this passage when studying Paramartha's con-
cept of *amalavijnana. Yet this passage may provide us with clues to part of the back-
ground of Paramartha's concept. Certainly, we can at least be sure from this passage 
that Paramartha knew Vasubandhu's use of amalavijnana. It is therefore likely that 
when he elaborated his own notion, he was picking up on Vasubandhu's term and infus-
ing it with new content.19
   Neither is the meaning of amalavijnana in AKBh entirely unrelated to 
Paramartha's *amalavijnana. As we will see below, two key parts of Paramartha's doc-
trine of *amalavijnana are: (1) that it is free of defilements (klesa), a claim which is re-
lated to freedom from "outflows" (asrava);20 and (2) that the realisation of 
*amalavijnana brings freedom from the attachments that condition future rebirth, 
which also seems to be a consideration at play in the present AKBh passage's consider-
ation of anusaya. These factors also make it likely this AKBh passage formed part of the 
background to Paramartha's coinage of his own *amalavijnana.
   To conclude, it is likely that: (1) Vasubandhu coined amalavijnana as a nonce 
equivalent, metri causa, for *anasravavijnana; and (2) Paramartha picked this rare term 
up as a label for his own ideas, and bent it flexibly to that use.
   We now turn to the consideration of " *amalavijnana proper", that is, the term 
*amalavijnana as it is used to articulate the distinctively Paramarthian notion of a "pure 
consciousness" in the context of the Yogacara system, usually represented by the tran-
scription amoluoshi mum. The term appears in four texts: Jueding zang lun, Shiba
PRADHAN 302 samasata ime sodasa dharmah kamaruparupyavacarah pancaprakarah 
anasravas ca, T1559:29.260a09; but I think, as VP's translation suggests ("dharmas pur" VP 4, 
67), that this is in error for anasravah dharmah.
19 This seems to be a time-honoured technique — a thinker picks up a rare or unusual (and 
  therefore suitably ill-defined) term from some nook or cranny, and reshapes it to fit the new 
  concept. Examples might include the standard concept(s) of dharmakaya; Zhiyi's 
Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha uses of prakrtiprabhasvaracitta; and even Mahayana sanyata.
20 In fact, the last paragraph of the passage I call JDZL<4> below, following the final mention of 
*amalavijnana in the text
, explicitly mentions anasravavijiiana.
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kong lun, Zhuanshi lun, and San wuxing lun.
2.2 Jueding  zang lun
   The term *amalavijnana occurs most frequently in four passages in the Jueding 
zang lun i (JDZL), T1584.21
2.2.1 JDZL <1>
*Amalavijn"ana occurs, most importantly, eight times in one short passage in JDZL. 
This passage is thus the most important source for information about what Paramartha 
meant by the term. Significantly, the context is a discussion of the "revolutionary trans-
formation of the basis" (agrayaparavrtti) of Yogacara theory, and the relationship be-
tween it and the "storehouse" or "base" consciousness (alayavijnana).22
"All that is included under [the head of] defilements ():RI
, *klesa)23 in the category (? f )24 of 
karmic conditioning [i.e. 'volition', saniskara (-skandha),fr125 is gathered together in the funda- 
mental consciousness (alayavijn"ana); [thus, when,] because of intensive and repeated cultiva-
21 JDZL is a freestanding translation of a portion of YBh corresponding to the first portion of the
Viniscayasarrrgrahanr (X7 She j uezc fcn  1 For Tib I have referred to the Tokyo Uni-
versity  reprint of the Derge version (Tokyo daigaku ... ed). Important secondary studies, 
which were helpful to me in preparing the present article, are HAKAMAYA; Ui 6, 541-790 ("Kettei 
zo ron no kenkyu"). MATSUDA Kazunobu has identified parallels to nearly half this text in a set 
of Sanskrit fragments in Nepal (see MATSUDA). According to MATSUDA'S account of the manu-
script, it corresponds to JDZL 1025c26-1035a18 (extrapolating from equivalences MATSUDA 
gives to portions of the XZ YBh). This should mean that it contains a parallel to one instance of 
the term amalavijn"ana, that at 1031a02-04, though MATSUDA also notes that the manuscript is 
damaged and it will not be possible to reconstruct a complete text on its basis, 18. However, it 
seems unfortunately that these Sanskrit fragments have not yet been published.
22 Parts of this passage are translated in DEMIEVILLE (1929), 42. 
23 Note that Tib. here reads rnam par spros pa, *viprapanca. XZ agrees. 
24 I presume this ff is the basis for SAxUMA's suggestion that there may have been an underlying 
   —gata: "das Alayavijnana die [gesamten] Element(e) aller dieser Arten von (?: °gata?) 
bedingten [Faktoren] ...", Sakuma (1990) 2, 156; I cannot see any basis for this reconstruction 
in either XZ or Tib.
25 This phrase is somewhat difficult of interpretation. Tib. and XZ are somewhat more expansive. 
  Tib. reads, "[Because] the alayavijn"ana is the element/domain of all that is included as (`habit-
  ual', Hakamaya) conceptual proliferation of (= resulting from?) sarnskara,"kun gzhi rnam par 
  shes pa ni 'du byed kyi rnam par spros par bsdus pa de dag thams cad kyi khams pa yin pa[`i 
  phyir]. XZ reads similarly "The alayavijn"ana is the element/domain of samskaras that are in-
  cluded in all prapan"ca" lif c --0gPh#p' IW.
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lion (asevita-bhavita)26 on the part of the wisdom that takes Thusness as its objective support 
(tathatalambanajfiana),27 the fundamental consciousness is abandoned, which is to say that a 
revolutionary transformation (*paravrttz) is brought about in the nature of the ordinary world-
ling (JL'[1, *prthagjanatva),28 such that all the qualities of the ordinary worldling (IL*{, 
*prthagjanadharmah) are discarded, then the fundamentaI consciousness is extinguished 29 Be-
cause this consciousness is extinguished, all defilements are extinguished, and by means of 
[the] counteragent[s] (]7q, pratipaksa) to the fundamental consciousness, the *amalavijn"ana 
is realised (cf. Tib/XZ: "the basis undergoes a revolutionary transformation", asrayah pravar-
tate) 3°
"The fundamental consciousness is impermanent (anitya)
, and is something attended by 'out-
flows' (, *sdsravadharma);31 [whereas] *amalavijilana32 is permanent (nitya), and is 
something devoid of 'outflows' (,!1!,igi , *anasravadharma).33 [This is because] *amalavijnana is
26 Tib. kun tu brten cing goms par byas, Skt. following HAKAMAYA 66. 
27 tal V , Tib. de bzhin la dmigs pa'i shes pas. 
28 For *prthagjanatva for fanfuxing JL '[t in P, see e.g. HIRABAWA 1, 241, which shows it is the
only Skt. term so translated by P in the context of AKBh. Within JDZL itself, fanfuxing (XZ yish-
engxing Att) corresponds to Tib. so so'i skye bo nyid = *prthagjanatva at T1584:30.1024c11-
15 = T1579:30.587b25-29, D 23b4-5. (I am grateful to Ching KENG for pointing out the latter par-
allel to me.) It is thus implausible to reconstruct *prthagjanagotra with GIMELLO 326.
29 The latter half of this sentence differs in its detailed wording, though not in its general import, 
  from Tib, which reads merely, "A revolutionary transformation is brought about in the basis 
   (gnas gyur bar byed, asrayah parivartate) because of intensive and repeated cultivation on the 
  part of the wisdom that takes Thusness as its objective support. The limitless revolutionary 
  transformation of the basis should be considered to be the abandonment of the fundamental 
consciousness;" de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i shes pas kun to brten cing goms par byas pa'i rgyus 
  gnas gyur bar byed do// gnas gyur ma thag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa spangs par brjod par 
   bya ste. XZ agrees. Such interpolated expansive glosses are typical of P's translation 
   methodology.
30 Tib. reads, "The basis (afraya) of this fundamental consciousness should be considered as 
  something to be [obtained by being] transformed by [means of in virtue of] the antidote and 
  counterpart [of that fundamental consciousness]," kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de'i gnas ni/gny-
  en po dang/ dgra bos bsgyur bar rig par bya'o. XZ is somewhat different again: "We should con-
  sider that the afrayaparavrtti, because it is opposite [to it,] can act as a permanent countera-
  gent to the alayavijn"ana;" SZMZEtitiffatk, firi7<lAp7''=111M.
31 Tib. here reads rather len pa dang bcas pa, Skt. sopadana, `attended by clinging/grasping". XZ 
  approximately agrees: Valtlit.
32 Tib./XZ *asrayaparavrtti, gnas gyur pa, Tk; so throughout. 
33 Once more, Tib. differs slightly, reading len pa med pa, anupadana. XZ agrees.
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realised  is by means of the attainment of the path that takes Thusness as its objective support 
(,0AF L, de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam, *tathatalambanamarga) 34
"The fundamental consciousness is accompanied by `badness' (dausthulyasamanvagama)
,35 [that 
is,] suffering as an effect [of karma] *;36 *amalavijn"ana is free of all `badness' [i.e.] suffering 
as an effect [of karma].
'The fundamental consciousness is the basis tli* for all the defilements .):Ri , but does not act 
Tip as a basis for i1i4K the noble path (21", *aryamarga).37 *Amalavijnana, on the other hand, is 
not the basis for the defilements, but only Tfi acts as a basis for the noble path and the attain-
ment of the path. The *amalavijnana acts as a 'cause for the perdurance' (*pratistha-hetu) of the 
noble path, but does not act as a `cause for the generation' (janma-hetu) [of it].38
'The fundamental consciousness does not exert controlling power (HA
, vibhutva) over good 
and neutral [dharmas; A ?,p2 kugala, (kugalakugala) avyakrta].39
34 Tib. reads, " ... because it transforms by [means of] the path that takes Thusness as its objec-
tive support", de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam gyis bsgyur ba'i phyir ro. XZ: " ... because it is only 
possible for the basis to undergo revolutionary transformation on the basis of the noble path 
that takes Thusness as its objective support", p12,
35 There placement of "badness" (dausthulya) by "ease" (prafrabdhi) has been traced by SAKUMA 
  as the oldest layer of meaning of the notion of the revolutionary transformation of the basis 
afrayaparavrtti in YBh. See SAKUMA (1990), esp. 164-165; also SAKUMA (1991), 440-439.
36 Nothing corresponds to this phrase in Tib. or XZ, and it thus seems to be an interpolated gloss 
  on the part of P.
37 Tib. reads, "The alayavijn"ana is the cause of the activation (pravrttz) of the defilements, and yet 
  is not the cause of the activation (pravrtti) of the path," etc.; kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon 
  mongs pa rnams kyi jug pa'i rgyu dang lam gyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ma yin la ... XZ agrees: m[ ,tI 
® etc.
38 I follow HAKAMAYA in identifying these two types of cause: Tib. gnas pa'i rgyu, skyed pa'i rgyu re-
  spectively; HAKAMAYA bases himself upon AKBh; 78 n. 78. Note that Tib. clearly says that it is 
  because the revolutionary transformation of the basis (= P's *amalavijnana) is this kind of 
  cause that it acts as a cause for the path: gnas gyur pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu 
  ma yin pa dang/ lam du 'jug pa'i rgyu yin te/ gnas pa'i rgyu nyid yin pa dang/ skyed pa'i rgyu 
  nyid ma yin pa'i phyir ro. SAKUMA translates "die Ursache far sein Fortbestehen" and "die 
  Ursache fur seine Erzeugung" respectively; SAKUMA (1990) 2,159. See also SCHMITHAUSEN (1987) 
  2, 369 n. 570, who translates respectively "the cause which supports [ ... continuance]" and 
  "the cause which generates ... [for the first time]".
3s P seems to be missing a phrase here. Tib. reads, "The alayavijn"ana does not exercise control-
  ling power over good dharmas or dharmas unspecified [as good or bad, i.e. neutral dharmas],
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"When the fundamental consciousness is extinguished
, then things appear different4° That is to 
say, the causes of bad [dharmas] and defilements in future existences have been extinguished, 
and because these causes have been extinguished, the suffering of the five 'rampant skandhas' 
Hi>mrtri will therefore not arise again in future existences. In this present existence, the bad 
causes of all defilements are extinguished, and thus the aggregates of the ordinary worldling (. L 
    *prthagjanaskandha)42 are extinguished. [The practitioner obtains] controlling power 
(*vibhutva) [with regard to] the body of this [present existence] lit ' n 41-'43  [it] being therefore
whereas afrayaparavrtti does exert controlling power over all good dharmas and dharmas un-
specified," kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa'i chos rnams la dbang 
mi byed la/gnas gyur pa ni dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa'i chos thams cad la dbang byed pa'o. 
XZ agrees.
40 p7 > f a: , A-4tH3P.. There is nothing corresponding to this sentence in Tib. or XZ. 2H 
  also strikes me as somewhat colloquial. I therefore suspect that this might be a record of an 
  explanatory lecture comment (see n. 98).
41 The term wu shengyin ku HAPR is relatively rare. This is the only attestation of the term in 
  the extant P corpus. The term first ever appears in the North in Narendrayasas (under the 
  Sui), T397:13.262b25; prior to that is confined to the South.
42 The term fanfuyin is very rare in the canon (only five instances), and other than here, never 
  occurs in a translation text. Other instances are in Huisi M,® (515-577), Jingying Huiyuan, and 
  Zhanran. Tib. and XZ parallels (see below n. 47) do not discuss the skandhas in this context. 
  However, the skandhas are linked to asrayaparavrtti (for which P is consistently substituting
*amalavijnana throughout the present passage) in MSg, which was arguably the most impor-
tant of all Mahayana treatises for P. See RADICH §5.2.10, pp. 1159-1162. It is further notable that 
in MSg, the paravrtti ("revolutionary transformation") of each of the skandhas in turn is de-
scribed as leading to various special kinds of "controlling power" (vibhutva) proper to the Bud-
dhas. Voluntary control over lifespan is not included among these powers, but there may be a 
connection between P's incorporation of the skandhas here, MSg's similar connection of skand-
has to asrayaparavrtti, and the fact that P, uniquely among our versions of the text, also talks 
here about controlling power (vibhutva) over lifespan (see n. 43 following).
43 Ordinarily, zizai would be for Skt. vibhutva, and I have translated accordingly. The logic, 
  as I understand it, is that one who has attained liberation is understood to have power over his 
  own life and death, especially in the case of the Buddha; see LA VALLEE PoussiN, "Notes"
(1928-1929), 803, referring to AKBh to VII.34, VP V, 83; AK II.10a and Bh, VP I, 120-121. Fur-
ther, AKBh 2.10, VP I, 120-124 holds at length that the power of prolonging or abandoning life 
at will is one of the rddhipada; this later became part of the standard (expanded) list of ten 
"masteries" (vasitatva) of the bodhisattva
, EDGERTON S.V. vasita; DBh, RAHDER 70, so evain
kayajnanabhinirharaprapto vasavartr bhavati sarvasatvesu/ ayurvasitam ca pratilabhate 
`nabhilapyanabhilapyakalpayuhpramanadhisthanataya/ etc.; Mahavastu, `Ten powers are de-
dared by the Buddha ... to be the attributes of the Bodhisattvas..... power over his own life, 
and the power of intelligence ..." etc., JONES I, 234. We can thus perhaps understand that the
passage is claiming that the body becomes "like a magical creation" in the sense that it is en-
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like a magical creation  4FJT[; (nirmana).44 This is because [the practitioner] has abandoned all 
bad karmic consequences, and attained the cause and conditions of the *amalavijn"ana; [he] 
thereby attains controlling power over the life force (jrvita) of the present body, [whereby he] 
can extinguish the causes and conditions of the life force (jrvitapratyaya45) in the body, and can 
also sever [his] lifespan [so that it is] completely extinguished with no remainder 
(*nirupadhisesa). [By this same process,] all sensations (vedana) are rendered pure,46 and so 
forth, as a sutra explains in detail.47
tirely under the voluntary power of its possessor. In this connection, it is most likely significant 
that elsewhere in YBh itself (in the final chapter of BBh), voluntary power over lifespan is con-
nected precisely with asrayaparavrtti, for which P is here substituting *amalavijn`ana; see SA-
KUMA (1990) 2, 150-151; WOGIHARA 384; RADICH §5.2.6, pp. 1134-1135. 
Parallel texts say nothing about voluntary power over lifespan here. Tib. has only, 'The body 
that is like a magical creation continues to exist," sprul ba lta bu'i lus kun to gnas pa; and XZ 
similarly has "Although the body remains, it is like a magical creation" 4 0tRIN AVTE;. 
This would seem to be an interpretation of the passage closer to the notion of "Nirvana with re-
mainder" (sdpadhifesanirvanadhatu) than P's. It is thus remotely possible that P's text is 
intended to convey a similar meaning, in which case we could also read zizai, unusually, as 
meaning something like "the body [of the present existence] continues to exist under its own 
[momentum]".
44 In giving nirmana T follow CerriiM (1990) 2, 160 
45 Cf. the reference to jrvitapratyaya that appears immediately preceding this locus in XZ and Tib.
  parallels: p , sroggi rkyen. 
46 Note that this concern with sensation (vedana) is a component of YBh's doctrine of
asrayaparavrtti in portions of the text outside JDZL. For example, the text proposes that the 
"basis" that undergoes revolutionary transformation is to be identified with the six (internal) 
sense-bases (sadayatana); see such passages as T1579:30.839a25-b04, SAKUMA (1990) 2, 
206-208; SCHMITHAUSEN (1969), 43-53, 42, 43 = T1579:30.747c17-21; these passages analysed in 
RADICH §5.2.5, pp. 1130-1134. The problem here seems to be that sensation is ordinarily defiled, 
and yet it seems clear that arhats and Buddhas continue to function in the ordinary phenome-
nal world after their liberation: in what sense, then, can we say that they are liberated, when 
they continue to have (usually defiled) experience?
47 This entire paragraph departs in many details, but not in its gist, from parallels. Tib: "The char-
  acteristic of the abandonment (prahanalaksana) of the fundamental consciousness is this: im-
  mediately after (samanantaram) this abandonment, [there occurs a further] abandonment of 
  the twofold clinging (dvividhdpadana), and [only] the body, which is like a magical creation
(nirmandpamasya kayasya), continues to exist. Because the causes that bring about the regen-
eration (punarbhava) of defilements in future existences have been abandoned, attachments 
that [might] bring about regeneration [of existence itself] are [also] discarded; and because all 
causes of defilements in the present existence have [also] been abandoned, all 'badness'
(dau#hulya) of [= related to] defilements in the present existence is also abandoned; and only 































49「 一切行種煩惱攝」者、聚在阿羅耶識 中。得真如境智、増上行故、修習行故、 斷阿羅耶識、
即轉凡夫性捨凡夫法、 阿羅耶識滅。 此識滅故、 一切煩惱滅、 阿羅耶識對治故、 證阿摩羅
識。阿羅耶識是無常、是有漏法;阿 摩羅識是常、是無漏法。得真如境道故、證 阿摩羅識。阿
羅耶識為麁悪苦果之所追逐;阿 摩羅識無有一切麁惡苦 果。 阿羅耶識而是一切煩惱根本、不為
聖道而作根本;阿 摩羅識亦復不為煩惱根本、但為聖道得道得作根本。 阿摩羅識作聖道依因、
不作生因。 阿羅耶識於善無記不得 自在。 阿羅耶識滅時、 有異相貌、 謂來世煩惱不善因滅。
以 因滅故、 則於來世五盛 陰苦不復得生、 現在世中一切煩惱惡 因滅故。 則凡夫陰滅、 此身自
在 、即便如化、捨離一切麁悪果報、 得阿摩羅識之因緑故。此 身壽命便得 自在、 壽命 因緑能
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 *Amalavijn"ana is realised when alayavijnana is abandoned through the operation of its 
counteragents. The process whereby these counteragents operate is equivalent to inten-
sive and repeated cultivation on the part of the wisdom that takes Thusness (tathata) as 
its objective support (alambana); it is also spoken of as the attainment of the path that 
takes Thusness as its objective support. The abandonment and extinction of the 
alayavijnana amounts to a radical transformation in the being of the practitioner, which 
is identified as "revolutionary transformation [of the basis]" ([asraya-] paravrtti).50 The 
resultant state, in which *amalavijn"ana is realised, is diametrically opposed to the state 
of the ordinary worldling: it is free of defilements; it is also free of all the qualities 
(dharmah), the skandhas, and the very nature (xing it) of the worldling (prthagjana). In 
this state, all causes of future suffering have been brought to an end. By contrast to the 
ordinary states of consciousness grounded in alayavijnana, this state is permanent; free 
of "outflows" (anasrava); free of karmic conditioning (samskaras); free of "badness" 
(dausthulya); acts as a basis for the noble path; and exerts control over good and neutral 
dharmas.51 The state brought about by the realisation of *amalavijnana is also charac-
terised by power of control over the body and over lifespan.
   Comparison with the parallels in Chinese and Tibetan allow us to add, more cer-
tainly than on the basis of Paramartha's text alone, that *amalavijnana is clearly a func-
tional equivalent of asrayaparavrtti.52 This is confirmed by the fart that even in 
Paramartha's text, which does not specifically mention asrayaparavrtti, *amalavijnana 
is characterised as "free from `badness' (dausthulya)" — an old characterisation of 
asrayaparavrtti itself.53 It is also confirmed by the fact that quasi-commentarial para-
phrases in Paramartha's text highlight other ideas known to be connected to 
asrayaparavrtti doctrine in Yogacara lore, despite the fact that parallel texts do not men-
tion those ideas — the transformed relationship to the skandhas,S4 power over the body
50 However, in P, this paravrtti is not explicitly identified as of the afraya. 
51 Assuming the phrase that seems to be missing from P as noted above, n. 39; this contrast is ar-
  guably implied, in any case, by what does remain in P's text. 
52 Parallel texts have asrayaparavrtti where P has *amalavijn`ana throughout. It is clear, even
from this first passage, that P's "translation" practice was different from that of the Tib. transla-
tors and XZ, and included unmarked periphrastic glosses. This feature of P's method has al-
ready been very effectively described by FUNAYAMA (2005), 97-122. The substitution of 
*amalavijn'ana for asrayaparavrtti could be read as part of this practice.
53 See n. 35. 
54 See n. 42.
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and lifespan,
55 and the transformation of sensation (vedana).56
2.2.2 JDZL <2>
   JDZL next mentions *amalavijnana at the end of a discussion about the different 
kinds of seeds (brja) possessed by three different classes of persons — those still in 
bondage (bandhana), those on the path but requiring further training (saiksa), and 
those beyond further training (asaiksa).57 The end of this discussion notes that it has 
been based upon the fundamental consciousness that is "not established" (rnam par ma 
gzhag pa, *avyavasthita). The text then considers the alternative perspective, in which 
seeds are considered on the basis of the "established" (vyavasthita)58 fundamental con-
sciousness. The discussion in this latter connection is very brief, but Paramartha differs 
significantly from parallel texts. Tib. and XZ merely say:
"On the basis of the 'established' fundamental consciousness, in brief, it should be known that 
the seeds of all dharmas exist (yod) in/upon the basis of that [fundamental consciousnessS9], and 
they are to be known respectively as either seeds that have not yet been abandoned and seeds 
that ought not be abandoned [at all],60
   Thus, the discussion here is only phrased in terms of distinguishing between bad 
seeds and good seeds. One set needs to be abandoned but has not been yet, whereas 
the other set must be retained in order to attain to the liberated state.
Paramartha puts the same point this way:
55 See n. 43. 
56 See n. 46. 
57 T1584:30.1022a08-17, corresponding to D 15a1-15b1, T1579:30.584a15-b02. 
58 It is not entirely clear to me exactly what distinction the text is positing between these two
modes of considering the alayavijniana. One possibility is that it is thinking of a difference be-
tween the alayavijnana as it should be considered for most provisional purposes of discussion, 
and a truly definitive view. Another possibility, especially given the way P interprets, is that the 
pertinent difference is between the alayavijnana as it is "given" in the pre-liberation state, and 
alayavijnana when it is considered in a "distinctive" perspective that contrasts it with the state 
succeeding upon revolutionary transformation.
ss Tib. has only de la, 'in that", but XZ spells it out, saying rather that the seeds of all dharmas 
  are based upon or grounded in alayavijnana: fit 1+--eJJrHAws = gis ,.
so rnam par gzhag pa la ni mdor bsdu na de la chos thams cad kyi sa bon yod par rig par bya ste/ sa 
  bon de dag ni ma spangs pa dang/ spang bar bya ba ma yin pa'i chos de dag dang ci rigs su ldan 
  par rig par bya'o// XZ differs in no significant respect.
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"[In the perspective of] the established exposition [of the fundamental consciousness
, we would 
rather say]: All worldly  dharmas take the fundamental consciousness as their basis, whereas all 
transcendent dharmas *sarvadharmah lokdttarah) and dharmas of the path 
not to be abandoned (? ;,{ *aprahanryamargadharmah?) have *amalavijnana as their ba-
sis.,'
   In other words, Tib. and XZ's YBh merely distinguish between different types of 
seeds, and specifically locate them in one and the same alayavijnana: Paramartha, by 
contrast, speaks rather of two different types of vijnana, one the basis for worldly and 
defiled dharmas, and the other the basis of transcendent (lokOttara) dharmas. 
Paramartha substitutes this point for the original text's assertion that it is important to 
distinguish between the two types of seeds; and he inserts this distinction in a place that 
seems to be speaking of alayavijn"ana from a kind of "ultimate" or "definitive" 
(vyavasthana) perspective.
   This passage thus adds to our picture of *amalavijnana the detail that 
*amalavijnana is the separate basis for transcendent dharmas (lokottaradharmah), 
whereas worldly dharmas (laukikadharmah) are based on alayavijnana. Further, it is 
perhaps implied that *amalavijnana so defined is consciousness as it appears in the 
perspective of definitive tr,,,th.
2.2.3 JDZL <3>
   JDZL next mentions *amalavijnana in another discussion of "seeds" (brja).62 The 
basic question at issue is a possible contradiction between the claim that all seeds are 
universally pervaded by "badness" (dauythulya), and the claim that there is a class of 
"transcendent" qualities (loktittaradharmas) which lead to liberation. What seeds give 
rise to these lokOttaradharmas?63 The basic answer is that lokottaradharmas are pro-
duced from a different class of seeds, which are based upon (alambana) Thusness itself 
as their necessary condition, and thus circumvent entirely the order of "impregnated" 
(vasana) seeds and their attendant "badness". The text then explains the difference be-
61 Jagm', i 1 IDNUMMIV *o —~JJ i ~~~ ., , lr i ~71 P L~ s ,
T1584:30.1022a15-17. 
62 The passage as a whole runs T1584:30.1025c12-26, corresponding to XZ T1579:30.589a13-b02,
D28b3-29a3. Cf. SAKUMA (1990) 2, 161-165, particularly the passage SAKUMA numbers "(4)". For 
some reason that is unclear to me, S uui v1A here omits the JDZL parallel.
63 F: fit% L7 , T7 r1$ ? ; Tib.... de ltar na 'jig  rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams skye 
  ba'i sa bon gang yin/ de dag skye ba'i sa bon gyi dngos po .. .
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tween four classes of beings (those who have not attained  nirvana, ravakas, Pratyeka-
buddhas and Buddhas/Tathagatas) on the basis of the relationship in each between 
these seeds of lokottaradharmas based upon Thusness and the two "obstructions" 
(avarana). The text summarises the difference between the two orders of seeds thus 
(Fib. and XZ):
"It should be understood that the continuance (rjes su 'jug pa, *anuvrtta) of lokottaradharmas 
[once they have] arisen is due to the increased strength of  the revolutionary transformation  of
the basis (gnas gyur pa'i stobs bskyed pa las, *asrayaparavrttibalddhanat64). This [fundamental 
transformation of the basis] is the counteragent (gnyen po, pratipaksa,'antidote) to the funda-
mental consciousness (alayavijnana), is [itself] without fundament (kun gzhi ma yin pa, 
*analaya)
, is a realm/element without 'outflows' (zag pa med pa'i dbyings, anasravadhatu), and is 
free of conceptual elaboration (spros pa med pa, *nihprapaiica)."65
By comparison, Paramartha reads:
"The continuum Me
, *samtana) produced by the lokottaradharmas can only be established T1 
on the basis of the *amalavijniana, since Lk this continuum acts as the counteragent to the fun-
damental consciousness (alayavijnana); [this continuum is otherwise] itself without fundament 
(MIA, more literally 'without a place wherein it is established'), a realm/element without 'out-
flows' (anasravadhatu), with no deleterious function ,lq,STif , and free of all defilements (M[`ri, 
klesas) .i67
Once more, the contrast betweenalayavijnana and asrayaparavrtti is at stake, and
64 See SAKUMA (1990) 2, 165 and n. 872. I am grateful to OYrA[cr Susumu for help with this term. 
65 jig rten las 'das pa'i chos skyes pa rnams kyi rjes su jug pa ni gnas gyur pa'i stobs bskyed pa las
rig par bya ste/ de yang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i gnyen porgyur pa dang/ kun gzhi ma yin pa 
dang/ zag pa med pa'i dbyings dang/ spros pa med pa zhes bya'o// XZ agrees.
66 There is an obvious difficulty in P's text here. The parallel texts clearly make afrayaparavrtti 
  the subject of the following string of predicates. In P, however, it is difficult to construe the 
  equivalent *amalavijnana as the subject. It is most rather most natural to interpret these predi-
   cates as modifying "continuum" (xiangxu); but the resulting sense is puzzling, most 
   particularly because the text thus says that the continuum has "no fundament" ,1,1%117E, where 
  it has just said that it is "founded" T on *amalavijnana. The suspicion that the text is here 
  meant to say, with XZ and Tib, that *amalavijnana itself has no basis, etc., is strengthened by 
  the fact that it does assert that *amalavijnana is without basis below; see n. 96.
67 ffit&Pfilf1M. 'ARV tlfir1- fl, L111~#~ 1~7 a l~rl fzpo ~,l:.T l ,i:.7 
,i17, T ;, p k '[ , T1584:30.1025c23-26.
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as in  JDZL<1> above, *amalavijnana is substituted for asrayaparavrtti. New is the idea 
that the counteragent of alayavijffana is a continuum produced by transcendent 
dharmas (lokottaradharmah), and that this continuum is based upon *amalavijnana.
2.2.4 JDZL <4>
   Finally, JDZL mentions *amalavijn"ana once more within the context of another dis-
cussion of the groundless counteragent to the alayavijnana.68 Significantly, it is clear 
from all three versions that the original text is indeed discussing a category of pure con-
sciousness. 69 Although the term *amalavijnana only occurs once, it is necessary to take 
into account the fairly long passage that comprises the context in which the term is used 
to fully appreciate what is at stake.
   The passage first asks how "the wise" (mkhas pa, *pandita) [i.e. the Buddhas] can 
free themselves not only from the immediate passions of attachment and aversion, but 
even from the underlying latent bondage to the basic conditions of existence, which 
gives rise to karma and therefore to future existences.70 In answer, the text explains how
68 The passage in full runs from T1584:30.1030c21-1031a15, corresponding to XZ
  T1579:30.595b06-c06, D 43a6-44a4. See also on this passage Ui 6, 785; and HAKAMAYA 10-17. 
69 For this reason, Ur thought that this passage provided us with evidence that the term
*amalavijnana was originally found in Skt. YBh, and had been replaced by arayaparavrtti in 
the lineage that led to XZ's translations. HAKAMAYA discusses and refutes this interpretation. 
Against it, he reasonably proposes, on the basis of XZ and Tib, that the original text most likely 
had asrayaparavrtti; HAKAMAYA 10-12.
70 So we can understand the general thrust, at least, of a question which poses difficulties in all 
  the versions available to us. P: AI —kJJ'A, ek4 fp itAtt. ,,,.~G M0 
a tk, fR* iK o T7J U? ; XZ: Z' ,4 i^p t T5 T7 P7r# ii iK lT to 
  x$'F in~PfliAIN UM, -0g7i(M. PfrJ 8I ? ; Tib: gang gi phyir mkhas pa ni gzugs rnam 
  pa thams cad nas 'du byed kyi bar la sred pas bsdus pa'i 'dod chags kyis kun nas dkris pa spong ba 
  las bral bar 'gyur gyi bag la nyal las ni ma yin no// de'i mdud pa nyon mongs pa'i char gtogs pa 
  las kun nas slong bar byed pa dag kyang kun nas dkris pa kho na las spong bar 'gyur ro// Even 
  the usually consonant XZ and Tib versions seem to part company here — a sign, perhaps, that 
  the original text may itself have posed difficulties to its translators. The first four aggregates 
  (skandhas) are here conceived of as the basic conditions of future re-existence; these four, as a 
  group, are taken as the "basis" for a worldly and defiled consciousness, presumably under-
  stood as the fifth aggregate (vijn"ana); and the bondage of this defiled vijn"ana to the fourfold 
  condition of future re-existence comprised by the other skandhas is understood in terms of the 
  technical Abhidharmic category of "latent tendency" (anusaya). My interpretation is based 
  upon the following observations about the question itself and subsequent discussion in the 
  passage as a whole. (1) All three versions agree that it is the first four skandhas at issue (P: 
J5 T7Pf; XZ: Tib: gzugs rnam pa thams cad nas 'du byed kyi bar). These four
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full liberation of the wise differs from the state of the householder (grhin) or the monas-
tic (pravrajita) who is not liberated. Householders are bound to future re-existences by 
the twofold fetter of desire and aversion (malice, ill-will), in addition to acts by which 
they harm sentient beings.71 Unliberated monastics are bound to future re-existence by 
excessive attachment to precepts and rules, which they mistake for the truth.72
   These two conditions comprise the foil against which the attainment of full libera-
tion by "the wise" is explained. This is where *amalavijnana comes into play. XZ and 
Tib. explain as follows:
"By means of plentiful cultivation of the ['supreme' XZ only] counteragent
, these twofold desir-
ous latent tendencies (anusaya) are abandoned, and because of this abandonment, one is freed 
from taking the four skandhas [such as] objective form, sensation etc. as the objective support 
(alambana) because of defilement; the continuum is thereby eternally (gtan du, *nityam) sev-
ered. The cessation of consciousness attended by latent tendencies (anusaya) [brought about] 
by this severing of the continuum is not grounded (based, gnas, *asritya) upon the bases of con-
sciousnesses associated with form, sensation etc., because of the completely purified conscious-
skandhas are presumably the same set referred to later in the passage as "material form, sen-
sation etc." (P: XZ: Tib. gzugs dang tshor ba la sogs pa). (2) Tib. speaks clearly 
throughout of bondage to these skandhas in terms of anusaya (bag la nyal); XZ agrees in plac-
es (.f/ lf, 595b15; Ifi , 595b17). (3) It is clear later in the passage that these four 
skandhas, as a set, are understood as a "basis" (P: [®]Q  ; XZ: 1 , Tl; Tib. gnas 
pa = *asraya, *sthana etc.). (XZ also speaks unusually of the fourfold set as a fourfold embodi-
ment IN ', 595b07, b13; for skandhas as "bodies" in earlier Chinese tradition, see RADICH n. 
1617, and more generally §4.3.6 and p. 556 ff.)
71 di ltar khyim pa'i phyogs la brten pa dag ni brnab sems dang/ gnod sems kyi mdud pa dag gis yul 
  la rjes su 'dzin pa'i rgyu las byung ba dang/ sems can la gnod pa byed pa'i rgyu las byung ba'i las 
  kun nas slong bar byed do//
72 rab tu byung ba'i phyogs la brten pa dag ni tshul khrims dang/ brtul zhugs mchog tu 'dzin pa 
  dang/ 'di bden no snyam du mngon par zhen pa mchog tu 'dzin pa'i mdud pa dag gis las kun nas 
  slong bar byed do// The text goes on to specify the ways that such attachment to rules and pre-
  cepts functions as an analogy to the cruder twofold defilements of the householder, inasmuch 
  as excessive valuation of the rules is functionally analogous to desire, and the corresponding 
  disregard (apavada, `degradation, deprecation") of nirvana is functionally analogous to aver-
  sion. Both of these errors are said (in Tib.) to be mere mental constructs (yid kyis rnam par 
  rtogs pa) and therefore to function, as their householder analogues do, to bring about further 
  karmically conditioned existence. (XZ here says somewhat cryptically that only the attachment 
  to the fourfold "embodiment" comprising the first four skandhas remains, because it is a prod-
  uct of imaginative construction belonging to the manobhumip® 'fiA a ft i)J411p1"t..)
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ness (rnam bar  sizes ba rnam bar da2 ba) that comurises the counteraeent (bratibaksaof that
[basis]. Thus, this [transformation] is known as 'the complete pacification (upasanti) of the 
cause of the basis'. Because of the cessation of the cause, there will in future never occur any 
[initial] apprehension or `[coming to] fulfilment' (yongs su rdzogs pa, *paripurna) of a body, nor 
any activation (jug pa, *vrtta) of a continuum; thus is it called 'the complete pacification of the 
basis'.
"That nurified consciousness (rnam bar sizes ba rnam bar dap' ba) which is attained as 'the coun-
teragent of that [basis]' is [itself] said not to be a basis (gnas pa ma yin pa, *anasraya?).73 From 
it as cause, therefore, it is not possible [for further re-existence] to develop (mngon par rgyas 
pa).74 Because of the intensive cultivation (bhavana) of the `Liberation Gate (vimoksamukha)75 of 
Emptiness (sunyata)', [this state] is deemed to be 'unconditioned' (*asamskara, 
*anabhisamskara).76 Because of the intensive cultivation of the 'Liberation Gate of No Desire 
(smon pa med pa, *apranihita)', it is deemed to be 'completely satisfied' (samtusta). Because of 
the intensive cultivation of the `Liberation Gate of No Marks (mtshan ma med pa, *animitta)', it 
is a 'basis' (gnas pa).77 Thus, for the reasons given, from 'there being no further development [of 
future re-existence]' to 'its being a basis', it is liberation (rnam par grol ba, vimoksa).s78
73 HAKAMAYA has suggested the following Skt, reconstruction of this sentence, thebasis vii~cuaSiS pi tita-
rily of XZ and Tib: *tat pratipaksdptam yad visuddharn vijnanam tad apratisthitam ity ucyate, 
HAKAMAYA 12. The reconstruction apratisthitam seems to me to be closest to XZ's 'r?P7T(, but 
Tib, which I am trying to follow first in my translation here, seems rather to say "is not a basis" 
(gnas pa ma yin pa) rather than "does not have a basis" (*gnas pa med pa).
74 de yang rgyu las mngon par rgyas par mi gyur ba yin no// This sentence on its own strikes me 
  as somewhat cryptic, and I am interpreting partly on the basis of parallels (XZ: ~  P: T g 
       and partly on the basis of the overall sense of the passage.
75 The three "liberation gates" (trni vimoksamukhanz) named here are common, and also known 
  under the name of the "three absorptions" (samadhitraya etc.), i.e.. anyatasamadhi, 
apranihitah samadhih, animittah samadhih. They appear elsewhere in YBh under this title, for 
  which see YOKOYAMA s.v. the name of each respectively.
76 Parallels here lead me to take Tib. 'dus ma as *anabhisamskara, more usually mngon par 'du 
  byed pa med pa.
77 Note that this is of course in direct contradiction to the statement with which the paragraph be-
  gins. The purified consciousness qua counteragent of the ordinary defiled basis, it seems, is a 
  kind of paradoxical "basis that is not a basis", or a "groundless ground".
78 de'i 'og to gnyen po shas cher bsten pas 'dod chags dang mdud pa de gnyis kyi bag la nyal spong 
  bar gyur te/ de spangs pa'i phyir nyon mongs pa gang gis gzugs dang tshor ba la sogs pa la dmigs 
  par byed pa'i dmigs pa de gtan du bral bas rgyun 'chad par 'gyur ro// de rgyun chad pas bag la 
  nyal dang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa 'gags pa de gzugs dang tshor ba la sogs pa rnam par shes pa 








basisnolonger[find]abasis(諸識 有 惑 於 四 住 處 則 不 復 住).Becausetheseconsciousnessesthat















grolbayinno//從此 以 後 、 由 多 修 習 勝 對 治 故 、 復 能 永 斷 貪 愛 身 繋 二 種 隨 眠 。 由 此 斷 故 、 煩
惱 所 緑 色 受 等 境 亦 不 相 續 、 以 究 竟 離 繋 故 、 由 此 所 緑 不 相 續 故 。 有 隨 眠 識 究 竟 寂 滅 、 於 色 受
等 諸 識 住 中 不 復 安 住 、 由 對 治 識 永 清 淨 故 。 是 名 「識 住 因 緑 寂 止 」。 又 由 當 來 、 因 緑 滅 故 、 於
内 身 分 不 取 不 滿 、 決 定 無 有 流 轉 相 續 。 是 名 「識 住 寂 止 」。 又 復 對 治 所 攝 淨 識 名 「無 所 住 」。
由 彼 因 緑 故 、 名 「不 生 長 」。 由 善 修 習 空 解 睨 門 故 、 名 「無 所 為 」。 由 善 修 習 無 願 解 睨 門 故 、












selfandother,and(11)sarnsaracomprisinggoodandbadrebirthdestinies身識 、 身 者 識 、 受





continuityofthe“conUnuum”3aη海 豌 αη吻 ガofthesentientbeingthroughallits晩timesor
incarnadons;世識 謂 生 死 相 續 不 斷 識,T1595:31.181c12;為明 厭 生 果 報 無 始 以 來 三 世 生 死 相 續








phenomenalthings”詈 分 別 識,acategoryalsoderivingfromthesameLAScontexts),i.e.(2)
theembodiedsubject;and(3)sense[organ];「顯 識 」 者 有 九 種:一 身 識 、 二 塵 識 、 三 用 識 、
四 世 識 、 五 器 識 、 六 數 識 、 七 四 種 言 読 識 、 八 自 他 異 識 、 九 善 惡 生 死 識 。 其 次 「分 別 識 」 有
二 種:一 有 身 者 識 、 二 受 者 識,T1618:31.878c27-879aO2.Inotherwords,itseemsthatforXSL,




































nomenalthings觀 行 於 塵,doesnothaveanyattachmentsto[notionsof]`1'and`mine'(ahamiti,
mam黎i,atm¢tmrya,etc.),andthus,evenwhenvisibleform(raga),etc.[i.e.phenomenaldhar-
mas]aredestroyedandpassoutofexistence滅壞,theminddoesnot[feel】anyhunger渇愛
[f6rthem;formoreofthesame).Intheserespects此諸 相,一 清 淨.





80此 諸煩惱對治滅故、 欲取色等以為境者即得永滅。 以此滅故、 諸識有惑於四住處則不復住。
諸對治識實清淨故、 如是得知、 住處寂静。 以縁滅故 、於未來世當生具足應得相續、不復更
生。 是名 「有縁住靜」。 阿摩羅識對治世識甚深清淨、読名 「不住」。復 次此識不為縁生。 空
解脱門善修習故、 不 能生業。 無願解脱門善修習故、 則能知足。 無相解脱門善修習故、 住於
不動。如前 四義、得正解脱,T1584:30.1030c27―1031aO7.
81ThissentencesaysthepolaroppositeofXZandTib:又由 彼 識 永 清 淨 故 、 不 待 餘 因 、 任 運 自 然



















 vedana)83 to its shadow (chaya),' then at this time, neither exists [any longer]; [for] where the 
tree no longer exists, so, too, its shadow no longer exists A SC,?q, ft,106..85 Because the tem-
poral mind (ifl s, *laukikacitta)86 has been extinguished iA, [this state] is called 'complete ces-
sation' MA' in the here and now [1A; drste dharme/ihaiva]. With reference to #Sz; the gradual OX 
kramena) liberation of undefiled mind (mind `without outflows', ,1,1!,N,b, anasravacitta) in 
which residual practice is necessary (I ...1$ , *saiksavinirmukti), [this state] is said to have 
been 'made peaceful' (1—MFV, *santa).88 With reference to liberation in which no further 
practice is necessary („T, °~° , *asaiksavinirmuktz)89 it is said to have been 'purified' W i 7 .90
83 The mention of the cessation of vedana in close proximity to talk of liberation "in the here-and-
now", "becoming cool", etc., also recalls to mind the classic formula "all that is sensed right 
here, being not rejoiced in, will become cold", idheva ... sabbavedayitani anabhinanditani 
srtrbhavissanti, as e.g. at Itivuttaka 44, WINDISCH 38; MASEFIELD 35. Thus, we see, running in 
order through the passage: "does not rejoice in" (Tib. only, mngon par dga' ba med pa, cf. P. 
anabhinanditani) [life and death]; "in the here and now" (cf. P. idheva); the cessation of the 
sensations (vedana, cf. P. sabbavedayitani); and the notion of coolness (srta etc., cf. P. srtr 
bhavissanti). In its locus classicus in It 44, this formula is associated with the distinction be-
tween nirupadhisesanirvanadhatu and sopadhisesanirvanadhatu, "Nirvana with/without a re-
mainder of attachment", and it likely that this distinction is in the back of the YBh author's 
("Asanga's") mind here, too, given that (1) the text lays out a gradated schema of several types 
of liberation; and (2) it is discussing liberation as a process whereby consciousness frees itself 
from grasping at (other) skandhas, where nir/sa-upadhi was often interpreted precise as hav-
ing/not having (a remnant of) grasping at skandhas = upadanaskandha.
84 I suspect here a nirukti (etymological gloss) in the original text, playing on the homophony be-
  tween chaya "shadow" and chanda "desire" (or some cognate thereof).
85 Obviously, strictly speaking,'#k,'r:,WAtti,:;,q means "therefore there is no tree; therefore 
  there is no shadow." However, to say that the tree and shadow no longer exist because both 
   [tree and shadow] no longer exist is tautological nonsense, and I suspect a better interpreta-
  tion of this phrase is to see in it a clumsy "translationese" equivalent of a Sanskrit yavad .. . 
   tavad construction, or something analogous.
86 Cf. "temporal consciousness" MR in the preceding paragraph of this same passage, JDZL<4>, 
  and n. 79 above. Comparison with XZ and Tib. strongly suggests that the Skt. had here 
sasravacitta/sasravavijnlana, consciousness/mind with outflows".
87 This epithet should correspond to P. nibbuto, Skt. nirvrta/nivrta, in the underlying DN 33 for-
  mula (see n. 82).
88 This epithet has no equivalent in the DN 33 formula (see n. 82). 
89 The strange word order kV).C0gt14-avl would literally lead to a translation
like "with reference to the liberation of the mind without outflows, in which no further practice 
is necessary, it is gradually said to be ..." This makes little sense to me, and I suspect we are 
looking at an artefact of awkward and somewhat literal translation. I have therefore in part 
following the Iead of the parallels in translating here. I do not know what to make of 9U.









92觀 行 於 塵 、 於 我 我 所 無 所 取 著 、 是 故 、 色 等 諸 塵 滅 壞 、 心 無 渇 愛 。 如 此 諸 相 、 心 極 清 淨 。 識
清 淨 故 、 不 自 滅 壊 、 亦 復 不 為 他 緑 所 滅 。 無 相 續 故 、 於 十 方 處 不 更 入 生 、 於 命 於 死 無 貪 欲 。
故 詭 「無 求 欲 」。 心 譬 如 樹 、 受 喩 如 影 、 於 時 二 無 、 是 故 無 樹 、 是 故 無 影 。 世 心 滅 故 、 諡 「現












thatthat[consciousness]hasbeenpurifiedinitsveryessence(自體 已 得 清 淨,Tib.`isanes―
Bencethatispure[-ified]',rnampardagpa'ibdagnyiddusnangngo).Moreover,becausethis
consciousnesshasbeenpermanentlypurified(又由 彼 識 永 清 淨 故,Tib.becauseofthepurity
ofthisconsciousnessrnamarshesddenirnam穩daanidk歪h29う,ltenterssponta―









s龝ravam[vijn`anam,XZIonceandforallinthehereandnow(於 現 法 中,tshe'dila,ヰ4衂θ
dharme/ihaiva),itiscalled`cessadon,(寂滅,myanganl¢s'daspa,nirodha).Thegradua1,step―
wise(隨 其 次 第,ra'mgyis,kra〃aena)liberationofundefiledconsciousnesses(consciousnesses
without`outflow,諸 無 漏 言哉zaamedaaninaadanasravarn[vi.'n`an¢m]



























因 緑 、 色 等 壞 時 亦 不 恐 怖 。 由 此 相 貌 、 顯 彼 自體 已 得 清 淨 。 又 由 彼 識 永 清 淨 故 、 不 待 餘 因 、
任 運 自然 入 於 寂 滅 。 此 識 相 續 究 竟 斷 故 、 於 十 方 界 不 復 流 轉 。 於 命 及 死 不 希 求 故 、 名 「永 離
欲J。 又 所 有 受 是 識 樹 影 、 彼 於 爾 時 不 復 有 故 、 名 「永 離 影 」。 諸 有 漏 識 於 現 法 中 畢 竟 滅 盡
故 、 名 「寂 滅 」。 諸 無 漏 識 隨 其 次 第 有 學 解 脱 、 名 「為 寂 靜 」。 無 學 解 蛻 、 名 日 「清 涼 」。 餘 依
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is explicitly said to be the counteragent of defiled consciousness.95 (2) *Amalavijnana 
qua the counteragent is overtly said itself not to have (or be) a basis.96 (3) The passage 
makes explicit an association between the "consciousness" in question and the 
vijnanaskandha, and thus seems to clarify somewhat the connections between 
*amalavijnana and the cessation of the skandhas already touched on in earlier passag-
es.
   The final paragraph is especially important, even though it does not overtly men-
tion *amalavijnana.
   Most strikingly, Paramartha says the polar opposite to parallel texts.97 In XZ and 
Tib, the pure consciousness does not have to depend upon any other causes in order to 
cease, but rather enters into cessation of its own accord. At the moment of liberation, con-
sciousness ceases to "exist", and liberation consists in this cessation. In Paramartha, 
pure consciousness "does not pass out of existence of its own accord, nor is it destroyed 
by other conditions [external to it]." In other words, the liberated, purified conscious-
ness — *amalavijnana — is permanent, as we already saw at JDZL<1>. However, it is 
difficult to be sure what to make of this reversal in meaning. Given the sometimes 
slightly garbled state of the remainder of the text, which apparently betrays problems in 
translation, the reversal may result from simple error. This impression might be rein-
forced by the fact that even Paramartha goes on immediately to say, " ... there is no 
longer any continuum (samtana/samtati)." (At least so long as "continuum" refers to 
consciousness, this would appear to be in direct contradiction to the assertion that puri-
fied consciousness "does not pass out of existence".) However, Paramartha's text no-
where else really departs from the gist of the original as seen through parallel texts. 
Why, then, only at such a crucial juncture? This divergence from the underlying text 
thus may be deliberate, and for this reason, a significant component of Paramartha's
95 I.e. rather than (as at JDZL<1>) that which is realised through the operation of the
counteragent(s), or (as at JDZL<3>) the basis for a counteragent otherwise identified (e.g. as a 
continuum produced by the lok6ttaradharmas).
96 Recall that in JDZL<3> above, the text was unclear, but seemed to say that the continuum 
  based upon *amalavijnana, rather than *amalavijnana itself, was without a basis — in direct 
  contradiction both of its own statement that the continuum does have a basis, and also of 
  parallel versions of the text. These textual problems might have led us to expect that JDZL is 
  there, too, like XZ and Tib, meant to say that *amalavijnana is without a basis, but the present 
  passage is thus the first place where JDZL has unambiguously made that statement.
97 See n. 81.
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doctrine of  *amalavijnana  — one that sounds rather close to "eternalism" (sasvatadrsti, 
nityadrsxi) .
   In this final paragraph (in parallels as well as Paramartha), the passage also explic-
itly connects the liberating realisation of pure consciousness to anasravavijnana/ 
anasravacitta, which was a dominant theme in the AKBh amalavijnana passage. This 
may show that there is indeed a conceptual link between the AKBh passage and 
Paramartha's use of *amalavijnana.
   Finally, this last paragraph reinforces the idea that the purified consciousness is the 
vijnanaskandha. Liberation is the process whereby that consciousness is freed from at-
tachment to the other four skandhas (aggregates). Here we hear echoes of a very old 
model, in which consciousness is the apparent subject of both transmigration and libera-
tion. I take this model to be extremely pertinent to the doctrine of *amalavijnana. We 
will return to this point below.
2.3 Shiba kong lun
   The Shiba kong lun -F-A a (T1616, hereafter SKBL), or "Treatise on Eighteen 
[Modes ofl Emptiness", is a text of a type that has been referred to as a "lecture text"?' 
SBKL is clearly based upon two sections of the Madhyantavibhaga (MAY), from Chap-
ters 1 and 3 respectively. It intersperses apparent citations from or paraphrases of that 
text with comment and expansion.99 Beyond its discussion of *amalavijnana, the text is 
of great interest because it makes use of a number of apparently Chinese categories!'" 
Since Paramartha separately translated the "root text", MAV (r4 5IJ , T1599), for at 
least one of the instances of *amalavijnana, we are in the unusual position of being able 
to see how Paramartha himself alternately interpreted the passage into which he inserts
98 Following FUNAYAMA (2002). This denomination identifies texts that are thought to result from
P's explanations to his team of Chinese collaborators about the texts he translated, given as 
they translated; there are reasons to think that some of these expositions were written down, 
and have come down to us among the P corpus.
99 For details, see Ui 6, 131-204 ('Juhachi ku ron no kenkyu -I-/tspFtiai iJf 5,,"), esp. 175-204. Ui ar-
  gues persuasively that the current text is a fragmentary remnant of some longer original, and 
  that the title, which is clearly based upon the first portion only (corresponding to MAV Ch. 1) 
  was also applied to the text later.
100 See, for instance, such categories as li and shi a*, T1616:31.863b05; or the use of the term 
  ziran nin the discussion of the ninth mode of emptiness (emptiness of "[salvation] unto the 
  final limit" MA-9c., atyanta-funyata), T1616:31.861c12-17; etc. I have in preparation a full anno-
  tated translation and study of SBKL, in which I intend to explore these dynamics in detail.
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the term. We are also fortunate to have a sub-commentary (taka) on Vasubandhu's MAV 
Bhasya by Paramartha's close contemporary Sthiramati.101 The term *amalavijn"ana ap-
pears twice in SBKL.
2.3.1 SBKL <1>
*Amalavijnana first appears in SBKL corresponding to comment upon MAV 1.21-22. 
The text is discussing the category of prabheda-sunyata, "emptiness differentiated" [i.e. 
into different aspects or characteristics], before moving on to pindartha-sunyata, "empti-
ness in general", i.e. a general summation of things that can be said of all the modes of 
emptiness collectively. In MAV, this corresponds to a section in which emptiness is 
"proven" as a doctrinal tenet.102 SBKL reads:
"Here begins part four
,103 proofs (31, *sadhana?) that emptiness is differentiated. There are 
three.
"(1) [The proof that emptiness can be differentiated according to its] purity and impurity. (i) If 
we were to say that emptiness (sunyata) were absolutely impure, then it would be impossible 
for all sentient beings to attain liberation, because, [emptiness] being absolutely impure, it could 
not be made pure. (ii) [On the other hand,] if we were to say that [emptiness] is absolutely pure, 
then there would be no point in cultivating the path (*margabhavana),104 because even before 
one had attained liberation at [the stage of] the path without taints, emptiness would already be 
aboriginally and innately . pure of its very substance .1°5 There would therefore be no
101 Obviously, Sthiramati (Sth) never went to China, and so there can be no question of any Chi-
nese influence on his thought. The detailed comparison of P's and Sth's ideas, from the point of 
view of the implications for supposed sinification in P, is an important avenue for future re-
search.
102 Corresponding to MAV and Bh 1.21, NAGAO 26, P T1599:31.463a21 ff. 
103 The fact that the text here announces a "part four" is one of the grounds upon which UT argues
  that our present text is incomplete. 
104 At roughly this same juncture, Sth, too, speaks of "meditative development of the path"
   (margabhavana); YAMAGUCHI 1, 59, STANLEY 77. 
los P's exposition only loosely follows his MAV model. He reverses the order of the two proposi-
tions comprising the proof (numbered i and ii respectively above and in the following, in order 
to facilitate comparison): "(ii) If it [emptiness] were not defiled, then all embodied beings 
would be liberated [already]/ (i) If it were not pure, then effort [towards salvation] would be 
fruitless;" sarnklista ced bhaven nasau 1,1 muktah syuh sarvva-dehinah/ vifuddha ced bhaven nd-
sau 1,1 vyayamo nisphalo bhavet. He also paraphrases the basic idea of these two propositions 
quite loosely and expansively, especially (ii).
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defilements to obstruct wisdom, nor anything that could extirpate [them], and all sentient be-
ings would automatically attain liberation without relying on  effort;'°6 [however,] it is evident 
that sentient beings do not [in fact] attain liberation without effort, and thus, emptiness is not ab-
solutely pure. On the other hand, it is also the case that liberation is [in fact] attained by dint of 
effort, and thus we know that emptiness is not absolutely impure.107 This is the proof of purity-
cum-impurity and impurity-cum-purity X r7 - 1 ] .b08
"Additional comment: If we say that the principle (li 3) of emptiness is absolutely impure
, then 
all efforts would be inefficacious w,*c, because the essential nature ( 'hi, *svabhava) of the 
element of emptiness MW, *sanyatadhatu) itself would be impure; and therefore, even when 
the path had arisen I, one would remain incorrigibly worldly/profane '(-7- A714, so that the 
path would be useless. Because it is not thus ,!,kt #St, we know that emptiness is not impure by 
nature.
"Question: If this is the case
, then given that there is no impurity by essential nature p itT,- jT-, 
there should also be no purity by essential nature [i• How can it be ascertained nl$IJ that 
the dharma-realm (MY,* dharmadhau) is neither pure nor impure?
"Answer: *Amalavijn"ana is the aboriginally pure [Skt. 'luminous] mind (II it ift ,LN, Prakrtipra-
106 According to the sequence of the text, this should correspond to MAV: "If dharmas were not
defiled by adventitious defilements when the counteragent [of defilement] had not yet arisen, 
then because there was no defilement, all sentient beings would be liberated even without ef-
fort;" yadi dharmmanam sanyata agantukair upaklesair anutpanne pi pratipakse na samklista 
bhavet 1,J samklesabhavad ayatnata eva muktah sarvva-satva bhaveyuh. P would correspond 
quite closely to this if it read„:;,M, liEW.V... klOTTzJ1j7—vJuat 44-14 . As the 
text stands, however, it seems that the logical relation among the various clauses is quite dif-
ferent to Skt.
107 MAV here reads: "On the other hand, if [emptiness] were not pure even when the countera-
  gent had arisen, then efforts for the purpose of liberation would be fruitless;” athotpanne 'pi 
  pratipakse na vifuddha bhavet moksartham arambho nisphalo bhavet.
los It seems that this sentence corresponds to MAV 1.22ab, "It [viz. emptiness] is neither defiled 
  nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure;" na klista napi vaklista suddha 'fuddha na cdive so. y 
  Ti i4if- could be read as a (somewhat muddy) attempt to convey the idea of being "neither 





























111此 下第四、 分別空道理。有三:一 、淨不淨。 若言空定是不淨、則一切厭生不得解脱。 何以
故?以 定不淨、 不可令淨故也。 若言定是淨、 則修道無用。何 以故?未 得解睨無漏道時、 空
體 本已 自然清淨故、 則無煩惱為能障智慧、 又能除、 則不依功力、 一切厭生 自得解脱。 現見
離功力厭生不得解脱、 知此空非是定淨。 復由功用 而得解脱、 故知此 空非定不淨。 是名 「淨
不淨、不 淨淨」 道理也。 又釋:若 言空理定是不淨、 一切功力則無果報。何 以故?以 空界 自
性是不 淨、 雖復 生道、俗不可除、道則無用。無此 義故、 故知此空非性不淨。 問:若 爾、 既
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   The passage translated here comprises only part of a longer section. In the se-
quence, it becomes clear from the wording of the argument that, as above, emptiness is 
being identified with the dharmadhatu (cf. the unusual use of *fanyatadhatu above, 
probably as a kind of intermediate term to this identification) 114 and with Thusness.l'S 
All three are therefore implicitly also identified with *amalavijn"ana qua the "innate pu-
rity/luminosity of mind" (prakrtiprabhasvaracitta). The identification of more than one 
of these terms as the topic or locus of absolute purity thus implies an identification of 
the truest pure substance of mind with the truest substance of all things.
2.3.2 SBKL <2>
   Strictly speaking, the second passage in SBKL may not in fact mention 
*amalavijnana
, but rather a "pure/luminous consciousness" (-L', prabhasvaracitta), 
which is then qualified as *amala. The passage in question corresponds to MAV 3.14 
and Bh. MAV Ch. 3 treats various kinds of reality (tattva, also 'truth", "real" etc.). The 
ninth category under which it does so is prabheda-tattva, or "reality as it is differentiat
ed".116 This category in turn is divided into seven different aspects under which reality 
may be known, approached or apprehended!' The third of these aspects is "the reality 
of representation only" (vijnaptitattva),118 which refers to the fact that in reality, all dhar-
  China, especially in Huayan contexts. 
114 863b24, b27 etc. 
115 These sections are not matched by anything in MAV. As it has for emptiness, the text ex-
pounds purity and impurity for the dharmadhatu, 863b22-c05; and Thusness (tathata), 
863c05-c24 (note in this connection that Sth also brings in Thusness in his exposition of the 
passage in MAVT: tathatayam agantukair malaih sarnklis;atabhyupagantavyeti etc., YAMAGUCHI 1, 
59.22-60.1). In each case, the basic proposition that the topic is "pure-impure" is expounded in 
different ways: in the case of the dharmadhatu, that it is "pure in some respects, and pure in 
others" TAil-f; in the case of Thusness, that it is "both pure and impure" i T i . The im-
plicit identification effected by this argument between emptiness, the dharmadhatu, and Thus-
ness is important; that *amalavijnana is also identified with the pure substance or essence of 
emptiness implies a further identification between *amalavijniana and all three of these in-
stances. The use of n11i9- to describe the dharmadhatu, e.g. 863b28-29, echoes the predica-
tion of n'I'im i4 of mind/ * amalavijnana.
116 Note the parallel with the treatment of "emptiness differentiated" in SBKL<1> above. 
117 These seven types of tattva are also found in other early Yogacara texts in addition to MAV,
including SdhN, as Sth's MAVT notes; see SdhN 8.20.2, LAMOTTE (1935) 99, 219; and MSA 
19.44 and Bh, LEvi (1907, 1911) 1, 167-168; 2, 275; JAMPSty. et al., 304.
118 I here provide the equivalent found in MAV (where the orthography is in fact — tatva), which 
  is certainly the more relevant here, in that MAV is the text upon which SBKL is based. Note, 





















121ThisshouldrefertoVasubandhu'sy伽∫a'伽,whichPtranslatedasthe大乘 唯 識 論,T1589.






nirvan稈himukhahsamyakbodhah.samyagititattvena;P㎜HAN328.11,VP4,122;「封 正 觀 」
者 、 此 句 何 義?趣 向 正 覺 為 義 。 云 何 此 唯 無 流 、 非 有 流?由 此 趣 向 於 涅 槃 、 緑 真 實 境 起 、 故
名 「正 」.PthenaddsacommentthatisnotparalleledinSkt:“ltiscalledbodhi(awakening)
because[one]comestoknowwhatwasnotknownbefore,andbecauseonepenetratestothe




















less(阿 摩 羅,★smala).pure/luminousmind(清淨 心,「 伽 肋as掘 ππ∫吻).”125
however,thatthetranslationofprayogaandevenprayogam穩gais,oncemoretypicallyforP,
variableevenwithinthischapter;themoreregulartranslationofprayogathroughoutthechap-
terisjiaxing加 行.)ThismaybecomparedtoP,sBhtoMSg3.3:一切 法 、 謂 有 為 無 為 、 有 流 無
流 、 及 四 界 、 三 乘 道 果 等 。 如 此 等 法 、 實 唯 有 識 。 何 以 故?一 切 法 以 識 為 相 、 真 如 為 體 故 。
若 方 便 道 、 以 識 為 相 。 若 入 見 道 、 以 真 如 為 體,T1595:31.200a19―22.Here,too,thecontrastis
















125第 三 、 明 唯 識 真 實:辨 一 切 諸 法 、 唯 有 淨 識 、 無 有 能 疑 、 亦 無 所 疑 。 廣 釋 如 唯 識 論 。 但 唯 識
義 有 兩:一 者 、 方 便 、 謂 先 觀 唯 有 阿 梨 耶 識 、 無 餘 境 界 、 現 得 境 智 兩 空 、 除 妄 識 已 盡 、 名 為
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 This passage is the first time we have seen *amalavijnana associated with the doc-
trine that there is representation only. In Sanskrit, there is a distinction, however tricky, 
between "representation(s) (vijnapti) and "consciousness" (vijnana). However, in this 
Chinese there is none — both are shi p. It seems clear that the present passage plays 
on this polysemy, and is predicated on thinking in Chinese: there is only shi, and that is 
of two kinds, alayavijnana (at the intermediate stage of practice) and *amalavijnana (at 
the stage of insight). This exposition situates *amalavijnana in relation to an interpreta-
tion of vijnaptimatra/weishi typical of the Paramartha corpus (see e.g. ZSL below), here 
articulated in terms of the distinction between fangbian weishi and zhengguan weishi. As 
opposed to a halfway-house understanding of vijn"aptimatra that hypostasises 
alayavijnana and imagines it to be all there is,126 *amylavijnana is associated with an ul-
timate understanding in which alayavijnana is gotten rid of altogether (as above; e.g. in 
JDZL<1> and <3>, where *amalavijnana is associated in various ways with its countera-
gents). This final perspective is also associated with a non-dualism that transcends the 
subject-object dichotomy (here, of subject and object of ignorance). Finally, it is also 
worth noting that the overall context of this passage associates *amalavijn"ana with real-
ity or Thusness (tattva, tathata), thus rendering direct a link that was only indirect in 
SKBL<1> above, where it was made via emptiness as middle term.
2.4 Zhuanshi lun (ZSL) 
   The Zhuanshi lun (SCI pt3, *Pravrttivijnana sastra?127 T1587, hereafter ZSL) corn-
is "perfected in [the sense of] being free of erroneous inversion" (aviparyasaparinispattya); 
YAMAGUCHI 1 135.9, STANLEY 179.
126 An interpretation which incidentally corresponds quite accurately to characterisations of 
Vijnaptimatra thought as "idealist", frequently found in the secondary literature; a 
Vijnaptimatra response to charges of "idealism" might thus be that the term only characterises 
  an imperfect or incomplete Vijnaptimatra.
127 The title of this text poses interesting problems. The term zhuanshi NA does not actually ap-
  pear anywhere in ZSL except the title; the vijn'anaparircama that is the topic of the text is rather 
  called (more logically) shizhuan a. Aside from this, zhuanshi only appears in two places in 
  P's extant corpus: once in the possibly problematic Yijiao jing lun, T1529:26.285c13-14; and 
  once in a passage in MSg and Bh, where it is part of a verb-object construction meaning "to 
  transform the aggregate of consciousness", NAKMAR, Tib. rnam par shes pa'i phung po [gnas 
  su] gyur pa'i phyir (*vijn"anaskandhasraye paravrtti[-tvat]?); T1593:31.130a22, 
  T1595:31.253b27-28, LAMOTTE (1973) 1, 86. 
  On the other hand, although it is elsewhere also quite rare, the term zhuanshi does appear in 
  the following series of texts. Beginning with Gunabhadra, all three Ch. versions of LAS use the 
  term for pravrttivijnana, Pravrtti or vrtti, Tib. 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa etc. (443 C.E.): in 
Gunabhadra, T670:16.483a29-b3, 484a13-14, corresponding respectively to NANJIO 38.13-15,
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prises a translation of Vasubandhu's  Trirnsika, with commentary seamlessly interwoven 
with the root text.128 In this sense, ZSL too may answer to the description of "lecture 
text". As for SBKL, we have the possibility here of some direct comparison with 
Sthiramati's interpretation, as his commentary on the Trimsika is also extant.129 
Sthiramati also comments in detail upon the verse, sometimes to similar effect,13o but
44.8; in Bodhiruci (513 C.E.), in addition to passages corresponding to these Gunabhadra pas-
sages at T671:16.522a16-20 and 523a19-23, also at 515a06-08=NAN.no 2.13, 523.c10-16=NANJIO 
47.3-8, 538c02-04=NANJco 126.18, 540b25-27=NANJco 136.12, 559c01-04=NAKno 235.17, 571c12-
13=NANJIO 300.11; and in corresponding loci in Siksananda's translation (700-704); see also 
Suzum (2000) 120, 412. A large number of these loci feature the conceit of the arising of the 
pravrttivijnana as "waves" upon the "ocean" of the alayavijnana: e.g. ebhir mahamate caturbhih 
karanair oghantarajalasthanryad alayavijn'anat pravrttivijnanataranga utpadyate, NANJco 44.8 
etc. The only other place it appears before P is in Bodhiruci's Dasabhumika sutra fastra 
T1522:26.172b17, where it corresponds to Tib. 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa (_ *pravrttivijnana), 
OTAxE (2005) 2, 488, 489 n. 10. Thereafter, the most important place where the term also ap-
pears is AE where it is clearly derived from LAS in at least some instances (being associated, 
for instance, with CA karma[-laksana-]vijilana, j`-5IJ f vastupratikalpavijnana, l~P 
khyativijfiana etc.; see T1666:32.577b06-12, HAKEDA ("evolving consciousness") 48; 579b20-23, 
HAKEDA 69; 581a26-29, HAKEDA 87. 
As Oraxs Susumu has pointed out (personal communication), in P's own texts, the more usual 
term for pravrttivijn'ana is by contrast shengqishi see MSg T1593:31.115c17, 116a03, 
(119c22, not in Tib.), 121b29-c03 = 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa, LAMOYFE (1973) 1, 12-13, 42; 
MAVBh to 3.22, T1599:31.457c16-17, = pravrttivijnana, NAGAO 48. (The term shengqishi, further, 
is not found before P, and only a few times in XZ after him in translation works, and so is a 
strong marker of his genuine style.) 
Thus, while the evidence is only circumstantial, it seems a term derived from LAS, but never 
certainly found in P's own corpus, has been applied as the title of this P text. The same term is 
further associated with AE i.e. the most famous instance of the interpolation of non-P ideas 
into the P corpus, which is itself associated with LAS-derived ideas. Rather than reading the ti-
tle in terms of the content of ZSL itself, then, and reconstructing *Vijnanaparinama fastra, it 
seems more consistent with this scenario to read the title in terms of the LAS provenance of 
the term zhuanshi, and to reconstruct *Pravrttivijnana sastra. This reflects a presumed intent 
of whoever applied the title to align the text with ideas derived from LAS and possibly AF. 
Note, finally, that Daoji, who quotes ZSL by name, must have seen the text in whatever 
modified form it assumed when this title was applied to it; conversely, we can conclude that the 
text must have acquired the title at least before his citations (in 633-637); see below p. 131.
128 A full translation of ZSL is the centre of the only book-length study of P's works in English, 
  PAUL; see 153-167. For apt criticisms of PAUL'S translation, see reviews by DE JONG and Cox.
129 See LEVI (1925) and LEVI (1932), 61-123. 
130 LEVI (1925), 36. Sth agrees with P that the first vijilanam refers specifically to alayavijn"ana;
and that various particular sense-consciousnesses are produced in the process of parinama
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the two commentaries differ in important respects.131 There is nothing in Sthiramati that 
sounds like the *amalavijnana passage translated here.132
*Amalavijnana occurs twice in one passage, at the end of a long comment on 
Trirnfika 18.133 That verse proclaims:
"[This] consciousness (i.e. alayavijnnana)134 is [possessed of/identical to] all seeds; due to the 
mutual influence [of consciousnesses one upon the other],135 [its] phenomenal transformation 
(parinama) goes from one form to another, and thereby each figment of the imagination comes 
into being [in turn]." 136
  (though P specifies a wider range of evolutes). 
131 In particular, P's translation and interpretation of tatha tatha/ yaty anonyavasad is strange and
difficult to account for. At this point, P's text also adds comments on the distinction between 
subject and object of discrimination, and equivalences between these categories and 
parikalpitasvabhava and paratantrasvabhava, none of which are matched in Sth's text. P's 
emphasis on the disproof of external objects alone is also not paralleled in Sth.
132 That is to say, no caveat that the kind of vijnaptimatra here expounded is limited or provision-
  al, no concern with a "pure" aspect of vijn"aptimatra system or practice, and no mention of any 
  concept that might answer to *amalavijnana itself. For a French translation of Sth's comments 
  here, see LEVI (1932), 107-108.
133 The passage as a whole runs from T1587:31.62b25-c20. For a translation (not always accurate) 
   see PAUL 159-160.
134 The root text has already adverted to this consciousness, i.e. alayavijn"ana, in the preceding 
  verse. Both P and Sth agree that it is alayavijnana that is meant here. Sth is at pains to point 
  out that it is specified by the epithet sarvabrjam, which is necessary to distinguish 
  alayavijnana from other kinds of consciousness that are not comprised of seeds (i.e. the "oper-
  ative" pravrtti sense-consciousnesses etc.), and therefore that no fault accrues to Vasubandhu 
  for omitting the qualifier alaya- in speaking of it here; LEvi (1925), 36. Yam has argued that be-
  cause talk of *amalavijnana arises here in the context of a discussion of alayavijnana, it is un-
  likely that the reference in ZSL to the "Chapter on the Doctrine of 'Nine Consciousnesses" is, 
  as it has been taken by the tradition, reference to a freestanding text (like the rumoured Jiushi 
  zhang) that expounded *amalavijnana as a "ninth consciousness"; see p. 106 below.
135 So at least Sth understands this notion of mutual influence: anonyava fad iti/ tatha hi 
caksuradivijiianarn svasaktiparipose vartamanam saktivis-istasyalayavijn"anaparinamasya 
  nimittam so 'pi alayavijnianaparinamah caksuradivijIianasya nimittam bhavati/ evam 
anyonyava fad yasmad ubhayam pravartate/ tasmad alayavijn"anad anyenanadhistitad 
  anekaprakaro vikalpah sa sa jayate, LEvi (1925), 36. P's gloss here is very peculiar and would 
  simply lead us away from the issue at hand; see T1587:31.62c06-10.
136 sarvabrjam hi vijnanam parinamas tatha tatha/ yaty anonyavafad yena vikalpah sa sa jayate.
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   This verse explains how apparent phenomenal experience originates from the mind 
as a product of the interactions of karmic forces (seeds,  bzja). The apparent objects of 
phenomenal experience are mere figments of false imagination (vikalpa), and the end-
lessly transforming stream of such experience is a series of transformations (parinama) 
of consciousness itself.
   Paramartha's ZSL then comments in detail on this verse, foot by foot. These com-
ments basically treat the verse as showing the falsehood, i.e. the non-existence in the ul-
timate perspective of truth, of external phenomenal objects only. On this reading, the 
verse disproves the independent status of external things, but not of consciousness it-
self.137 In a move clearly related, in content if not in name, to the doctrine of two perspec-
tives on vijnaptimatra we saw above in SBKL <2>, the text characterises this aspect of 
vijnaptimatra as the "impure aspect" (TARO — a clear parallel to "representation only 
in the perspective of practice" (j Pfga),138 This leads the text directly to the notion of 
*amalavijnana. It seems clear (though implicit) that this exposition is intended to 
present *amalavijnana as the "pure aspect" of vijnaptimatra (both as practice and ob-
ject of realisation), by contrast to the "impure aspect" just examined:
"Question: If we do away with the phenomenal object, but allow consciousness (vijn"ana) to re-
main AVA, then we can call this principle `consciousness only' MA, vnaptimatra, 'repre-
sentation only'). But once both object and consciousness have been done away with, what 'con-
sciousness' is there to be demonstrated/realised (I, /siddh) [in order that we can call the 
resulting state `consciousness only']?"
"Answer: In establishing `consciousness only', it is in the final analysis only for the purposes of 
argument (~,)139 that one [proposes] merely doing away with the object and retaining the 
mind. In fact, the true purport [of ` consciousness only'] is that one does away with the object be-
cause one wants to render mind empty (it), and for this reason, the principle [of 
`consciousness only] is only truly realised (1 h ) when both object and consciousness dis-
137 a ~gl'o* TAG • • • I li fiU *,'."..PR,T1587:31.62b27-28. 
138 RN+IJ'I`l - , T1587:31.62b28; ffillitAIMA. ravA7ta a iL ly o tSc i At,
   62c14-15. 
139 This phrase, which occurs twice in close succession, is a mysterious hapax (apart from its
duplication here). Even the phrase ( is only found here and in an isolated instance in Zhiyi 
(T1718:34.49c25) down to this period. As we shall see immediately below (n. 140), it is also, in 
its second occurrence, implicated in the textual problem that also besets the second instance 
of the term *amalavijnana. My translation here is therefore tentative.
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appear at once. This simultaneous disappearance of both object and consciousness is precisely 
the perfected nature (parinispannasvabhava); and the perfected nature is precisely the
*amalavijn"ana.s140
   As in SKBL<2> above, we here see *amalavijnana related to a more perfect aspect 
or version of vijnaptimatra/weishi doctrine. Again, this "higher weishi" is superior, and 
ultimately true, because it not only disposes of external objects, but also of ordinary 
consciousness. The most significant new aspect of the doctrine here is the identification 
between the perfected nature (parinispannasvabhava) and *amalavijnana; once more, 
this is associated with a non-dualism that obviates the subject-object dichotomy.
2.5 San wuxing lun
   The San wuxing lun (E,T,'I'tpa T1617, *Nihsvabhavatatraya-sastra, "Treatise on the 
Threefold Absence of Essential Nature", hereafter SWXL) corresponds to the Cheng 
wuxing Chapter (A, ?,'[ q, "Proof of the Absence [s] of Essential Nature") of the Xian-
yang shengjiao lun (PAT'4121tSti, T1602, hereafter XYSJL).141 The term *amalavijnana
140 1=69 : /./''n rPit i . af PMi , MATTA ? o 1I Ak~P ^  /./J'LL.L~fS~®
fAla1-Pj.K. I.. C, 11L1p-CPiK, 
I'MiRMNIVREA, T1587:31.62c15-20. My translation differs significantly from PAUL'S. 
The second instance of the term *amalavijnana occurs in the phrase immediately following, 
4A-FR-jF 1p . There are reasons to believe there is a textual problem here. (1) 
*Amalavijn"ana is uniquely here represented by #.a:ah alone, whereas in all other instances of 
the term it always has a preceding syllable for Skt. a- (l0JJ ffa , CUM, etc.); note, howev-
er, that Song, Yuan, Ming and Palace editions of the canon have a here. (2) As we noted in the 
preceding fn. 139, the odd phrase k is unique, in the entire canon, to the present 
passage. Its repetition at such close proximity may be a sign of a scribal error. (3) It is very 
difficult to extract any sense from this sentence. (PAuL's translation here, "Additionally, we can 
say in the final analysis that this is Pure Consciousness," is a guess at best, and does not 
acknowledge the strangeness of the Chinese syntax.) In support of this conjecture, we might 
note that the text seems also to be corrupt in other places; at the very beginning of the passage 
discussed here, for example, we see an apparently meaningless repetition of the phrase aP7-Tgi 
Uf + thus: Zpt% fi-apff -Lp ft-T- RIEV6:: Lf f T-, T1587:31.62b29-c02, where it 
seems clear the copyist's eye has been drawn back to the first instance of zhongzi and he has 
redundantly reduplicated its sequence. These possibly corrupt passages are the same in all 
editions of the text available to me (including the southern Qisha and two derivatives of the 
Kaibao canon, namely the Koryo and Jin versions). Ui silently corrects the latter passage, Ui 6, 
416. In any case, whether or not the sentence is indeed corrupt, it is difficult enough to make 
sense of it that it adds nothing to our analysis of the overall meaning of the term 
*amalavijnana.
141 XZ's translation of the text. The title of this text is variously reconstructed
83
MICHAEL RADICH
appears in two passages in this  text.142
2.5.1 SWXL <1>
*Amalavijnana occurs three times in a passage expounding the third of the seven 
tattvas, i.e. "the reality of representation only" (vijnaptitattva, vijnaptitathata). As we 
saw above, *amalavijiiana is expounded in the same connection in SBKL <2>.143
"(3) The reality (Thusness) of representation only (MOO, *vijnapti [-matra-]tattva).144 By this 
is meant that all conditioned phenomena (—kMgfr, *sarvasamskara) are nothing more than 
representation/consciousness (A, *vijn"apti, *vijn`ana). This 'consciousness' is called 'reality' 
013P, tattva) in two senses: (i) it is a comprehension free from error (14,?4.11, 
*aviparyasasarngraha?145); (ii) it is immutable (';,A, *avikara),146
"(i) In saying it is 'a comprehension free from error'
, we mean that all dharmas, i.e. the twelve 
sense bases (X, ayatana) etc., are nothing more than representation/consciousness, and that 
beyond [this] deluded consciousness ILA197there are no other dharmas. Thus, all dharmas are 
comprised by consciousness and nothing more.148 The discernment of this principle is called
*Aryadesanavikhyapana, Aryafasanaprakarana, Sasanodbhavana etc. The chapter in question 
begins at 557b04. Parts of XYSJL and therefore of SWXL also correspond in some measure to 
portions of YBh, and I will refer to relevant parallels below. On the Xianyang shengjiao lun, see 
SCHMITHAUSEN (1987) 2, 261-262 n. 99.
142 PAUL incorrectly asserts that it only appears in SWXL <2>; PAUL 142. 
143 This passage is translated in its entirety in GIMELLO 317-319, and I have benefited greatly from
consulting this translation and annotations in the process of making my own. A partial 
translation is also given in DEMIEVILLE (1929), 41-42. GIMELLO also comments extensively on this 
passage, 320 ff.
144 The reader is referred to comments introducing SBKL<2> above p. 76, for the meaning of this 
  concept and its place within larger rubrics. Note that the translation terminology varies: for as 
litzn here SBKL has *MAW;  see n. 118.
145 Following GIMELLO's suggested Skt. and explanation, 318 n. 206. 
146 See GIMELLO 318 n. 207, esp. the illuminating reference to MAV 3.11, NAGAO 41. 
147 P uses r a to translate both bhranti "error, delusion" and abhutaparikalpa Imagination of that
which does not really exist" in his MAV. See GIMELLO 318 n. 208. This term is a fingerprint of 
P's style; see n. 337.
148 Note that here, in being associated with luanshi, weishi Fpf takes on a stronger sense of "con-
  sciousness only" than would be suggested by Skt. vijnaptimatra "representation only". This 
  same dynamic is noticeable at other places in P's expositions of weishi also.
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'comprehension free from error';19 and it is because it is free from error that it is 'reality'15° ( p 
tfl, 'Thusness'). However, this `reality free from error' is not yet the [higher] Thusness free of 
characteristics („',,ttil Cp cp> *alaksanatattva).152
"(ii) In saying 'it is immutable'
, we show that this deluded consciousness N., a is in fact 13[J mani-
fested in consciousness of the pseudo-objects 1L'l '53i'54 proper to the imagined and interde-
pendent [essential natures] (5-3IJ1A1th, *parikalpita[-svabhava], *paratantra[-svabhava]).155 Be-
149 I have differed from GIMELLO (who translates "comprises", "comprisal" etc.) in translating
samgraha as "comprehension". I am attempting to convey what I take to be a play on words. On 
the one hand, vijnaptimatra is said to "comprehend" what is free from error in the sense that it 
includes it or encompasses it. On the other hand, the discernment with which vijnaptimatra is 
realised is itself a "comprehension” in the sense that it consists in arriving at an understanding 
of or insight into this basic fact of the reality of existence. It is this "comprehension" (under-
standing), I believe, that is "freed from error" (aviparyasa). At least in Skt., the verbal root / 
grah admits of a similar polysemy to English "comprehend" in this regard, though it is a 
stretch to naturally interpret Chinese she in the cognitive sense.
150 GIMELLO 318 n. 209 refers us to the third of the ten tattvas in MAV Ch. 3. This third category is 
  aviparyasatattva, "reality free of error", which is the reality that is discerned when we under-
  stand that existence is characterised by impermanence, suffering, absence of self, and impuri-
  ty. (It may help to recall that prabhedatattva, or "reality as it is differentiated", is the ninth of 
  this tenfold list; and is the master rubric under whose sevenfold head the present vijnaptitattva 
  is discussed as the third item).
151 Recall that vijiiaptitathata is a variant name for this third "reality"; see n. 118. 
152 GIMELLO 318 n. 210 refers us to MAV 3.7. 
153 The term 11'1is also a unique hallmark of P's style, never found in any other translator, and
only in native Chinese scholiasts after him, beginning with Huisi, Jizang, Jingying Huiyuan and 
Tanyan I3± (516-588).
154 I take this to mean, in line with standard Yogacara doctrine, that the apparently dualistic 
  experience of objective phenomena by a perceiving subject is merely a manifestation of the un-
  derlying defiled consciousness (alayavijnana = luanshi), which is in fact all that there is.
155 It is more accurate, though cumbersome, to translate the names of the three natures as "the 
  essential nature of all things whereby they are figments of the imagination" 
  (parikalpitasvabhava), "the essential nature of all things whereby they are products of mutual 
  interdependence" (paratantrasvabhava), and "the essential nature of all things as they are 
  when brought to perfection" (parinispannasvabhava). Note that the identification of this delud-
  ed experience with both parikalpitasvabhava and paratantrasvabhava is in line with P's usual 
  doctrine of the three natures, which holds that paratantra, also, is dispensed with, transcended 
  or sublated in the liberated state, and all that remains is parinispannasvabhava. This under-
  standing of the three natures differs from that found in XZ, from the apparent doctrine of MSg
(and perhaps therefore the interpretation of this doctrine by Asanga), and from many modern 
characterisations of three natures doctrine in the secondary literature.
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cause the imagined essential nature never exists. the interdependent essential nature also does
not exist; and the inexistence of these two [essential natures] is *amalavijniana (VMfp ).l56
Uniquely, this consciousness alone is 'immutable', and for this reason it is [fit to be] called `reali-
ty' (Thusness').
"[Now
,] the former `reality' [i.e. (i) Thusness/reality free from error'] only dispenses with the 
twelve sense bases (ayatana) [and] all [such] dharmas distinguished in the Lesser Vehicle.157 
[This discernment or comprehension] merely frees the [understanding of the] twelve sense bas-
es [etc.] from [predicative?] error'-F--.J•,4A$ 11. Here, however, the tenets of the Greater 
Vehicle demolish lil'x the twelve sense bases [etc.], such that they are [seen to be] completely 
non-existent and only the figments of deluded consciousness IILpfi. Thus, [in this per-
spective,] the twelve sense bases [etc.] themselves are in fact errors 11IJZAM1, but there is still 
no [predicative?] error MR101 with regard to the deluded consciousness that is in fact all that 
exists. Thus it is called `reality' (Thusness').
"However
, the substance of this [deluded] consciousness is still mutable WAR. Next, 
[therefore,] in consideration of [its inexistence in terms of] imagined and interdependent na-
tures, we do away with it this consciousness. [In this perspective,] only the *amalavijnana is 
free of [the] error [even of positing bare existence per se, nfl 1,i;, 1fl];'59 [only
156 This effectively identifies *amalavijn"ana with parinispannasvabhava. 
157 Ta11-:11y.J.4pjivt--pj a M. My translation here differs from G1MELLO's. 
155 I have tried to reflect in my translation of this paragraph and the next a distinction that the text
may be making between two kinds of negation, and two corresponding kinds of "freedom from 
error". Fei 4I1, which in classical Chinese is usually used to negate predication, and wu 
which negates existence, are perhaps deliberately used in a distinct manner throughout. In 
what the text calls the perspective of the Lesser Vehicle, one refutes or negates (fel) certain 
mistaken understandings of the Abhidharmic reals (dharmas) as represented by the synecdo-
che of the twelve ayatanas, but one accepts their fundamental existence. In the perspective of 
the Greater Vehicle, one comes to the more profound insight that dharmas themselves funda-
mentally do not exist, and therefore negates (wu) their very existence itself. The former per-
spective is a kind of freedom from predicative error 4M,1, but not from the error of assuming 
sheer existence :!,J. We might alternatively express the two types of error as the error "that 
[a given] X is Y" and "that there is X". Thus, P immediately trumps the ordinary perspective of 
the Greater Vehicle with one even more sublime, in which the deluded consciousness is per-
ceived in a manner free not only of predicative error, but also of the error of positing its exist-
ence — i.e. the perspective he elsewhere calls "vijnaptimatra in the perspective of truth" 
(SKBL <2>), "the perfected nature" (ZSL) etc.
159 Reading ;, J 1 in the sense contrasting with "predicative error" 4rto1 tl laid out in n. 158 
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fied:”三 、 唯 識 真 如 作 意 、 謂 如 前 読 、 乃 至 於 染 淨 法 所 依 思 惟 、 諸 法 唯 識 之 性6
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三、 識如如者。 謂一切諸行、 但唯是識。 此識二義故稱如如。 一攝無倒、 二無變異。 「攝無
倒」者:謂 十二入等一切諸法、但唯是識、 離亂識外 、無別餘法、故一切諸法、 皆為識攝。
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唯十二 入非是顛倒。 今大乘義、破諸入並皆是無、 唯是亂識所作故、 十二入則為顛倒、 唯一







(1) one group of five characteristics, namely
(i) signifier (, *abhilapa); 
(ii) signified (ifi A, *abhilapya); 
(iii) meaning (, *artha?); 
(iv) attachment/hypostasisation (1fk *abhinivesa); 
(v) non-attachment ( r, *anabhinivesa);161
(2) "three characteristics" corresponding to the three essential natures of Yogacara,
namely: 
  (i) the characteristic of [all things as] imaginary constructs
(parikalpitalaksana) ; 
(ii) the characteristic of [all things as products of] mutual interdependence
(paratantralaksana) ; 
(iii) the characteristic of [all things as they appear when brought to] perfec-
   tion (parinispannalaksana).
161 These five characteristics are expounded elsewhere in XYSJL, at T1602:31.536c21-537a06, cor-
responding to YBh T1579:30.751a21-b07. They seem otherwise to be rare. For the five catego-
ries concerned, XZ YBh reads as follows: (1) "referents" (Pfrp$, brjod par bya ba, *abhilapya); 
(2) "speech" or "language" (tglk, brjod ba, *abhilapa); (3) "the conjunction of these two [refer-
ent and speech]", i.e. reference GEE: i* i? , *taddvayasamyoga?); (4) "attachment", i.e. hyposta-
sisation of the construction of the world according to the categories of language (OM, mngon 
par zhen pa, *abhinivista, *abhinivesa); (5) "detachment, non-attachment" (7f }I,Z, mngon par 
ma zhen pa, *anabhinivesa), i.e. the undoing, deconstruction or transcendence of hypostasisa-
tion. This paragraph corresponds to nothing in the extant Tib. YBh (we would expect it to fall 
at Derge i 50b1, following ... bsams pa las byung ba'i sar ji skad bstan pa de bzhin du blta bar 
bya'o). It is therefore impossible to provide precise Tib. equivalents for the terms used. Howev-
er, we can tentatively reconstruct the equivalents given, in part on the basis of Tib. equivalents 
provided in YOKOYAMA for other instances of the same translation terms. The order in which the 
first two characteristics are given is reversed in P's SWXL. Useful comments on a selection of 
these categories state: (1) The first of these categories refers in turn to a complex analysis of 
categories under which all reals can be understood, for which see T1602:31.507a17-b01, 
T1579:30.696a01-21. (2) `speech/language", upon which the texts comment in the most detail, 
is identified with other technical categories including parikalpitasvabhava, hypostasisation or 
reification (samaropa), etc. (4) "Attachment" is explained rather technically as "the 
parikalpitasvabhava of the benighted (*bala), continuously operative from beginningless time, 
and its attendant tendencies (*anusaya)" a . *A:;, q*,r,*#U *NA Tt V "g fa.
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   The text then considers whether the five encompass or comprise (, *sam/grah) 
the three, or vice versa. It answers that of the fivefold rubric, categories (1) signifier and 
(2) signified are comprised in all three members of the threefold rubric; (3) "meaning" 
is comprised of the imagined characteristic (parikalpitalaksana) alone;162 (4) "attach-
ment/hypostasisation" is comprised of the interdependent characteristic 
(paratantralakana) alone; and (5) freedom from attachment is comprised of the per-
fected characteristic (parinispannalaksana) alone.163
In SWXL alone, a comment follows, bringing *amalavijnana to bear:
"The reason the first two characteristics [of the fivefold 
acteristics [in the threefold rubric] is as follows.
rub ric] are comprised of all three char-
"(1) The characteristic [called] 'the signifier' is the names of all things (dharma) and language. 
This signifier is a product of consciousness. (i) Consciousness arises in the apparent guise of 
the signifier, and for this reason it is of the nature of what is imagined (parikalpitasvabhava). (ii) 
The subject [or 'agent'] of [this] imagination, viz. consciousness ht'ij'AINA, is of the nature of 
what is produced by interdependence (paratantrasvabhava). (iii) Since the signifier constituting 
the imagined object P7r/,does not exist, the consciousness constituting the agent of im-
agination also does not exist, and [the discernment of] this [very fact] is the nature of [things as 
they are when brought to] perfection (parinispannasvabhava). For this reason, this first [catego-
ry] is comprised of all three natures ~'[!f.'6'
"(2) The second characteristic is also comprised of all three natures
. The characteristic called 
'the signified' is the meaning/referent (*artha) intended by the signifier t H A
, that is to say, 
all things --C '9J,16s which are also products of consciousness. (i) Where only consciousness
162 Recall that *artha, if it is what underlies yi , can also mean "object", "referent". 
163 T1617:31.873c02-08, T1602:31.559b19-27. 
164 Note the way P's comment here slips from talk of parikalpita, paratantra and parinispanna as
   "characteristics" to talk of them as "natures". 
165 Is relatively unusual in a Buddhist translation context, but very common otherwise in Chinese
philosophical discourse, to refer to all "things" as wu It; translation texts, P's included, would 
probably more often talk of all dharmas, or sometimes of shi (, *vastu). This seems to be the 
only instance of —kljf `'t in P, though we do quite frequently find — PJ'i/J: in JDZL 
T1584:30.1027b28; in MSgBh T1595:31.250c27-251a01; especially numerously in Rushi lun #W 
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   In this passage, as previously in ZSL and SWXL<1>, *amalavijnana is once more 
identified with parinispannasvabhava. This passage adds to our picture of 
*amalavijnana a new dimension of non-dualism. Where previously the non-dualism was 
defined in negative terms, as the obviation of a false dualism between subject and object 
of delusory thinking, here, its content is defined positively as a relation of indistinction 
between perfected gnosis (wisdom, jnana) and its object. In the emphasis in its exposi-
tion of the earlier members of the fivefold rubric, the passage also exposes a certain di-
mension of the relationship between *amalavijnana and language. Previously, in 
SWXL<1>, we were already told that *amalavijnana is identical with "reality" in part be-
cause it is beyond error (aviparyasa); given the frequent connection between viparyasa 
and language, we could perhaps have inferred that this meant it was free of ordinary 
language also. Here, however, this aspect of *amalavijnana is made explicit. All aspects 
of the operation of language and its referential function are associated with the imper-
fect parikalpita- and paratantrasvabhava. *Amalavijnana, by contrast, is associated ex-
clusively with parinispannasvabhava, in large part because it is "free of attachment to 
word and meaning".
3. Summary and analysis: Two doctrines of *amalavijn na
   Let us now review the picture of *amalavijnana that emerges from the primary 
texts taken in the aggregate. For the purposes of this summary analysis, it will be con-
venient to divide the primary texts (excluding Abhidharmakosabhasya) into two groups: 
(1) Jueding zang lun (JDZL); (2) other texts. There are several reasons for this division.
   First, the JDZL passages in which *amalavijnana appears have counterparts in par-
allel versions of the text in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Xuanzang's Chinese. By contrast, in 
SBKL, ZSL and SWXL, there is uniformly little or nothing in parallel texts that corre-
sponds to passages expounding *amalavijnana. This suggests strongly that in SBKL, 
ZSL and SWXL, we are dealing with sub-commentarial or "lecture" passages (whether 
by Paramartha and his team at the point of translation, or by some later hand).
Second, JDZL is traditionally supposed to have been translated (or composed) earli-
ZT4--fia  5t8U'rto O®#El4l fkfthi't Z-, ilL ttti 
7-*8, 1 AR WSt, 4p 4A4fl il, T11APh t, & 5.- IJ0 AtifPlf53-'L .6St4~ 
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est of all the texts under consideration here, during the Liang (before 557). The facts 
here are complex and  tenuous;168 but in the absence of firm evidence to the contrary, we
168 JDZL is first mentioned in the catalogues in the Da Zhou kanding zhongiing mulu JcJ J F rE ctx
. El 0 , composed by Mingquan FA13under Empress Wu (r. 690-705). Here, it is ascribed to P 
and the Liang in the Song, Ming and Yuan versions of the text,'~!-p ,T, 
T2153:55.407c15; in the Korean version, however, this line is missing, so that JDZL ends up ap-
pearing to be ascribed to Gautama Prajnaruci (active c. 516-543?), alongside his ;OM 
                                                                Vigrahavyavartinr T1631. JDZL is not more precisely dated until the next catalogue of the can-
on, Zhisheng's (t 3N-, 669-740) Kaiyuan lu rAfcfli (which dates to 730). Even then, 
Zhisheng only dates the text on the basis of the fact that it contains an interlinear note glossing 
a transliteration term by saying "in Liang, this is said ..." Kg,; T2154:55.538b05; relevant 
JDZL passage at T1584:30.1018c09. So it is not until 120-160 years after P's death that JDZL 
turns up, under that title, in the catalogues, and then the dating is based upon one very slender 
piece of evidence. Note that this means that the first recorded references to the title Jueding 
zang lun are actually found outside catalogues; e.g. the reference in Wonch'uk (see below, 
p. 107-108, 145) predates Mingquan. 
The situation is further complicated, however, by the fact that older catalogues, beginning with 
Fei Changfang's (ef, d.u.) somewhat unreliable Lidai sanbao jiT-1 d in 597 
(T2034:49.99a04), list a lost Shiqi di lun ±-1 1la among P's works, which seems to have been 
a partial translation of YBh (see further also n. 283). It is possible that our present JDZL is a 
surviving remnant of that text; for example, we will see below that there is at least one clear in-
stance in which T2807 refers to contents included in JDZL by the title Shiqi di lun (see n. 283). 
If JDZL is a remnant of the Shiqi di lun, it may be relevant that that text too is supposed to date 
to early in P's translation career, dating from the fourth year of the Taiqing era tiit® 
(approx. 550). 
Judging from its title, we might well expect that Shiqi di lun ("Treatise on the Seventeen 
Stages") should have been a translation of the Maulrbhumi portions alone of YBh. However, 
this seems not to have been the case. T2807 cites a portion of the text corresponding to the 
present JDZL, i.e. the Viniscayasamgrahanr (see once more n. 283). Bhikkhu Huimin has fur-
ther pointed out that one of three Shiqi di lun passages referred to in P's MSgBh is also from 
the Viniscayasamgrahanr: ±fl(IT7, t1 r-I--LilMb,ptJ , T1595:31.224b18-19 (Huimin has 
a19, in error), corresponding to T1579:30.706c22 (in juan 74 of XZ); Huimin [1994], 6 (I am 
grateful to OTAKE Susumu for pointing out this reference to me). In unpublished work, OTAKE 
has also found passages quoted from the Shiqi di lun that correspond to sections of the 
Maulrbhami ranging from XZ juan 4 to juan 48. It therefore seems that whether or not it was a 
full translation or, as seems more likely, merely a set of excerpts, Shiqi di lun covered passages 
corresponding to a very wide range in the present YBh, including parts outside the 
Maulrbhumi. Thus, while it is possible that JDZL is a remnant of Shiqi di lun, Shiqi di lun 
cannot have been identical to our present extant JDZL. We should also note that when Huijun 
summarises the seventeen stages as laid out in the text (which he calls Shiqi jing t-OD, 
stages nine to fourteen comprise five sets of ten stages, totalling fifty stages, known to be 
unique to Chinese Buddhism, i.e. (1) ten "faiths" -]-Tq, (2) ten "abodes" -I-'(, (3) ten
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should still follow the traditional bibliographers. If JDZL was thus the first text in which 
*amalavijn"ana was mentioned, and followed only at a distance of perhaps a decade by 
the other texts under consideration, the concept may have undergone considerable de-
velopment between JDZL and the other texts. For this reason, we should be alert to pos-
sible differences in *amalavijn"ana doctrine as it is expounded in JDZL, against the doc-
trine of the other texts.
   Third, close study of the style of these texts suggests that SWXL, SBKL and ZSL 
may be part of a reasonably close sub-group in Paramartha's corpus, but differ in impor-
tant respects from JDZL. These stylistic considerations reinforce the hints from the bib-
liographic tradition that the circumstances, and indeed collective authorship, of our 
texts may have differed in important respects.'
"practices" ±q--, (4) ten "dedications of merit" (here broken up into two sets, for the hrnayana 
and Mahayana) lo[ and (5) ten "grounds" -rih 
(X784:46.569c11-13; OTAKE, personal communication). This would seem to make it unlikely that 
the text was simply a straight translation of any Indic version of YBh. 
SWXL, by contrast, is attested as early as the Zhong jing mulu uti lI OA by Fajing ({ z, d.u.) 
of 594 (T2146:55.141b10) (much more reliable than the Lidai fabao ji); here it is already 
assigned to the Chen. It is also found in the Gu jin yijing to ji~u~`i*!E1fdby Jingmai 
d.u.), dating to 664-665, where it is assigned even more firmly to a period in which P was sup-
posed to have been in residence at Zhizhi si $11 which various sources place either "for 
some time" after 562 or between 563 and 567; T2151:55.365a01, 364c20. Given that ZSL is 
supposed originally to have been part of the same larger text as SWXL, viz. the Wuxiang lun 
tu-, this information may apply to it also. Mention of an independent ZSL, however, is first 
seen in the Da Zhou lu, where it is ascribed to P and assigned to the Chen dynasty, 
T2153:55.408a01; Zhisheng concurs, adding the detail that assignment to the Chen was 
confirmed by another catalogue, the Chulun ti danben w u v. c, T2154:55.609a20-21. 
Finally, SBKL, like SWXL, is attested quite early, in the Zhong jing mulu ufi lI as by Yancong 
(AM of 602, where it is ascribed to the Chen, T2147:55.153c16; as with SXWL, Jingmai 
ascribes it to the Zhizhi si period. In the cases of what I am here calling the "other" texts 
(SWXL, ZSL and SBKL), then, our most concrete information is also late, dating to a century 
after P's time. 
Uncertain though it may be, this information suggests that JDZL may be ten years or more 
older than the other three texts, and thus date to a significantly different period of P's career, 
when his team was of very different composition, etc.
169 I will address the complex issue of authorship and style in a study currently in preparation. To 
  give only one example, JDZL calls alayavijn"ana — 71 times! — but the term is previ-
  ously entirely unknown (and is only attested three times in one text even thereafter). JDZL's 
  frequent use of this term is thus unique in the P corpus in this regard.
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   Fourth, we find that there are important differences between the  *amalavijnana 
doctrine of JDZL and that of the other three texts, but the other three texts present a rel-
atively uniform version of the doctrine.
3.1 *Amalavijnana in JDZL
   We can summarise the most important points of the rich doctrine of *amalavijnana 
in JDZL as follows. *Amalavijnana corresponds closely to asrayaparavrtti. The term 
corresponds to asrayaparavrtti in textual parallels; it is also spoken of as paravrtti in 
JDZL itself, where context shows clearly that asrayaparavrtti is meant; and it is free of 
"badness" (dausthulya). The text (especially in ParamArtha) equivocates paradoxically 
over the exact status of this asrayaparavrtti — in places it is said not itself to have, or be, 
a basis; but elsewhere it is said to be the basis for this or that (e.g. the path, lok6ttara-
dharmas). The identity with asrayaparavrtti is doubtless also connected to the interest-
ing doctrine, propounded with special emphasis in JDZL<4>, that *amalavijnana, identi-
fied with a purified vijn`anaskandha, stands in a radically transformed relationship to the 
other four skandhas. The other four skandhas, when the object of grasping or attach-
ment, are clearly spoken of as the "basis" (asraya) for further rebirth, because clinging 
to them leads to appropriation of a new body (incarnation) after the end of one lifespan.
   There seems to be a number of respects in which JDZL's *amalavijnana-cum 
afrayaparavrtti warrants the epithet "pure". It is the counteragent, or the result of the 
operation of counteragents, to alayavijnana and other features of the defiled state. It is 
associated with (a separate basis for) the "transcendent dharmas" (lokOttaradharmah). It 
is also pure because it is diametrically opposed to the ordinary defiled state in many spe-
cific respects: most importantly, it is free of defilements (klesa, ):Ri ;) and "outflows" 
(asrava), and their causes; it is also free of all other qualities associated with the ordi-
nary worldling (prthagjana). The purity of *amalavijnana is also reflected in the fact 
that in it, the sensations (vedana) are rendered pure. Its purity is also reflected in its as-
sociation with Thusness. *Amaaavijnana is realised by intensive cultivation of the wis-
dom that knows Thusness (tathata), and the very notion of "taintlessness" (amala, nir-
mala) may well be intended to recall expositions of "purified Thusness" in RGV, other 
parts of YBh, etc.
*Amalavijnana is also permanent (nitya), and this is emphasised by Paramartha's 
assertion, against parallel texts, that amalavijnana-cum-asrayaparavrtti does not cease 
of its own accord.
Apart from the naming of the liberated state (asrayaparavrtti etc.) as
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 *amalavijnana, Paramartha adds little to ideas already found in YBh. In effect, he has 
just given a clear name to an already-present configuration of ideas about the implica-
tions of liberation for consciousness. The name, moreover, is not inappropriate. The par-
allel passages also discuss liberation as a liberation of consciousness from defilements, 
in a manner that amply justifies the epithet "pure"; and the phrase "pure consciousness", 
in some form, even appears in one place in parallel versions of the text.
   It is impossible to miss, throughout these passages, the ring of the Yogacara 
"Mahayana Abhidharma" — much of the talk is of seeds (br a)
, defilements (klesa), "out-
flows" (asrava), aggregates (skandha), gradualist models of paths of practice and realisa-
tion (including faiksa and asaiksa), etc.
   Some of this doctrine echoes the AKBh amalavijnana passage, not only in the gen-
eral "Abhidharma" language, but in specifics. In both contexts, at issue is a conscious-
ness pure specifically in that it is free of "outflows" (asrava), and of defilements under 
other names. This purity matters so much because it enables us to attain freedom from 
eventual rebirth, or more precisely (especially in AKBh) freedom from the "latent ten-
dencies" (anugaya) that constitute the most subtle level of grasping after the bases of fu-
ture rebirth. If Paramartha picked up the term amalavijnana from AKBh 5.29 ff. and 
used it to name the doctrine of pure consciousness elaborated in these YBh passages, it 
was thus an artful move.
   We see echoes here of an old doctrine of consciousness as the subject of transmi-
gration and liberation.170 These echoes have not been noted by previous *amalavijn"ana 
scholarship. In brief, this old doctrine is as follows.
   In some texts, such as the Mahanidana sutta (DN 15), vinnana is presented as the 
sine qua non for embryonic development; as "descending" into the mother's womb, 
"leaving" in cases of miscarriage
, etc.171 Vinnana is also presented as a "surviving" fac-
tor, called in the Majjhima nikaya the "consciousness that evolves [into the next life]" 
(samvattanikavinnana).172 In both these connections, the understanding of vinnana is 
closely related to the place it assumed in the standard twelvefold chain of dependent
170 See esp. WuESEKERA (1964): 254-259; WZJESEKERA (1945): 73-107; WALDRON 9-45. 
171 See e.g. WUESEKERA (1945): 92, referring to D 2.63. 
172 Ibid., 93; WUESEKERA (1964): 259; referring to Anenjasappaya sutta (M 106), i.e. M 2.262 ff.
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origination  (paticcasamuppada).173 Another related idea is that consciousness arising 
from moment-to-moment sense experience is the "origin of the world" (lokassa 
samudayam)174 with all its suffering, and that the suffering world ceases when conscious-
ness ceases.175 Wijesekera has further shown that vinnana so understood is connected 
to the notion of the gandharva/gandhabba, as the "being that enters into the womb" on 
conception, a "being of the intermediate state" (antarabhavasattvam);176 this notion in 
turn is linked with manas, mind or "soul",177 and, ultimately, with an ancient and sprawl-
ing network of various mythemes reaching back to the Vedas and apparently beyond.178 
The resonances between these ideas and JDZL are strengthened by other key details. 
Even in the earliest texts, as in JDZL, vinnana is continually drawn back into rebirth pre-
cisely because it is still associated with anusaya (anusaya).179 Further, vinnana is spoken 
of in the Sampasadaniya sutta (DN 28) as a "stream" (vin"nanasotafn), in a manner that 
clearly recalls the "continuum" or "flow" (sarrctana) at issue in JDZL.tso
In the early texts, this same consciousness is sometimes understood as continuing
173 In this formula, vin"pana is pivotally placed as the key link in the process leading to rebirth. On
the emergence of the twelvefold model, problems of internal consistency in it, and its possible 
basis in more than one earlier model, see the still seminal LA VALLEE PoussiN (1913).
174 This might make us think of P's notion of "temporal consciousness" (more literally, "world 
  consciousness") NA in JDZL<4>, for which see n. 79.
175 SN. 44.4 "The World", S 2.73-74, BODHI 581-582.; WALDRON 31-32. 
176 WJJESEKERA (1945): 88-89; note especially the Assalayana sutta (M 93) passage discussed here:
"We know how the descent of an embryo comes about. Here, there is the union of the mother 
and father, and the mother is in season, and the gandhabba is present . .. Then, sirs, do you 
know for sure whether that gandhabba is a noble, or a brahmin, or a merchant, or a worker?", 
Janama mayam bho yatha gabbhassa avakkanti hoti. Idha matapitaroca sannipatita honti. Mata 
ca utunr hoti, gandhabbo ca paccupatthito hoti. Jananti pana bhonto yagghe so gandhabbo 
khattiyo va brahmano va vesso va suddo vati? M 2.156-157, NANAMOLI and BODHI 769; WALDRON 
14; here, the status of the gandhabba as a personal entity from previous lives is very clear.
177 WUESEKERA (1945): 84. 
178 Ibid., infra; note discussion of Avestan and possibly Greek parallels, 73-75. 
179 On this dimension of the early doctrine of vin"pana, see e.g. WALDRON 33 ff. 
180 E.g. "the unbroken stream of consciousness that is established in this world and the next",
vin"n"anasotam ... ubhayato abbocchinnarp idha loke patitthitam ca paraloke patitthitam Ca, D 
3.105, WALSHE 420. This is part of the key distinction between the doctrine of transmigrating 
vinnana in these early texts and related, more outright ontological concepts current in 
Upanisadic and other contexts, as is shown particularly by the Buddha's refutation of "Sati's 
thesis" that "it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders through the round of 
rebirths, not another;" see M 1.258 ff., NANAMOLI and BODHI 349 ff., WALDRON 195 n. 44.
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even into rarefied meditative states as far as nevasan`nanasann"ayatana,181 and there are 
indications that it, or perhaps "mind" construed more generally, was in some sources re-
garded as the quasi-"subject"" of the process and state of liberation itself.183 Such a con-
sciousness is said to be "unestablished" (apatitthita-vinniana): a representative statement 
says that when lust (raga) has been abandoned with regard to each of the five khandhas 
in turn, "there is no basis (arammanam) for the establishing of consciousness (patittha 
vinnanassa na hoti);" such a consciousness is liberated (vimuttam), steady (thitarn) and 
satisfied (santusitarn), and has attained nirvana (parinibbayati).184 It seems clear that in 
such a state, consciousness is still undergoing experiences of some kind, which are free 
of suffering, and that it is such experience that comprises liberation. (However, we must 
also note other passages that depict liberation as a "cessation" of vinnana altogether.185) 
It is also noteworthy that this state is already spoken of in terms of there being no "ba-
sis" (arammanam = Skt. alambanam) for consciousness (although the term is not 
agraya, JDZL clearly echoes these ideas). In "Volition", SN 40.10.3, the attainment of this 
"unestablished" state without a basis is further clearly linked to the absence of "latent 
tendencies" (anusaya = anugaya),186
   These and related ideas find resonances in the JDZL doctrine of the ordinary 
vijnanaskandha, attached to the other four skandhas as "base" and therefore undergoing 
repeated rebirth and suffering; and of *amalavijnana as a metamorphosed or purified 
transmutation of this vijnana, which is freed from suffering, the subject of a pure kind of 
experience, and eternal.
   Modern scholars have often taken *amalavijnana as a kind of bridgehead, intended 
to enable annexation of tathagatagarbha doctrine into Yogacara. Perhaps the doctrine
181 WUESEKERA (1945): 93, M 2.263-264. 
182 As always in discussing Buddhist doctrines, any such term must be handled with caution and
  due provisos; but at the same time, if we are to discuss the problem, we must say something. 
183 For aspects of this notion, see HARVEY; ALBAHARI; THANISSARO; LINDTNER I am grateful to my
  student Benno BLASCHKE for bringing my attention to several of these studies. 
184 E.g. S 3.58, Bonin 894; appatitrhitam vin"n"anam also features e.g. at S 3.53-54, BODHI 891; D 3.105,
WALSHE 420; as a description of the liberated state of one Godhika, S 1.122, Bourn 214; S 2.66, 
BODHI 577, where it is associated with the cessation of the whole mass of suffering; etc.
185 D3.103, S1.122, S2.66, 2.103, 3.61 etc. 
186 Yato ca kho bhikkhave, no ceva ceteti, no ca pakappeti, no ca anuseti, arammanametam na hoti
viiiiianassathitiya. Arammane asati patittha vinn"anassa na hoti etc., S 2.67, BODHI 577-578; so 
too S 2.66, BODHI 577; S 2.103, BODHI 600-601.
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did lend itself to that use, and perhaps  Paramartha was at pains, elsewhere in his work, 
to bring about such a rapprochement. However, very little in JDZL calls to mind 
tathagatagarbha doctrine — only, faintly, that *amalavijnana-cum-asrayaparavrtti is as-
sociated with "pure Thusness"; that it is permanent (nitya); and that it somehow pre-ex-
ists the liberatory state (thus resembling tathagatagarbha as a ground for potential reali-
sation). Moreover, this is all also present in parallel texts, and therefore was presumably 
in Paramartha's source. The connection between tathagatagarbha and *amalavijnana in 
JDZL may thus be weaker than scholars have thought.
3.2 *Amalavijnana in SWXL, ZSL and SBKL
   In SXWL, ZSL and SBKL, *amalavijnana is identified with a "higher" or complete 
understanding of vijnaptimatra/weishi ("consciousness/representation only"), in which 
the practitioner realises the unreality not only of objects, but also of ordinary defiled 
consciousness itself (of alyavijfiana). A state is thus attained that transcends the usual 
epistemological dualism of subject and object. Further, in explicit connection with this 
"higher weishi"
, *amalavijn"ana is identified with the parinispannasvabhava ("perfected 
nature") (ZSL, SWXL). This status of *amalavijnana as the "perfected nature" hinges 
on the obviation of the delusory dualism of subject and object that pertains in ordinary 
consciousness.187 It is also said to be also expressed in the non-dualism of perfected gno-
sis and its object in the liberated state (SWXL). *Amalavijnana is further associated 
with (the pure aspect of) Thusness or reality, particularly in the context of the exposi-
tion of the seven kinds of tattva (SBKL, SWXL).
   The concept of *amalavijnana in these texts is thus relatively consistent and uni-
form. However, some claims are unique to a single text. Most importantly, only in SBKL 
is *amalavijnana identified as "aboriginally luminous mind" (prakrtiprabhasvaracitta), 
which is tainted by adventitious defilements (agantukaklesa). This aboriginally luminous 
mind is further identified with the fundamentally pure aspect of Thusness (tathata), and 
also of the related domains of emptiness (sanyata) and the dharmadhatu. SWXL<l> 
alone claims that the aspect of Thusness constituted by *amalavijnana is real (or "thus") 
because it is immutable, i.e. not subject to metamorphosis (avikara). SWXL<2> alone 
claims that it is real, also, because it is beyond ordinary language. On the whole, howev-
er, divergences between the texts are minor, and the coherence in their doctrine of
187 Note, in this connection, the way that the application of the notion of parinispannasvabhava in
parts (1) and (2) of SWXL<2> also hinges on the obviation of a dualistic relation, in which it is 
vital that an apparent subject be involved.
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*amalavijnana is more striking.
   There is still relatively little, in this version of *amalavijnana doctrine, that recalls 
tathagatagarbha doctrine. The strongest echoes of tathagatagarbha ideas are found in 
SBKL, where *amalavijnana is identified with prakrtiprabhasvaracitta as obscured by 
"adventitious dust s".
   The relatively uniform *amalavijnana doctrine of these three texts is strikingly dif-
ferent from that of JDZL. JDZL does not associate *amalavijn"ana with vijnaptimatra/ 
weishi doctrine in any form. It unsurprisingly, therefore, never breathes a word of tran-
scendence of the subject-object dualism. Neither does it identify *amalavijnana with the 
"perfected nature" (parinispannasvabhava). Despite its clear concern with the purity of 
consciousness and mind, it also does not link *amalavijnana and 
prakrtiprabhasvaracitta. Nor does it link *amalavijnana to emptiness or the 
dharmadhatu; nor claim that it is beyond ordinary language.
   By contrast, these three texts do not associate *amalavijnana with asrayaparavrtti 
as JDZL does. They do not treat *amalavijnana as the vijiianaskandha, nor consider its 
relationship to other skandhas. They do not associate *amalavijnana with the problem-
atic of rebirth or its escape. There is, correspondingly, no discussion of defilements or 
"outflows" (asrava). *Amalavijnana is never said to be the "counteragent" (pratipaksa) 
to anything. These texts never broach the question of the relationship between 
*amalavijnana and the path, or various kinds of dharmas (e.g. lokottaradharmas, 
prthagjanadharmas), or the stages of saiksa or asaiksa. They never speak of the purifica-
tion of vedana. Nothing in these texts echoes the AKBh passage in which the term 
amalavijnana is attested in Sanskrit. There is also nothing, in these texts, of the echoes 
with the old doctrine of consciousness as the subject of transmigration and liberation.
   More generally, in JDZL we observed a close entanglement of *amalavijnana doc-
trine with the Yogacara "Mahayana Abhidharma". Here we see, rather, attempts to con-
nect *amalavijnana more directly with core elements of innovative doctrines more par-
ticular to Yogacara itself — that there is "only consciousness" (vijnaptimatra); three 
natures (trisvabhava); theory of language; the non-dualist nature of true gnosis; and the 
relationship between that gnosis and the reality or Thusness it knows. In fact, SWXL<1> 
even seems to scorn an Abhidharmic understanding of reality (twelve ayatana etc.) as 
"hrnayana".
In contrast to these stark differences, there are only minimal areas of overlap be-
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tween the presentation of  *amalavijnana in JDZL and the other three texts. In both sets 
of material, *amalavijnana is associated in some regard with Thusness; and in both, the 
permanence of *amalavijn"ana is stressed.'88
   What, then, are we to make of these differences? We cannot be sure what they 
mean, but some possibilities suggest themselves. The traditional bibliographies assert 
that JDZL is much earlier than other texts featuring *amalavijnana. There also seems 
to be a closer fit between its *amalavijnana and amalavijnana in AKBh. These are also 
the only passages in which *amalavijn"ana features in a "translation" rather than a "lec-
ture" or "sub-commentarial" context. JDZL<1> is also the only passage that expounds 
*amalavijn"ana at length, whereas it is elsewhere often merely mentioned. Finally, stylis-
tic differences1S9 and other structural considerations190 make it possible that 
*amalavijn"ana passages in the other texts may have been added by a later hand. JDZL 
is thus far more likely than the other texts to preserve for us the first known exposition 
of *amalavijnana.
   It is possible that the differences between the "Yogacara Abhidharma" of JDZL and 
the "core Yogacara" of the other three texts is merely a function of the different topics at 
issue. The two versions of *amalavijnana doctrine, while different, do not directly con-
tradict one another, and so may be mutually consistent developments, in different direc-
tions, of the same doctrine by the same hand. It is also possible that both sets of materi-
als are equally the work of Paramartha('s group), but that the doctrine was further 
developed between JDZL and the other texts, and that the composition of the authorial 
team shifted in the interim as well. SWXL, SBKL and ZSL may therefore show us a later 
version of *amalavijn"ana. Alternatively, *amalavijnana passages may have been inter-
polated later into SWXL, ZSL and SBKL, perhaps as subcommentary. Such a later hand 
might still be quite closely related to Paramartha's group.
   Whatever the reasons, within Paramartha's corpus we thus find not one but two rel-
atively distinct doctrines of *amalavijnana. We now turn to the question of how accu-




JDZL<1>, <4>, "immutable" SWXL<1>. 
See n. 169. 
For example, the fact that ZSL seems clearly to contain different layers of commentary on the 
root text (Trimsika), whereby the second layer may be the addition of a later hand (see further 
n. 243). In SBKL<1>, too, as we saw, mention of *amalavijnana occurs in what is clearly 
labelled as an "additional comment".
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4. *Amalavijnana in later sources
   There are relatively few sources for Paramartha's doctrine of *amalavijnana. It is 
natural, then, to turn for further information to the testimony of later scholastics. Such 
scholastics report aspects of *amalavijnana doctrine never found in Paramartha's ex-
tant corpus, and this may be because they had access to additional facts. Such authors 
may have seen texts since lost; sometimes they refer to such texts (or at least claim to). 
They were also closer in time and space to Paramartha, and may have learnt things by 
hearsay that were never written down.
   However, we cannot always be sure that later reports are accurate. These authors 
may have quoted from memory, or at second-hand. They may not have had access to 
Paramartha's texts, but could be relying upon hearsay. Ideas might have been ascribed 
to Paramartha to lend them authority, even if actually elaborated by someone 
else — much as was the case with the entire Awakening of Faith. Some portrayals of 
Paramartha's ideas may have been coloured by sectarian polemics.
   For these reasons, we must determine the extent to which later authors concur 
with or diverge from Paramartha, as a way of judging their reliability. To this end, I will 
here summarise reports about *amalavijnana to 800 C.E. under three heads: (1) what 
later authors report that we do not find in Paramartha; (2) agreement between 
Paramartha and later authorities; and (3) what we find in Paramartha that is not report-
ed by later authorities.
4.1 What later sources say that Paramartha does not
   In later reports of *amalavijnana, we find much that is never found in 
Paramartha's extant corpus. First, later authors use various terms never found in 
Paramartha; second, the specific content they attribute to the doctrine of *amalavijnana 
is extremely various. In what follows, I consider this material in approximate chronologi-
cal order.
4.1.1 A proliferation of various terms
   Turning first to terms, we find that later sources frequently refer to *amalavijnana 
by various names that Paramartha's texts do not use.












pearinParam穩tha:(1)切〃¢aJa吻 舫%aiscalleda%〃aoluoshi菴摩 羅[識 】byZhiyi;204by
isiThetermwugoushiisalreadymentionedinconnectionwithYog稍穩adoctrinebyJingying
Huiyuan淨 影 慧 遠(523―592),buthethinksthatitisatermf0r稷ayavijn”ana
(T1851:44.524c25-26).Th罇issimilartothemeaningthetermhasintheChengweishilun,
T1585:31.13c19.27);Huizhao(惠沼,d.714)understandstheterminasimilarmanner,asoneof







196金 剛 三 昧 經 論,T1730:34.961bO3-04,980c14,BUSWELL[2007】,49,157.W?hyoalsousesthis
term,inadditionto庵摩 羅 識(金 剛 三 昧 經 論T1730:34.978a20,980c10[citingtheroottext亅,
BuswELL[20071,142,157)and阿摩 羅 識(浬 槃 宗 要T1769:38.249bO8).Bycontrast,VSSuses
only庵 摩 羅 識T273:9.368c28―29.











appearsintheapocrypha1大佛 頂 如 來 密 因 修 證 了 義 諸 菩 薩 萬 行 首 楞 嚴 經,T945:19.123c14―16.
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Kuiji;205 by Zhanran (AM, 711-782), perhaps following Kuiji;206 and once by Tunnyun, 
citing Kuiji.207 (2) In the Vajrasamadhi sutra T273 alone (prior to the Song), 
*amalavijn"ana is referred to by the variant anmoluoshiII[pi].208(3) It is called an-
moluoshi *1g NE [A] by Wonhyo;209 in Amoghavajra's (4cy f41,1, 705-774) T1177A;210 by 
the anonymous (perhaps late eighth century) Shi moheyan lun T1668;211 by Amoghava-
jra's disciple Huilin (24, d. 820);212 and in a sub-commentary on T1668.213 (4) The tran-
scription amoluoshi P7* [ ] was used by Kuiji;214 by Wonch'uk ( 1 Ij, 613-696);215 by 
Tunnyun, citing Kuiji;216 by Taehyon citing Kuiji;217 and by Tankuang (fA, c. 
700-788).218 (5) *Amalavijnana is called anmoluoshi V*Fga by Kuiji;219 and, citing him, 
by Tunnyun.22° (6) The transcription amoluoshi P71-Efipis used by Li Shizheng (-7-0 
1 Z, d.u., fl. 627-649);221 and byTankuang.222
205 T1829:43.179a01-05. 
206 T1912:46.221c02-12; the contents of Zhanran's comment also support the suspicion that he was
  getting his information from Kuiji. 
zo7 T1828:42.605b19-23. 
208 T273:9.368c28-29 (twice); see n. 209, 211. 
zoo T1730:34.978a01-28 (several times including quotes from the root text), 980b10, 980c07, c10-11,
981a24, 981a26; note that these instances include quotes from the root text, in which Wonhyo 
follows his own orthography rather than that of (our extant) VSS.
210 This text is the t*WA] T1177a:20.757c14-15. 
211 T1668:32.611c23-27; this text is also citing VSS, and it is perhaps significant that both Wonhyo
and T1668 have the same variant orthography; it is possible that VINE crept into the VSS 
itself as a scribal variant sometime during its transmission, and that the original had Pet #E.
212 T2128:54.604c20. 
213 X771:45.800c18-801a03. The byline ascribes this text to the Tang monk Famin V, (579-640),
  but this is a chronological impossibility (see n. 482) . 
214 T1830:43.344c10 (Kuiji here notes that this is a variant, and in the same passage also gives l7
*NM ; T1861:45.261b22 (this is the only transcription appearing in this passage). Kuiji 
ascribes the doctrine of amalavijn"ana to the Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing in the passage in 
T1861. See n. 431.
215 X369:21.247a01; Wonch'uk cites the same Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing that Kuiji is discussing 
  when he also uses this transcription.
216 T1828:42.318a22, citing T1861:45.261b22. 





222 T2812:85.1075a19-23. Some of these transcription terms (h7,f, v* a) were also used for
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   Of course, orthography was sometimes a matter of some indifference. For example, 
when  Wonhyo quotes the Vajrasamadhi sutra in his Vajrasamadhi sutra lun, he uses a 
variant orthography from the one we find in the extant text of the VSS itself.223 However, 
the majority of sources do still use the standard Paramarthian transcription amoluo Ii J) 
a. Where transcriptions in later authors depart from this standard, variant transcrip-
tions are also retained by later authors who quote those authors in turn (e.g. Tunnyun 
or Taehyon's quoting Kuiji). Thus, it seems authors did stick with a given transcription, 
and departures from the usual transcription may indicate, for example, that an author 
had heard the term but not read it; or that his knowledge of it came from a source other 
than the texts of Paramartha himself.
4.1.2 "Ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses"
   Perhaps the most significant variant term we encounter for *amalavijnana is "ninth 
consciousness" (jiushi AM). Numerous later sources frequently say that Paramartha 
expounded *amalavijnana as such a "ninth consciousness" over and above the "stan-
dard" eightfold model of consciousness of normative Yogacara. However, Paramartha's 
extant texts never say that *amalavijnana is a "ninth consciousness".224
4.1.2.1 Reference to *amalavijnana as "ninth consciousness"
   The claim that *amalavijnana is a ninth consciousness is found as early as 2hiyi,225 
Jingying Huiyuan (i q;,523 592),226 Huijun,227 and Jizang (q,549-623);228 in the 








the amalaka (myrobalan) tree, fruit etc. P himself, by contrast, uses amoluo fi JJ f even for 
amalaka: e.g. T669:16.468b15, 469a23-24. 
See n. 209. 
We must be careful to distinguish cases where P uses the phrase jiushi, but to refer to the 
ninth of the eleven vijilapti, e.g. T1595:31.181c14-15. See p. 106, and n. 245, 79. 
T1716:33.742b01-10, 744b22; T1783:39.4a12-13; T1778:38.686a06-11; X356:20.42b08-09. 
T1843:44.176a08-13, 179a20-29, 179c13-17. 
See below n. 272. 
T1824:42.104c08-09. 
T2807:85.1016c10-11. The date of the group of Dunhuang texts including T2807 is uncertain, 
but the best estimates of modern scholars, including ODA Akihiro, KATSUMATA Shunkyo, 
Shengkai and Ching KENG, tend to place each sometime between 590-640. For a recent summa-
ry of research on this subject see Shengkai, Shelun xuepai yanjiu 1, 47-59; see also, especially 
on 12805, the forthcoming Harvard PhD dissertation of Ching KENG. I am grateful to KENG for 
pointing me to this information (personal communication, September 2008).
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dasheng yi zhang *A* T2809 (probably by Daoji);230 in other writings of Daoji;231 
in Zhiyan (W, 602-668) ;232 in Li Tongxuan (*AA, 635-730) ;233 in Kuiji;234 in the 
Vajrasamadhi satra;235 in Wonhyo (based on the VSS);236 in Zhizhou (j p , 668-723);237 in 
Tankuang;238 and in Zhanran 239
4.1.2.2 A supposed special text on "ninth consciousness"
   In addition to the reports of the authors just cited, there is a complicated body of 
further evidence that similar ideas may have been contained in a lost text attributed to 
Paramartha, apparently primarily on this subject.240 The text in question is given a wide 
variety of titles containing the phrase "nine consciousnesses/ninth consciousness" 













T2809:85.1036b28. On Daoji's probable authorship of this text, see n. 382. 
See below §4.1.3.7. 
T1869:45.522c24-25; T1870:45.543a20. 
T1739:36.722b15; 722c22; 723a06-07; 723b09-11; 736a20-b03; 741b29-c01. Li Tongxuan is 
notable because, in discussing *amalavijnana, he never uses any transcription term (he rather 
calls it a danavijiiana!); his understanding of the doctrine is also highly peculiar; see n. 482. 
T1829:43.179a05; T1830:43.239a11-19; T1861:45.282c24-25. 
T273:9.370b22-c01; 371b14-16. 
T1730:34.961b03-04; 961b20-22; 978a07-08; 989b07-11; 989b23-26; 994c22-27; 995a17-19; 
1003b20-26. Some of these loci include quotes from the root text VSS. 
T1833:43.819b16-17. 
T2810:85.1050b21. It is uncertain that this passage really means *amalavijn"ana by jiushi, since 
Tankuang refers rather to the Larnkdvatara sutra, but the doctrine sounds compatible with 
what was thought about *amalavijnana by Tankuang's time: Q iturA 11POM i _ 
T1717:33.942c23-24 (implicitly); T1912:46.221c02-12. 
On this problem, see also Yom 37-42. 
In translating all the various versions of the title of this text in English, we necessarily confront 
the problem of whether it was supposed to be about a system of nine consciousnesses, or 
about a ninth consciousness specifically; in English, we cannot preserve the ambiguity of the 
Chinese. On the one hand, if we presume that the passages about *amalavijn"ana in the 
present JDZL were what was referred to as the "ninth consciousness section/chapter" of 
JDZL, then it is clear that those passages do not focus on expounding a ninefold system of 
consciousness, but rather, just on expounding *amalavijnana itself, so that we should translate 
"ninth consciousness". On the other hand, if we suppose that an entirely separate text existed 
and was lost, it seems possible, from comments that are made about its supposed content by 
authors who refer to it, that it did expound a ninefold system of consciousnesses and not just 
the ninth consciousness alone, so that we should translate "nine consciousnesses". In this 
paper, I have varied the translation as fits what seems the most likely interpretation of each
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   1) ZSL contains the phrase "as it says in chapter on the doctrine of 'Nine Conscious-
nesses'  Pp/I   j  ".242 However, this is not conclusive proof that Paramartha himself 
knew of such a text, let alone that he wrote one. ZSL apparently contains a sub-commen-
tarial layer, perhaps by a later hand,243 and this comment may belong to that layer.244 
Further, I'm Reimon has argued the possibility that this comment refers to a text like 
the Xianshi lun (XSL), which expounds not a ninefold system of "consciousnesses" (pmi, 
vijn"ana) but the first nine out of eleven "categories" or "ideas" (a, vijnaptz) (the 
xianshi = khyativijnana of XSL's title).245 Further, the comment falls in the course of a 
discussion which is in fact on alayavijiiana, i.e. eighth consciousness 246 The ZSL com-
ment may thus refer to a text entirely separate from the issue of *amalavijnana as 
"ninth consciousness".
   2) The preface to Awakening of Faith (AF) claims that a Jiushi yi zhang AMA* 
was translated by Paramartha, and gives quite specific circumstances and dates.247 How-
ever, this is a preface to a text whose own attribution to Paramartha is generally regard-
ed as spurious; and the preface is also considered inauthentic.248
   3) Bibliographic sources report that Paramartha was the author of a text called the 
Jiushi yiji jt,p aZ. However, the first report of this text is in the often unreliable Lidai 
sanbao ji ltEE, among a crop of texts dated to Paramartha's period of activity un-








passage; but I stress that all these translations are provisional. 
T1587:31.62a04. 
See FUKAURA 1, 315 ff. 
ZSL is not mentioned in the catalogues until the Da Zhou kanding mulu, composed under Em-
press Wu (r. 690-705). However, we can be certain that the text already existed (though not 
precisely by this name), and that it already contained this reference to a "chapter on the doc-
trine of nine consciousnesses", from the fact that it is quoted by Daoji, writing at the latest in 
637; see n. 375 below. 
Ym o, 41-42. See also n. 224 above. On the set of categories at issue here, see n. 79. 
YDKI 42. 
T1666:32.575a28-b01. 
See DEMIEVILLE (1929) 11-15. CHEN Yinque, however, has pointed out that some historical de-
tails in this preface could only have be known by someone very close to the original context in 
which P and his group worked, so that we cannot dismiss all of its contents out of hand. Prof. 
FUNAYAMA has rightly stressed that we must take this into consideration in weighing the testi-
mony of the preface about the Jiushi yi zhang (personal communication, October 2008).
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a suspicious precision about dates and places of translation.249 The Da Tang neidian lu 
repeats this report verbatim;250 other Buddhist bibliographers through to Zhisheng (730) 
do not pick it up.25'
   4) Gyonen says that Daoji's Shelun zhang is a commentary on the Jiushi zhangp 
1.252 From context, it is clear that Gyonen probably understands the Jiushi zhang to be 
the source of doctrines Daoji has just attributed to Paramartha in a passage Gyonen has 
quoted.2s3 Gyonen seems to have had Daoji's Shelun zhang before him as he wrote (he 
quotes it extensively). If Gyonen has this information direct from Daoji, this is probably 
our strongest piece of evidence that a Jiushi zhang existed and was already attributed to 
Paramartha in the Shelun school of Daoji's time. However, Gyonen does not say that the 
Jiushi zhang was in fact by Paramartha, and it is possible that Daoji was reading a Jiushi 
zhang by another author (for instance, his teacher Jingsong; see below) which described 
Paramartha's doctrines at second hand. It is also possible that Gyonen knows of a sup-
posed erstwhile Jiushi zhang by Paramartha, and has merely inferred that Daoji is com-
menting upon it.
   5) Wonhyo also refers to what seems most likely to be a similar text (a zhang), but 
without specifying its title.254
   6) Wonch'uk cites a Jiushi zhang ft,p *,255 and even says specifically, in his com-
mentary on the Samdhinirmocana sutra, that the text was quoting a 'Ninth Conscious-
249 T2034:49.99a12. Yoxi also points out, following earlier scholars, that there is an inconsistency
in Fei's account: P was not where he is said to have translated the text in the year he is sup-
posed to have translated it; Ymu 38.
2so T2149:55.266b06. Yoxi points out that neither Fei nor Jingmai ever actually saw the text, 38. 
251 On the Jiushi yiji, see also Su (1937): 28. I am grateful to Prof. FUNAYAMA Toru for pointing out
  this reference to me. 
252 E_E4l*0 Tlwt,pra, ~~> DBZ 12, 364b. 
253 A-p E. 4:3 Nig etc., DBZ 12, 364a-b. 
254pv~A, 2 , 4RA znia*gt, T1730:34.978a07-08. However, at the same locus,
Wonhyo also asserts point blank that P expounded his theory on the basis of the VSS passage 
under discussion, which is chronologically impossible, so we must take what he says with a 
grain of salt.
2ss T1708:33.400b26-29; X369:21.240c06-07, 271b11-12. Uich'on ( 1055-1101) reports that a 
  text of this title was included in the canon, but perhaps he was just relying on Wonch'uk and 
  other reports? T2184:55.1177c06.
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ness' Chapter" of  JDZL.256 This is the first time we see the claim that JDZL contains such 
a special chapter, here found in tandem with the notion of a freestanding text on the 
same topic. The most impressive thing about Wonch'uk's evidence is that he cites the 
Jiushi zhang as a source for ideas that are not directly connected to the doctrine of 
*amalavijn"ana or ninth consciousness.257 Here, it is difficult to imagine any motivation 
for Wonch'uk (or any intermediate source, if the citation is indirect258) to ascribe the 
passage to the Jiushi zhang, except that such a text indeed existed and contained it.259 
This evidence cannot reassure us that the Jiushi zhang these scholars cite was correctly 
ascribed to Paramartha, but it strongly suggests that some text of that name certainly 
did exist.
7) In a Vinaya text by Dajue )c (712),260 we also see the claim that JDZL contains 
a "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" AAA, referring to *amalavijn"ana.m
   8) Tunnyun reports that according to Huijing „;t„ Paramartha "established the 
doctrine of nine consciousnesses AA* on the basis of a citation from the 'Ninth Con-
sciousness Chapter' Mai of JDZL." Tunnyun is sceptical, and notes that there "never 
was" any such chapter in the corresponding part of YBh.262 Tunnyun notably tells us ex-
plicitly that he only has this information by hearsay.
   9) Tankuang reports that the theory of ninth consciousness is found in "the 'Trea-
tise on Nine Consciousnesses' (Jiushi lun jt,pi p a), translated by Paramartha".'
256 4 CH r7Az.? ajr j-L,A,pni itigt, once more at X369:21.240c06-07. 
257 Anzia FJLur*1 QiC I ?
   T R~ ( ?) Q,~, 2' t 1A. 1A i p po J r p P7rZt-F f PRTI t, 
X369:21.271b11-14.
258 YoHI does not believe Wonch'uk ever saw the text; 39. 
259 The same is true of a much later reference in Chinkai ( i , 1092-1152). p ;k•: riuS0J
                     T2299:70.228c, cited in -Orlin 2007(b). 
260 On the date of this text, see n. 457. 
261 { ,,~ p~~ ~~t aaaAp~ )L rR7f p J, X736:42.876b19-20. 
262 Tunnyun also goes on to express scepticism about the claim that the notion of *amalavijnana
really derives from WXL, on the grounds that corresponding parts of XYSJL do not feature the 
concept; T1828:42.318a11-15.
263 T2812:85.1075a19-23. Note that Tankuang may well, like Tunnyun, have been getting his infor-
  mation via Kuiji; he too was trained in the Faxiang school.
108
'The Doctrine of  *Amalavijnana in Paramartha (499-569), and Later Authors to Approximately 800 C.E."
   10) In a statement either paraphrasing Dajue or quoting a third common source, 
Chengguan (738-839) also refers to a "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" of JDZL; 
WO-Lag 264
   11) A Jiushi lun JLp in two juan is attributed to Paramartha in a catalogue of 
manuscripts from Japan dating to 753.265 However, the entry in question is included in a 
list of manuscripts "yet to be copied" (misha '4-), so there is no guarantee that the 
compiler of the catalogue actually sighted the text in question.
   We should also note the ambiguous case of Huijun, who refers at one point to doc-
trines expounded in MSg and a `Jiushi yi" JL^266 ~ p a11. Jiushi yi here could sim-
ply mean "[in expounding] the tenet of ninth consciousness", but given that later reports 
held that Paramartha wrote a text entitled the Jiushi yiji JLa- etc. (AF preface, Fei 
Changfang), we must also recognise the possibility that this is an abbreviated reference 
to the title of a text.267
   Against these sources, we must weigh another set of references, which sometimes 
purports to trace the idea of "ninth consciousness" or "nine consciousnesses" to similar 
source texts, but without referring to a special text or chapter with "ninth conscious-
ness/nine consciousnesses" in the title. Such authors are largely early.
1) Huijun (conceivably our earliest witness268) says:
264 T1736:36.323c10, 336b20. 
265 r JLa nd Misha kyoritsuron sha mokurokup a El a (Shosoin bunsho TA" 
Z1), Dai Nippon komonjo juni (tsuika roku) , 553; cited in 
YOSHIMURA (unpublished 2007b), 3, on the basis of OTAKE 2007(b).
266 The context makes it clear here that the illegible character must be shi ;f . 
267 However, elsewhere, Huijun also ascribes the doctrine of ninth consciousness rather to the
Shiqi jing (see p. 109 below). Huijun also immediately cites a verse that appears in MSg (see n. 
335), so that either this verse should have appeared in the putative Jiushi yi as well, or the 
phrase merely means "in his [teachings on the] tenet of the ninth consciousness and the 
Mahayanasarzzgraha". Matters are further complicated by the fact that in the series of three 
quotations that follow (the second and third introduced by X ), there is material that is not 
found in the present MSg or MSgBh, including a phrase that can, rather, be traced to FXL and 
SBKL, i.e. gripgr4— X784:46.645c06; see n. 334. This may indeed indicate that material 
included in these apparent quotes not found in MSg and Bh was found in a separate text, 
available to Huijun, called the Jiushi yi.
268 See n. 330.
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"What is the practice in seventeen stages? It is as laid out in the Sutra of Seventeen [Stages]  -F--L 
s,269 which is cited by the Trepitaka Paramartha to prove the tenet that there is a ninth con-
sciousness A'jt0$I. His treatise are says, "nine kinds of mind AA-Ls", and thus there exists a 
ninth consciousness AV)-(MI. However, that sutra [i.e. Shiqi jing] has not been translated here 
[in China it F 271], and [Paramartha's claim] is thus difficult to believe."272
   It is key that Huijun does not say the "Shiqi jing" contained a chapter A specially on 
"ninth consciousness" (i.e. a Jiushi pin AMA). Rather, he says that the text speaks of 
jiu pin xin f(, A L , most naturally read "nine kinds/categories of mind". This claim fits 
better with our extant JDZL (if we grant the identification between *amalavijnana and 
"ninth consciousness") than any claim that any partial YBh translation by Paramartha 
contained an entire special section devoted to "ninth consciousness". This is also the 
earliest reference in our extant record to the exposition of ninefold mind in JDZL. We 
might thus suspect that the idea of a "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" arose later by a re-
versal of Huijun's word order (it A L' -, )1,,[1,A), combined with the idea that 
Paramartha wrote a special text on this topic.
   2) The anonymous Shelun School Dunhuang text, She dasheng lun shu)4R 
T2805,273 mentions a passage in which JDZL "expounds ninth consciousness"274{
269 Certainly, given the context, to be identified with what the tradition has more usually called the
  Shiqi di lun, for which see n. 168. 
270 This might also refer to the Shiqi di inn, even though it was referred to as a jing f• in the
previous sentence. However, given that the text is here discussing P's citation of the so-called 
Shiqi di inn to prove the existence of ninth consciousness, it is more likely that it refers to a 
lun by P in which he gives the citation. That the two sources are separate in Huijun's mind is 
made still more likely by the fact that Huijun reverts to calling the Shiqi jing a jing in the 
sentence immediately following.
271 CH'OE argues, at least for some instances, that cijian and similar expressions refer to Paekche, 
  where he holds the Si lun xuan yi was composed, in opposition to Wu l and Lu 2 as 
   appellations for parts of China; see e.g. 18-23. However, Cx'oE's theory seems to me to still be 
speculative; and it would be odd, in this instance, for Huijun to have the expectation that any 
  text would be translated "here" if "here" means in Paekche.
272 IAE I -Lith45- 0 'n • 0.-E N, XA 0±-I !J p.Q glA. rApn,bi, 
f[ a~iI0 ft'JlLN1rlK[FEFr, MOPE, X784:46.569b24-c02. The text then goes on to enumerate the 
   seventeen stages.
273 Ching KENG dates T2805 between 590 and 600; see his forthcoming Harvard PhD dissertation. 
274 See n. 241 on this translation.
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j i-ak #'.275 This passage is of particular interest because T2805 is here not itself 
expounding *amalavijnana or "ninth consciousness", so this characterisation of the text 
is clearly not motivated by T2805's doctrinal agenda. The quote following this introduc-
tion is not a verbatim citation, but perhaps rather a paraphrase.276 However, the author 
clearly knew Paramartha's text.Z77 The cited passage falls just before JDZL<1>.278
   This passage, comments by Huijun, comments in T2807,279 and comments by Daoji 
(who cites parts of XWL)280 are the only instances where a later reference to "ninth con-
sciousness" can clearly be shown to have in mind an extant Paramartha text. T2805 is 
also the earliest text to say that "ninth consciousness" derives from JDZL, and the only 
text that actually recognisably cites JDZL in the process. T2805 also shows no special in-
terest in "ninth consciousness" or *amalavijnana, but rather merely mentions it here, in 
passing. It is thus early, accurate, and has no special interest in presenting any version 
of "ninth consciousness" doctrine. If T2805 also does not say that JDZL contains a spe-
cial "chapter" on "ninth consciousness", we may be glimpsing another intermediate 
stage in the elaboration of a legend of a special chapter on ninth consciousness in JDZL.
   3) Another anonymous Shelun School Dunhuang text, the She dasheng lun zhang 
top a0. T2807, says "it is said abroad" 3jj-12T47 that the "Bodhisattva Chapter' of the 
'Treatise on Seventeen Stages'281 [Shiqi di lun +-L i ag Q ga] goes into detail to distin-
275 T2805:85.985b19. 
276 Referring to JDZL T1584:30.1019b16-19. O-rAKE 2007(b) points out that there are places in
which this version of the text of JDZL is closer to the text of YBh as reflected in XZ and Tib. 
than the extant JDZL. He suggests that this may indicate that the author of T2805 is citing 
from the so-called Jiushi yi (which he takes to have been a separate text), in which P, rather 
than citing his own earlier translation of JDZL verbatim, retranslated from the original San-
skrit. One difficulty this inference must confront is the question of why T2805 calls this text 
"Jueding zang lun"
, if it was citing a different text to our extant JDZL.
277 Other than via P, we know of no other way that an author in China at the time of T2805 could 
  know the content of this part of YBh.
278 JDZL<1> begins a full Taisho page later, T1584:30.1020b08. Note too that JDZL itself says, at 
  the end of JDZL<1>, that the whole section has been about "the realisation of the 
*amalavijnana"; see n. 48. That the citation falls outside our JDZL passages suggests that the 
  author of T2805 considered a Iarger portion of JDZL to be centrally engaged in "expounding 
  ninth consciousness" than only the passages that actually mention *amalavijn`ana.
279 See §4.1.3.5 below. 
280 See §4.1.3.7 below. 
281 Does this statement in T2807 mean that the author had heard of some foreign text or authority
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guish an *amalavijn"ana, and counts it as a ninth consciousness *Miff ttawurt., 
p.„282 Now, Shiqi di lun is the title of a lost partial translation of YBh by Paramartha, and 
the present JDZL may be a remnant of it.2S3 The present JDZL does not contain a `Bo-
dhisattva Chapter";284 but the passage that concentrates most on *amalavijnana, 
JDZL<1>, does open with an indication that it is discussing the entry of the bodhisattvas 
into the "stage of non-regression” (f .b, avaivartikabhami). Thus, the title "Bodhisat-
tva Chapter" may be no less appropriate than "Ninth Consciousness Chapter".285
   T2807 thus traces *amalavijnana to the exposition in JDZL, but refers to it by an-
other alternate chapter name, also unattested in our extant text. This suggests that: (1) 
reference to texts by title was loose; (2) the tradition that JDZL contained a "Ninth Con-
sciousness Chapter" was either not yet established, or at least not yet universal.
   4) The wording of Huijun's report ((1) above) is echoed by Daoji j. Daoji says 
that Paramartha cited the "definitive exposition (? { --" ) of nine kinds of mind f[ pa L 
in the Shiqi di lun" to prove a theory of ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses.286 
However, Daoji does not seem to have very concrete information about his sources. He 
claims, for example, that Paramartha quotes LAS in expounding his theory, which is not 







who said that Shiqi di lun corroborated the doctrine of *amalavijnana found in JDZL? Or does 
it simply indicate that the author presumed it was a "foreign tradition M- M " because the text 
is presented as a translation? Does the use of the title Shiqi di lun mean that the author had ac-
tually seen a text circulating under that title that expounded *amalavijn"ana — and as a ninth 
consciousness, to boot — or that he was just attempting to put two and two together from vari-
ous pieces of hearsay? 
T2807:85.1016c21-23. 
See n. 168. 
The*amalavijnana passages appear in a chapter entitled "The Stage/Ground of the Mind" Ls 
pg A x4- T1584:30.1020b05 
X I r+-LIp J VI. , DBZ 22, 370a, 370b, 388b. 
p p = `c. q I DBZ 22, 370a, 370b, 388b. Ornlc Susumu points 
out that the wording of this quotation matches no Chinese translation of LAS, and suggests 
that this is because the quote genuinely dates back to P, who translated himself and directly 
from his knowledge of Skt. LAS; he regards this as supporting evidence for the likelihood that 
a special text on ninth consciousness by P really did exist (OrARE 2007d). However, given the 
confusion that Daoji seems to evince in this very same passage about his other source, the Shi-
qi di lun (in which case he is possibly referring to or "citing" a text he himself never even saw, 
and thus basing himself on hearsay), it does not seem that we have strong grounds for confi-
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lun. He rejects it as a proof-text on the grounds that "has never circulated in this country 
[i.e. China] iFE VT7".288 Daoji himself thus never saw the Shiqi di lun, and any informa-
tion he gives us about it is based on hearsay.289
   Once again, Daoji does not say that the Shiqi di lun contained a special section 
whose title had anything to do with "ninth consciousness". Daoji was a Shelun scholar in 
a direct line from Paramartha himself. His teacher, Jingsong (one remove from 
Paramartha), may have written a text entitled Jiushi yi zhang (see below), which we 
would expect his disciple Daoji to have known. If even Daoji does not say that 
Paramartha's Shiqi di lun (or JDZL) contained a special chapter on "ninth conscious-
ness", and if he nonetheless refers to Shiqi di lun (and LAS!) for his textual support, 
rather than a dedicated text by Paramartha on ninth consciousness, then it seems un-
likely such a text existed by the 630s.
   In addition, Daoxuan ( J, 596-667) reports that two other texts with similar titles 
were written by important Shelun figures. (1) Tanqian * (542-607) is supposed to 
have written a Jiushi zhang ik .290 Tanqian was extremely influential in spreading 
Shelun School thought to the North, and a prominent figure under the Sui.291 (2) Jing- 
song (l~---A, 537-614) is supposed to have written ajiushi xuan yiJl a.292 Jingsong 
was a disciple of Fatai %f and so a "dharma grandson" of Paramartha himself; he was 
also, like Tanqian, an important figure in the transfer of the Shelun school to the 
North.293 Jingsong was also pivotal because he was the master of Daoji, an important 
Shelun-school witness to later *amalavijiiana doctrine (see below). It is thus not impos-
dence that Daoji certainly quoted word-for-word from texts on paper, rather than roughly, from 
memory or hearsay. The slight difference in wording here might therefore only be evidence 
that Daoji's "quotation" is actually simply a "near-enough" paraphrase.
288 DBZ 12, 370b; in fact, as we will see below, Daoji goes to some lengths to find alternative proof-
  texts for the notion of ninth consciousness, precisely because he is so suspicious of the Shiqi 
di lun.
289 This ignorance about the text is mirrored by the fact that details of Daoji's reference to the text 
  also seem confused; his mention of z-Zis perhaps a vague echo of the title of Jueding zang 
  lun, and it is possible that he knows that these two titles have something to do with one anoth-
  er, but is not sure what.
290 Xu gaoseng zhuan T2060:50.574b04. It is important to remember, in assessing this 
   report, that Daoxuan's information is never repeated in any other source.
291 See CHEN Jinhua. 
292 Xu gaoseng zhuan, T2060:50.502a02. 
293 See n. 366.
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sible that one of these texts became associated in the tradition with Paramartha, leading 
to the reports we have seen above of a similar text in  Paramartha's name.294
   Finally, we should also consider that the earliest mention of a ninth consciousness, 
or nine consciousnesses, is found not in Paramartha or his successors, but in the 
Lamkavatara sutra (LAS), as early as the translation of Bodhiruci.295 The verse in ques-
tion reads: "The various consciousnesses, eight or nine in kind/ Are like waves on wa-
ter."296 This passage, or its doctrine, was frequently referred to as later scholastics dis-
cussed the concept of *amalavijnana and ninth consciousness: for example, by Jingying 
Huiyuan,297 T2807,298 Li Tongxuan,299 Kuiji,300 Tunnyun,301 and Tankuang.302 This shows 
that later authors were interested in using LAS to furnish a scriptural warrant for 
*amalavijnana; or using the notion of *amalavijnana to interpret this cryptic passage 
in LAS; or using LAS to account for the errors perceived as inhering in the notion of 
*amalavijnana; etc. Whatever tack the various later scholars took, these passages sug-
gest that LAS is one possible alternative source of the enumeration of *amalavijnana as 
a ninth consciousness.
Surveying this tangled body of evidence, we can discern several main points.
   First, there seems to be considerable confusion about the title of the text(s) as-
cribed to Paramartha (jL, - --Lth A p, AMAI, AMA, AMAgE, 
'AZa A-fLp ab, AAA), , ), which we find alongside a number of other locu-
294 In this connection, YOSHIMURA points out that Tanqian is said in his biography to have read AF
before he encountered MSg. Thus, if later characterisations of "ninth consciousness" (e.g. 
Wonch'uk) present it as if through an AF filter, and at the same time cite a Jiushi zhang as the 
source of the doctrine, this would be consistent with Tanqian being the actual author of the 
Jiushi zhang in question; YOSHIMURA (2007a), 181.
295 Ynki, in particular, has seen great significance in this connection with LAS; see n. 307. 
296 ItfafrA/t0zt(+1; T671:16.565b24. Skt. astadha navadha citram tarangani
mahodadhau/ 10.13cd, NAND() 265; "The Vijiiana[-system] rises; severally as eightfold, as 
ninefold, like waves on the great ocean:" Suzuic (1999), 227. The entire surrounding section is 
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tions which may or may not even refer to a freestanding text (iL vL', fGpa.t, JLPi 
FP). We also see much confusion about whether it this was a freestanding text or a chap-
ter in a larger text (usually specified as in JDZL), or (perhaps) both. This confusion does 
not inspire confidence that many authors had actually seen such a text.
   There is a clear association in some quarters between this supposed text and JDZL 
(or Shiqi di lun). If "ninth consciousness" refers to *amalavijnana, this association is 
partly justified; however, extant JDZL *amalavijnana doctrine does not call it a "ninth 
consciousness". Further, as we will see, the actual ideas about *amalavijnana that are 
expounded in JDZL almost never appear again in the record.
We can further sort the above materials into three main groups:
   (1) the idea that JDZL or Shiqi di lun expounded the idea of ninth consciousness, 
without any claim about a section with a related title: Huijun, T2805 and T2807, and 
Daoji.
   (2) the idea that there existed a separate text on the same topic: beginning (possi-
bly) with ZSL, or Fei Changfang and the AF preface; the root-text of Daoji's Shelun 
zhang (only as reported by the much later Gyonen); the Da Tang neidian lu; the Fax-
iang authors Wonch'uk and Tankuang; possibly Wonhyo; and the Japanese catalogue of 
735. In Wonch'uk we find the unusual hybrid assertion that such a freestanding text 
Jiushi zhang) cited a special chapter of JDZL.
   (3) The idea that JDZL contained a text with a title to do with ninth consciousness, 
expounding the same.3o3 This idea is first seen in Wonch'uk, then in Dajue, Tunnyun and 
Chengguan. In Wonch'uk, moreover, we find the unusual hybrid idea that this chapter 
was the source for a separate text called the Jiushi zhang.
   Thus, the broad pattern seems to be as follows. Our earliest evidence contains two 
conflicting accounts. In the first century after Paramartha, one line of evidence holds 
that the doctrine of ninth consciousness is grounded in JDZL (among other texts; WXL, 
MSgBh etc. are also cited). This line of evidence is found in our best informed, most 
scrupulous early sources: Huijun and texts closely associated with the Shelun school, 
which go into detail about doctrines and accurately cite Paramartha's real texts. Along-
303 See also Yoshumu A (2007a), 180-182.
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side this, we have texts which, especially in the early period, only touch very fleetingly 
on the whole problem, and never show themselves to be well informed about the con-
crete contents of Paramartha's texts. These texts hold that the doctrine of ninth con-
sciousness is found in a separate text by Paramartha containing the term "ninth 
consciousness/nine consciousnesses" in the title, but cannot agree on what that title is. 
At the same time, we also have accounts that inform us that two important Shelun 
School authors in the late sixth century, Tanqian and Jingsong, wrote texts with "ninth 
consciousness/nine  consciousnesses" in the title. There is thus a possibility that the 
freestanding text of that title ascribed to Paramartha might, like AF, have been incor-
rectly attributed to him, and actually authored by someone else.304
   When we arrive at the Faxiang authors, the characterisation of the textual basis for 
the theory of ninth consciousness changes. Wonch'uk seems to be pivotal. In him, we 
see an assertion, never repeated, that there exists a freestanding text, and that it cites a 
section of JDZL also named for the doctrine of ninth consciousness. Perhaps Wonch'uk 
was attempting to reconcile the two contradictory traditions that had preceded him, i.e. 
that there was a text with jiushi in the title, and that the doctrine was expounded prima-
rily in JDZL.305 After Wonch'uk, all authors but one take to saying that ninth conscious-
ness doctrine is expounded in a chapter of JDZL named for that doctrine. The idea that 
there existed a separate text only recurs in catalogues and in Tankuang.
   While we cannot be sure, it thus seems likely that neither JDZL nor Shiqi di lun 
ever contained a section with the term "ninth consciousness" in the title. The idea that 
such a text existed seems rather to emerge over a century after Paramartha's death, as 
an attempt to reconcile conflicting traditions, and then to be repeated in a way that 
shows the extent of the authority of Wonch'uk (which he shared with Kuiji; see below).
   It is even more difficult to know whether or not Paramartha did indeed compose a 
freestanding text with jiushi in the title. On the one hand, the texts that do say 
Paramartha wrote such a text are less clearly reliable. On the other hand, the portion of 
Fei Changfang's Lidai sanbao ji about Paramartha's translations may have been based 
on a list drawn up by Cao Bi; CHEN Yinque has shown that the apocryphal AF preface 
still contains considerable accurate historical information; and Wonch'uk and Chinkai 
cite the Jiushi zhang on topics other than ninth consciousness. These facts and others
304 YOSHIMURA argues this was the case; YOSHIMURA (2007a), 181. 
305 Yoiu suggests this possibility; 40.
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discussed above seem to me to suggest that at least one text with a title like Jiushi zhang 
certainly existed, and that it was almost certainly ascribed to Paramartha as early as 
590. However, perhaps that attribution, and indeed the text itself, was not widely known 
for quite some time beyond that (otherwise why would Daoji not cite it?). Beyond this, 
however, it seems to me impossible to exclude either of two mutually contradictory pos-
sibilities: (a) the text was by Paramartha, or (b) that it was by another author, and the at-
tribution was apocryphal.
4.1.2.3 Did Paramartha propound a ninth consciousness?
   The idea that there are nine consciousnesses, and the identification of 
*amalavijnana with the ninth consciousness, was certainly current and well-known in 
the scholastic Buddhism of North China from the early Sui (by the late 580s or 590),306 
All our most reliable witnesses for this early period relay to us this idea. We have no evi-
dence that is closer to Paramartha and his circle than these witnesses, that might give 
us grounds to doubt this testimony. We must recognise the possibility that these ideas 
were genuinely propounded by members of the group (including perhaps Paramartha 
himself), but were lost from the extant record of their texts.
   On the other hand, these ideas are absent from the extant Paramartha corpus. Fur-
ther, as we will see, even our earliest witnesses were not very well-informed about 
Paramartha's actual doctrines of *amalavijnana; many of the aspects of the doctrine we 
have seen above are entirely absent from their accounts, and each of them appears igno-
rant of the bare existence of at least some key texts, let alone their contents. We have 
also seen that the notion of nine kinds of consciousnesses could have been derived from 
LAS, and *amalavijnana labelled a ninth consciousness in order to make sense of the 
LAS passage and furnish the Shelun school theory of mind with more textual support.307 
It is also possible, then, that a nine-consciousness model grew up in the early Shelun 
school, to reconcile earlier convictions that the ground of mind was pure Thusness with 
the idea that alayavijn na was the repository of all defiled seeds.308 Given that our 
present evidence gives us no firm testimony of the existence of the idea of ninth con-
306 Indeed, YOSHIMURA makes the valid point that if Jingying Huiyuan, who himself espoused an
eight-consciousness theory, nonetheless felt obliged to make room for a ninth consciousness 
theory and *amalavOana understood as such, it is a sign that this position was already strong 
in his time; YOSHIMURA (2002), 229.
307 Ywu in particular argues that P did not expound nine consciousnesses, but that the doctrine 
  developed under the influence of the LAS; see esp. Yoxl 21-44.
308 Something like this is the conclusion argued by YOSHIMURA (2002); see esp. 240, 241 n. 28.
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sciousness until perhaps as late as 590, we cannot exclude the possibility that the doc-
trine of ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses was an early  post  Paramartha devel-
opment, which was then ascribed to him as founder of the Shelun school.
   It therefore seems impossible to determine for sure whether or not Paramartha or 
his group expounded ninth consciousness, or nine consciousnesses.
4.1.3 Later reports of concrete contents of the doctrine of *amalavijnana
   In tracing the later development of *amalavijnana doctrine, we must treat the re-
ports of several individuals separately, since there is relatively little agreement between 
them 309 This lack of consensus alone suggests that there was a lot of creative interpreta-
tion mixed in with these reports.
4.1.3.1 Jingying Huiyuan
   Jingying Huiyuan (z'AM , 523-592)31° places *amalavijnana under a broader ru-
bric of "true" Al consciousness, which is twofold, including also alayavijnana. He says 
that amala means "taintless" in Chinese 1th ,1,1!,t , and also "originally pure" i . He 
says further that it is referred to as "taintless" in the sense that the substance Q of what 
is true (or Thusness) is permanent and pure p , igaQ ?f . He equates it with the 
"Thusness aspect of mind" =C iiiin, a term clearly derived from AF.311 he quotes AF ac 
a proof-text in the next line, so connecting *amalavijnana to tathagatagarbha.312 Else-
where, Huiyuan again associates "ninth consciousness" with the "Thusness aspect of 
mind" ,C VEI, and alayavijnana with "the aspect of mind [that is subject to] arising, 
cessation and conditions" Ci Nfm• The ninth consciousness is the "substance of 
all dharmas" ,?,#{ . Both *amalavijnana and alayavijnana are part of the same mind, 
but the difference is that ninth consciousness is the state in which language is cut off 
and conditionality is transcended, whereas eighth consciousness is the state in which 
[mind] conforms to the metamorphoses brought about by conditions?"
309 The most through discussions of later witnesses, to my knowledge, are Yoru and YOSHIMURA
  (2002) (2007a). 
310 We have already seen that Jingying Huiyuan refers to *amalavijn'ana as a "ninth




313 !—'t'*gA"'. MA o fs,41, Igik , T1843:44.179a20-29. See also
T1843:44.179c13-17.
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   Already, the concept of *amalavijnana is clearly being interpreted in part through 
the lens of AF. As a result, the relationship posited here between *amalavijnana and 
alayavijnana differs from that found in Paramartha's works. Paramartha understood 
*amalavijnana to be the counteragent to alayavijnana, and the two to be in a temporal 
relationship to one another, whereby alayavijnana existed only until liberation, and was 
then succeeded by fully realised *amalavijn`ana.314 For Huiyuan's post-AF analysis, by 
contrast, the two are different facets of the same "true" consciousness, *amalavijniana 
in its pure, eternal, self-contained and transcendent purity, and alayavijnana as it is en-
gaged with and even immanent in samsara.315
   Huiyuan also links *amalavijnana as "ninth consciousness" to the LAS passage 
mentioned above.316 Here again, he says that within the rubric of a ninefold analysis of 
consciousness, there are two possible analyses, depending upon whether one under-
stands "true" and "false" as (1) distinct 1~5 U or (2) as dialectically "analysed and 
then synthesised" t-,. (1) In the former perspective, the "true" aspect is twofold, and 
comprises *amalavijnlana on the one hand and alayavijnana on the other. (2) On the lat-
ter analysis, only "the fundamentally pure *amalavijnana" *i -R71 Lai is "true", and 
alayavijnana is included among eight consciousnesses that are an "amalgam of true and 
false"fa Q .317 This approach is again redolent of AF. However, these are only two 
among a longer list of various modes of analysis consciousness admits of, which also in-
clude tenfold and elevenfold analyses.
   It seems, then, that Huiyuan is wielding the concept of *amalavijniana and related 
concepts in the pursuit of his own hermeneutic projects,318 and is not simply concerned 
with giving us accurate doxographic reports of Paramartha's own doctrine. Huiyuan also 
shows little sign of direct acquaintance with Paramartha's own pertinent texts.319
314 As we saw, this relationship is complicated by the fact that P also, in some passages, considers
  that *amalavijn"ana pre-exists liberation in some form, e.g. as the basis for the path, etc. 
315 PI k u ...U~.,;f... i A, T1851:44.530b09-11. 
316 See n. 296. 
317 T1851:44.530c08-16. 
318 On this same point, see Yoxl 29, YOSHIMURA (2002), 226-227. 




   The bulk of Zhiyi's  (Mi, 538-597)32° discussion of *amalavijnana321 is found in his 
Fahua xuanyi { A-, most likely dating to around 593.322 Zhiyi maps the different lev-
els of consciousness, in which he includes *amalavijnana, onto his unique doctrine of 
"three dharmas" E{ or "three rules" E1L: *amalavijnana is the "rule of Thusness [it-
self)" Alittt alayavijnana corresponds to the "rule of contemplation of Thusness" ~A 
1t; and adanavijnana mu& corresponds to "the rule of extending this understand-
ing to the workings of Thusness" W J *JLL.323 Zhiyi also says explicitly that the difference 
between *amalavijnana and alayavijnana is just that *amalavijnana is alayavijnana in 
which the seeds of wisdom exist and in which the "perfumation (vasana) of hearing" has 
grown, so that it undergoes a "revolutionary transformation of the basis" 
(asrayaparavrtti) and is transformed into "Thusness after the path" GIASI.p).324 He 
identifies *amalavijnana with something he rather idiosyncratically calls "the light of 
nirvikalpakajnana" :VyTh-V,M jC 325 Elsewhere, Zhiyi also says that *amalavijnana is the 
"consciousness" of a Buddha
, whereas alayavijnana is the consciousness of the bodhisat-
tva, and adanavijnana, which he calls the "seventh" consciousness and identifies with 
*prativikalpavijnana !I.MIJ-M, is proper to the two lesser vehicles.326
As this brief overview shows,327 much of what Zhiyi has to say about *amalavijnana
320 We have already seen above that Zhiyi uses the otherwise unusual transcription Vita [m] for
*amalavijn`ana, and also understands it as a "ninth consciousness". 
321 On Zhiyi's understanding of "ninth consciousness", see YosHIMURa (forthcoming). 
322 i/, T1716. Lectures upon which this text is based are traditionally said to have
been given in 593 during Zhiyi's stay in Jingzhou ij)ii; however, doubts remain about the exact 
date and place of these lectures, and it is possible they took place slightly later. See SATO, 58-59. 
Moreover, because many of Zhiyi's texts were revised in light of other information (e.g. the 
work of Jizang) by Zhiyi's disciple Guanding i ]f (561-632), it is difficult to be sure which 
details in those texts date back to Zhiyi himself.
323 T1716:33.744b18-20. The doctrine of the "three dharmas/rules" as a whole is expounded from 
  T1716:33.741b07.
324 Z[t7 411=', ra`''~e, 13D$ 'fPA alkA I, rilga ], T1716:33.744b28-29. 
325 T1716:33.744c08. 
326 T1783:39.4a12-13. SATO concludes that it is impossible to be sure if the presentis
genuinely by Zhiyi, or if so, when the lectures upon which it is based might have been given. 
Zhiyi is thought to have preached on the Suvarnaprabha around 581, but Guanding could not 
have heard these teachings; SATO 452-453. He is also thought to have preached on (part of) it 
between 588 and 592, but the circumstances make it unlikely that these sermons were the 
basis of the extant commentarial texts; SATO 454-455.
327 Further comments about *amalavijn"ana are found in two other works ascribed to Zhiyi in the
120
 "The Doctrine of *Amalavijnana in Paramartha (499-569), and Later Authors to Approximately 800 C.E."
is unique to him, and looks like the result of creative attempts to coordinate what he 
knows of *amalavijnana from other sources with other doctrines and his own original 
system.'"
4.1.3.3 Huijun/Hyegyun
   Important evidence about the image of Paramartha's doctrine in late sixth-century 
China is preserved in Huijun's (M t% d.u., fl. 574-5900329 Si lun xuan yipn^a ---X784. 
It is difficult to know exactly when Huijun was writing,33o but the Shelun school already
canon, but it is difficult to be sure of their authenticity and date. Even if these two texts are not 
actually by Zhiyi, however, we should not automatically exclude their evidence. They may both 
nonetheless contain information as early as the period immediately after Zhiyi's death, and 
thus still comprise some of our earliest evidence. (1) The ^~A; .. 411X356 is a 
collection of fragments made in 1023 by Zhili Uit (960-1028) of the Shanjia LLJ faction, in-
tended to disprove accusations from representatives of the Shanwai Il1N- faction that parts of 
the Jin guangming xuan yi were apocryphal. It may contain sub-commentarial layers, and these 
are further of uncertain date; SATO 451. This text says *amalaviiiiana is an "unmoving 
consciousness" (7nii), and says it is another name for prajna and awakening ~T; 
X356:20.42b08-09. It further identifies *amalavijn`ana with the attainment of a sophisticated in-
sight N. into the nature of mind, which has both empty and non-empty aspects; this insight 
does not hypostasise either the empty or the provisional, but understands their dialectical in-
terrelationship; 60b10-13. It also maps this schema onto the analogy to gold, earth and impuri-
ties from MSg; *amalavijn"ana equates with the gold, and is all that is left when full buddha-
hood is attained; 48c15-18. (2) The Chan men zhang opm X907 is probably not actually by 
Zhiyi, but is rather a commentary on Zhiyi's ?k ii Mj. SATO thinks it probably dates after 
Zhiyi's death (in 597), but otherwise is unable to speculate about its date; SATO 125, 276. This 
text includes *amalavijnana in a string of different names which variously identify the abso-
lute, all of which have in common that they strike the happy medium (madhyamapratipad) be-
tween the extremes of various false dualisms like conditioned/unconditioned, bondage/libera-
tion, worldly/transcendent, defiled/pure etc. In this context, *amalavijnana is identified with 
ultimate truth (paramarthasatya), Buddha nature (foxing Stt), Thusness, the "limit of what 
exists" (bhatakotz), non-abiding, non-production etc; X907:55.645b17-22.
328 See YosHIMURA (forthcoming), 2. 
329 We have already seen above that Huijun says that P propounded a ninth consciousness, and
that he said he did so in a "treatise" that cited the so-called "Shiqi jing"; see above p. 48. The 
only transcription he uses for *amala [vifilana] is 157Vi . He also calls it wugoushi „ ;f and 
jingshi i i. Huijun attributes the doctrine of "ninth consciousness" mA,-la to the "Shelun 
masters"; X784:46.635b09.
330 Huijun/Hyegyun, also known as Junzheng AI, was a Sanlun scholar-monk, and like Jizang 
  was a disciple of Falang ( aj (507-581). This fact is known from several passages in the 
  recovered fragment of his Si lun xuan yi entitled "Chu zhang zhong jia yi" 1J*I1'; in 
  particular: jul'M [i.e. Falang], Jci. [574 C.E.] HiA ,C 7 ,141i.*, which informs us
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had some identity that it presented to  outsiders,331 and thus Huijun's knowledge of the 
concepts that concern us was filtered through a Shelun lens. The only *amalavijnana 
text he mentions by name, he apparently misnames (Shiqi jing for Shiqi di lun), and he 
makes it clear that he has not seen the text himself.332 Huijun's attitude to ideas he iden-
tifies as belonging to Paramartha is also probably coloured by his polemical hostility to-
wards the Shelun school.333
that he most likely heard Falang lecture in person in 574, thus providing our most precise clue 
as to the dates of his activity. Other clues seem to indicate that he was a student of Falang from 
relatively early; that he was close to Falang over an extended period; and that he was slightly 
senior to Jizang; see MITSUGRI 223-225, KANNO (2002) 87. It was long thought that the partial 
version of the Si lun xuan yi collected in the canon was his only surviving work, but modern 
scholars have discovered other parts of that text in Japan; see e.g. OCHO, and works listed in 
KANNO (2008) n. 1. Further, ITo has argued that the Mile jing you yi quiviat, T1771, 
traditionally ascribed to Jizang, is also his (see Iro [19771 847-848 for a summary of the reasons 
for this claim; also ITo 1973). It has also been proposed that the Dapin jing you yi jC A y 
T1696, also ascribed to Jizang, is by Huijun (CH'oE 26). Recently, CH'OE (infra) has proposed 
that Huijun may have been from Paekche{, and also that the Si lun xuan yi may even have 
been composed in Paekche. (I will nonetheless refer to him as "Huijun", not "Hyegyun", be-
cause CH'oE's theory is still new and speculativa and haraiise Huijun was active in China and 
wrote in Chinese.) In the current state of our knowledge, it is not possible to know definitively 
the chronological relations between Huijun and Jizang (or their works), nor the exact date of 
the Si lun xuan yi. The full text of the Si lun xuan yi is thought to date at least to after Falang's 
death in 581 (MITSUGIRI 225); it mentions events of the Sui, and figures like Huijue MN; 
(554-606) and Huichong g, which would seem to indicate that the text was completed after 
Huijun was active in Chang'an AV under the Sui (Foguang dacidian 6029). As we saw, Huijun 
is thought to have been senior to Jizang; on the other hand, he also refers to Jizang (%, 
X784:46.599b02; KANNO [2008] 6). Despite this uncertainty in their chronological relations, I 
have placed Huijun before Jizang because he is thought to have been slightly senior; because 
the only firm date I know for his activities is his reference to hearing Falang lecture in 574; and 
because, to my knowledge, there is no firm evidence for his activity much beyond the time 
shortly after the death of Falang, whereas Jizang lived for several more decades. It is also pos-
sible that Huijun is the earliest among our sources after P. Both Jingying Huiyuan and Zhiyi 
were active into the 590s, and Zhiyi's texts, further, were in many cases revised and expanded 
by his disciple Guanding, who lived until 632. Given that Huijun was active before the 580s, 
this may mean that some information in his text(s) about P predates these other sources.
331 The Shelun masters represent one of four positions comprising Huijun's main foils in Si lun 
  xuan yi, the others being Dilun, Satyasiddhi and Abhidharma; KANNO (2008).
332 See above p. 109. 
333 See, for example, his critiques of both Dilun and Shelun positions touched upon in n. 347 be-
low.
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   Against this, however, we should also weigh the following factors. Huijun is poten-
tially a particularly reliable witness not only because he is close in time to Paramartha, 
but because he knows Paramartha's works better than many of our other witnesses. He 
quotes SBKL verbatim;334 he also accurately quotes MSg335 and unique parts of 
Paramartha's MSgBh.336 This puts Huijun among a very small number of later witnesses 
to *amalavijnana/"ninth consciousness" doctrine who quote Paramartha verbatim, or 
even cite texts and loci in which *amalavijnana is in fact expounded. Huijun also knows 
at least one term that is found very rarely outside the writings of Paramartha himself.337 
In addition, Huijun is unlikely to himself be consciously applying AF concepts to the in-
terpretation of Paramartha's ideas (though the ideas may have already passed through
334 4r -lr~j , X784:46.599c18, 645c06; quoting SBKL T1616:31.863a27-28, 4rry rT
  863b19; in the second passage, particularly, this phrase is associated immediately with 
*amalavijnana and prakrtiprabhasvaracitta, for which see SBKL<1> above. See also FXL
  T1610:31.795c02. 
335 11- Rffi)L^ YF FTI eJrJfM] .i.4t14-. —kJJiHH[for % ?]T ±] X784:46.645b24, probably
citing MSg: ltl;-!,,,4i * / T1593:31.114a01, cf. anadikaliko dhatuh 
sarvadharmasamasrayah I tasmin sati gatih sarva nirvanadhigamo 'pi ca, TrBh 37, 12-13.
336 i> ip ]EaSti,r, r n iti. q  X784:46.599c20-21, and again in greater length at 602a02-06, 
  referring to MSgBh T1595:31.200c23.
337 The term in question is luanshi EA, for which see also n. 147. This term is only found twice, 
  in one location, before P's translations, in the "Second [? Part of the?] Annotated Preface to the 
Dasabhumika satra" ±J`0— by Sengwei [e i* (fl. 410-420?) preserved in Sengyou's 
  Chu sanzang ji ji, T2145:55.61b02-05. (Sengwei may be approximately dated by the fact that he 
  appears in the biography of Tanyi = [F "—,IghAr4ri'irj, T2059:50.356a12-13], who is 
  known to have been a student of Lushan Huiyuan J)IWMi [334-416]; by the fact that he is 
  said in Baochang's Pan  d.u., active under the Liang]P,{ iai to have been from Changsha 
si {% in Jiangling am. under the [Eastern] Jin a [317-420] [X1523:77.347b16]; and by this 
  preface itself, which is to a text translated by Kumarajiva in 410.) Given that the preface is cited 
  by Sengyou and therefore must date at the latest before approx. 515, when the Chu sanzang ji 
  ji was completed, only two explanations are possible for the appearance of the term luanshi 
  there, well before P: either it is coincidence; or P's team took the term from Sengwei. Luanshi 
  appears 52 times in P's corpus: in MAV, Alarnbanaparksa, Hastdvalaprakarana, MSgBh (but 
  not MSg), FXL and SWXL. Thereafter it appears occasionally (and interestingly enough) in a 
  few translation works by XZ (part of a wider pattern where special P terms are peppered 
  through XZ's works, seemingly indicating either that some of XZ's terminology was still 
  influenced by hangovers from P, or perhaps that he even occasionally based translations of 
  certain passages on P's translations); and in the works of some Tang scholiasts. The only other 
places where it appears to my knowledge before XZ are in the Shelun texts lat# * Z— 
  (T2807:85.1014a09) and 1;to * VIN (T2809:85.1044a24, 1044b26). Thus, the fact that 
  Huijun cites this term, otherwise so rare, shows he must have had direct and exceptionally 




























Hesays(inacommentthatsurvivesonlyinaquotedfragment):『起 信 』 是 虜(詈呉P)魯 人 作 、
借 馬 鳴 菩 薩i名;quotedinCH'oE16.
『攝 論 』 師 云:「 第 九 識 、 名 言 所 不 及 、 故 言 語 道 斷 。 想 所 不 及 、 故 心 行 處 哉 。 故 第 九 識 不 可
識 。」X784:46。635bO9-10(itisdifficulttoknowwherethequoteendshere,anditmayendafter


















huangSheluntext攝 大 乘 論 章 卷 第 一(r2807:85.1013a27).JingyingHuiyuanaisosaysthat
















inroughlythesamesenseasshengyin=karanahetu,seeMPNS:有二 種 因:一 者 正 因 、 二 者 了
因 。 尼 拘 陀 子 以 地 水 糞 作 了 因 、 故 令 細 得 麁,T374:12-532b14―16.





alayavijn穗a,[oneislsurelystillbeholdentoadualisticview”彼 義 宗 、 無 沒 識 為 解 或 之 本 、
至 金 心 無 沒 盡 顯 無 垢 、 豈 非 二 見 之 徒,X784:64.602a20-22.Hefurtherseemstochargethem
withdistinguishinginadualisticmannerbetweenwhatis“mind”andwhatisnot:豈開 心 非
心?乃 至 八 九 識 亦 然,602bO1-02;andwithfailingtoavoidtheerrorsofnihilisticandeternalist




erdetailsofhisargumentescapeme):彼地 、 攝 兩 論 意 、 金 心 以 下 是 有 為 、 無 垢 識 是 無 為 、 故
盧 實 兩 識 故 被 破 也etc.,X784.603a13-14ff.Theclaimthattaintlessconsciousnessisasamskrta
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exposition, Huijun mentions an understanding of "taintless consciousness" that seems 
accurate to what we have seen of it in Paramartha, namely that it succeeds upon the ces-
sation of alayavijn"ana   348
   To summarise, then: Huijun calls *amalavijnana a "ninth consciousness", and uses 
the term wugoushi for the same; he seems indifferently to identify the views of 
Paramartha and those of the Shelun school; he understands that *amalavijnana/ninth 
consciousness is beyond language and conception, and even unknowable; he connects 
the doctrine of this consciousness to prakrtiprabhasvaracitta; and he seems to report 
loose associations between this consciousness and Buddha nature/tathagatagarbha (as 
part of a position indifferently ascribed to both Dilun and Shelun schools).
4.1.3.4 Jizang (writing c. 599-608)349
   Jizang (a , 549-623)35° lists *amalavijnana among a set of terms that are identi-
fied by different schools or figures as what is "non-dual" (advaya, 711) 351 Jizang also
does seem to correspond to the understanding that it is asamskara, seen in Tib. and XZ paral-
lels to JDZL<4> above.
345 X784:64.602a21; note, however, that this comment falls in the middle of a passage that is diffi-
  cult of interpretation.
349 The Jizang works in which *amalavijnana is discussed seem all to date between about 599 and 
  608. (1) HIRAI considers iff-t, zit T1780 to probably be the first thing Jizang wrote during his 
  residence at Riyan si in Chang'an A, i.e. between his move to Chang'an in 599 and 
  the end of the Kaihuang Mt era (581-600) (HIRAI 374; citing Jizang's own words in his ;fAl V! 
N, T1781:38.908c17-19); the text was thus written in 599-600. (2) Because the exposition of 
  the category of A7ca in -CT,f a T1853 is extremely close to that of Huijun, scholars have 
  long been doubtful whether the text is actually by Jizang, or perhaps rather by Huijun; Hixni, 
  however, concludes that whatever may be the provenance of passages concerning this 
  category, the text as a whole is representative of Jizang's thought, and cannot be excluded with 
  certainty from the list of his authentic works; HIRAI 256. HfRAI seems to believe that this text 
  was at least written after T1780; 595. (3) Tradition has held that rl'ait*, T1824 was 
  completed in 608; HIRAI 375. However, HIRAI notes that the group of texts to which it belongs 
  were the work of several years, and other complications surround the dating of the text; 608 is 
  only the date of completion; 375-377. The text could thus contain elements older by a few 
  years. (4) ) ! V a X343 was probably written in 604; HIRAI 375.
350 We have already seen that Jizang speaks of *amalavijn"ana as a ninth consciousness. To my 
  knowledge, the only transcription of the term found in his works is the standard amoluoshi P7 
Jt J i.
351 Others are: the principle of the [Four Noble] Truth(s) .1'; prajna that carries the mark of 
  reality x ;; alayavijn'ana, identified with Nirvana that is pure in its essence li g I J ic' 
gm. In T1853, these are identified as the positions respectively of the Satyasiddhi masters; the
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refers to the notion of *amalavijnana in another doxographic passage discussing views 
of various schools on the "real/true" A., saying that "scholars of the 
Mahayanasamgraha" hold that the principle of the twofold absence of self 
(nairatmyadvaya i,T,Jl), the principle of the threefold absence of essence 
(*nihsvabhavatraya ,[9,t'i), and the *amalavijnana can rightly be called "true/real", 
but all else is false.3'2 In another passage, in his "Exposition of the Profundities of [the] 
Vimalaktrti [sutra]" ({, , T1780), Jizang returns to this characterisation. Accord-
ing to him,
"Adherents of the Mahayanasarpgraha and the *Vijnaptimatrata sastra NUR% NURi
.e. the 
Vir?zfatika]353 take non-attachment to the three natures as the principle f! of the threefold ab-
sence of essence; this principle of the threefold absence of essence is *amalavijn"ana, which is 
also the principle of the twofold absence of self. The 'three natures' are the interdependent na-
ture (paratantrasvabhava), the imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhava), and the perfected nature 
(parinispannasvabhava)... The perfected nature is Nirvana."353
   Elsewhere, Jizang also recalls a similar classification to distinguish the ultimate, as 
it is characterised in all these schools, from the "Nirvana of the true doctrine" ({{4A, 
*saddharmanirvana) taught by his own position. In all these other cases, including that 
of *amalavijnana as taught by the Shelun masters, he says that the instance in question 
is manifest upon the attainment of buddhahood, and this resultant state is called
Mahaprajnaparamitopedasa masters; and the Dilun school; where identifying the nondual as 
*amalavijnana is the position of "the Shelun masters and Trepitaka Paramartha" Ql p eJ fli, 
 riER. See T1780:38.856c11-17, 912b09-18; T1853:45.66c02-06;
352 T1824:42.123c22-124a02. Jizang also mentions this same doxographic characterisation at 
  126c04-07. The other positions are: for adherents of the Abhidharma A (i.e. Satyasiddhi 
  specialists) it is the principle of the Four Noble Truths, and most specifically of the third truth 
  of cessation (nirodhasatya); for the [adherents of the] "Mahayana of the south" (?Tf± ; 
  this is the only time this phrase ever occurs in the canon) it is the "principle of the truth of 
  refutation" (?fl); for "those in the North" (i.e. Mahaprajnnaparamitopadesa exponents) it 
  is prajn"a that carries the mark of reality "Mar-.
353 Given that these are referred to as a separate group of scholars, Jizang may be referring to 
  exponents of the text in Gautama Prajnaruci's translation, T1588, translated around 540. For 
  example, Tanqian's biography reports that he studied this text before he went to the south, 
  and so presumably before he had access to P's texts (it is known that he only encountered the 
Mahayanasarngraha, for instance, after he fled Zhou Wudi's 577 persecution of Buddhism); 




 dharmakaya because these schools maintain that certain dharmas definitively exist's' 
Finally, Jizang also briefly mentions a difference of opinion between the Dilun position, 
in which the "six consciousnesses" are eradicated to leave alayavijnana, and that of a 
certain Trepitaka and certain "masters" ERN (presumably Paramartha and the Shelun 
masters) who say that "the eighth consciousness is also eradicated, since it too is not 
pure; [only] the ninth, *amalavijnana, is entirely pure". Jizang again differs with these 
positions because they still posit a dualism of pure and impure.356
   Jizang's explanation of the doctrine is rare in linking *amalavijnana to three na-
tures doctrine, and more specifically to the perfected nature. The general silence on this 
matter contrasts with the fact that it was so central to *amalavijnana in Paramartha. 
However, other members of the string of identifications Jizang ascribes to the doctrine 
are new: *amalavijnana is also identified with the nondual in a new sense, with the two-
fold absence of self, and with Nirvana; the identification with dharmakaya in T1853 is 
also new. Jizang also ascribes the positions he describes either to the Shelun school and 
Paramartha indiscriminately, or else only to the Shelun masters, on occasion not even 
mentioning Paramartha. Even if Jizang reports everything with fidelity, we apparently 
see here a version of the doctrine already filtered through the early Shelun school.
   On the whole, Jizang's presentation of *amalavijnana, like those of Zhiyi and Huiy-
uan, is also clearly bound up with his own intellectual agendas, and his attempts to fit 
the material into his own doctrinal system.
4.1.3.5 She dasheng lun zhang357
   The anonymous Dunhuang Shelun text She dasheng lun zhang Jw,4*- T2807 
argues that the same consciousness can either be called eighth or ninth, and cites LAS 
in support.358 Like Huiyuan, it adduces the AF categories of a "Thusness aspect" A tzA r9
355 T1853:45.46c24-47a03. By contrast, in the position he expounds, it is in fact the "middle path"
that is Buddha nature (madhyamapratipad) rl aZittt, and in this middle path, there can be 
no question of Buddha nature being either latent or manifest. The other positions are here 
characterised as the "essentially pure Nirvana" fliVirlffl or alayavijn"ana of the Dilun masters, 
and the original Nirvana 4cA-illfffl or attainment of Buddhahood of the Satyasiddhi masters.
356 X'h-IE GM -. jLP7 p . # ( f or ) 1E TAff-, 
  X343:19.166a24-b08. Jizang reports the dispute in very similar terms, and attempts to bring 
  LAS and AF to bear to adjudicate it, at T1824:42.104c07-13.
357 On the dates of this text, see n. 230. 
358 See 296.
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and "samsaric aspect" ilcrul of mind to negotiate the apparent contradiction between 
eightfold and ninefold analyses, identifying "ninth consciousness" with the Thusness as-
pect. It then cites what it calls the "Chapter on Marklessness" (wuxiang pin )if rl qp, ac-
tually citing our extant SXWL) from the Wuxiang lun: "Because the imagined essential 
nature never exists, the interdependent essential nature also does not exist; and the in-
existence of these two [essential natures] is *amalavijnana ()."359 It then says 
that this consciousness is "the ultimate, unique pure consciousness" y';A—r M. The 
text then says that a tradition from outside China reports that the Shiqi di lun contains a 
"Bodhisattva Chapter", which gave an extensive exposition of *amalavijnana as ninth
consciousness.36o
   This passage from T2807 probably conforms more closely to what we see in our ex-
tant Paramartha corpus than any other later account of *amalavijnana. Even here, how-
ever, we see a certain admixture of AF concepts.
4.1.3.6 Prabhakaramitra's Mahayanasutraclamkara (tr. 630-633)
Prabhakaramitra's ({ ERRA;gyrt, 564-633) translation of the 
Mahayanasatralamkara T1604 famously mentions *amalavijnana.361 The mention fea-
tures as part of commentary on the verse corresponding to Skt. 13.19.362 This verse is 
part of a set dealing, in significant part, with "aboriginally luminous mind" 
(prakrtiprabhasvaracitta), which, we saw above, is connected with *amalavijnana in 
Paramartha's SBKL. These verses assert that defilement (nihsamklesa) and purification 
(visuddhz) do not really exist, but are illusory, like a magic trick or "space" (akasa) 
(3.16). This is likened to the way a flat picture, skilfully executed, appears to contain 
height and depth; similarly, there is in fact no dualism (dvaya) in the imagination of what 
is unreal (abhutakalpa), but it appears as if dual (3.17). Water is intrinsically clear, even 
when tainted by mud, and when the mud is removed, the water is not changed, but rath-
er, its original true nature simply becomes manifest (3.18). 3.19 spells out the parallel to 
this conceit in the case of the mind:
359 This citation actually appears in SXWL T1617:31.872a05-06; see SWXL<1> above. There is a
slight difference in wording, but the quote is nearly verbatim: SXWL: J35 -5U r iK, :,~uk, 11'it 
•rt7rTA- , flklJf p '; T2807: iu'yIJ•iA()."., T T 'r ~rT Jll ~,i':.Pff , 9~J
360 T2807:85.1016c08-23; already noted above, p. 111. 
361 The word *amalavijnana NIVE itself occurs at T1604:31.623a09. 
362 This passage occurs in Chapter 14 of Prabhakaramitra.
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"I have explained that the mind is pure in essence  4: Ai; 
But is defiled by adventitious dirt ); 
There is no essential purity of mind 
Apart from the Thusness' of the mind ,C' i.s364
   In other words, like water, the mind is pure all along and by its very nature; it is not 
the case that, when it is purified, some new, pure mind is produced in the process.
   In the Bhasya to this verse, Chinese features an extra sentence that does not corre-
spond to anything found in the Sanskrit. "It is this mind[, equated with Thusness,] that 
is expounded as aboriginally pure [I tt 1llif • This mind is *amalavijnana IJ) 
pa "365 This reinforces the association of *amalavijnana with prakt-tiprabhasvaracitta. 
This association, made in SBKL, Huijun, and Daoji, appears again in Wonhyo and 
Chengguan.
4.1.3.7 Daoji (writing c. 633-637)
   One of the most important moments in the history of *amalavijnana doctrine after 
Paramartha is found in Daoji's (a.g., 577-637)366 lost Shelun zhang* ,367 which is
363 Corresponding to dharmata in Skt; Bh gives "Thusness", tasmac cittatathataivam cittam
veditavyam, LEvi (1907, 1911) 1, 88. 
364 t^ -C4i / TJ i / t 1 / ~i~1 5'r i , T1604:31.623a03-04. I translate
Prabhakaramitra's Ch., which agrees only in its gist with Skt. Skt. reads: "It is understood that 
while the mind is ever aboriginally pure, it is always poisoned by adventitious poisons;/ Apart 
from this aboriginal mind, there is no other essential mind characterised by purity (luminosi-
ty);" matam ca cittam prakrtiprabhasvararn sada tadagantukadosadusitam/ na dharmatacittam 
rte nyacetasah prabhasvaratvam prakrtau vidhryate// (3.19), LEI/ (1907, 1911) 1, 88; 2, 158; 
JAMPSAL et al., 171.
365 T1604:31.623a08-09. 
366 Daoji was a disciple of Jingsong tilt* (537-614). Jingsong was originally from the North, but
fled the N. Zhou persecution of Buddhism in 577, and while in Jinling ^ (mod. Nanjing) met 
Fatai ( (d. after 577), a prominent disciple of P. Fatai introduced him to MSg, and Jingsong 
took the text back to the north when he moved to Pengcheng WOJA in 590. See CHEN Jinhua 31 
n. 56, 32, 199-200 n. 60; Xu gaoseng zhuan T2060:50.501b06-502a25. This means that Daoji was 
a "dharma great-grandson" of P, in a direct line. Daoji was in turn a teacher of XZ, and his testi-
mony is thus particularly important because it is possible that Kuiji, Wonch'uk and their suc-
cessors had their information about P's supposed "ninth consciousness" via him, rather than 
directly from P's texts. On Kuiji's apparent relation to Daoji, see further below, n. 433.
367 Daoji cites the MSA, which enables us to date his comments quite closely between 630-633, 
  when MSA was translated, and his death in 637.
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quoted by Gyonen i (1240-1321) in the Kegon komokusho hatsugo ki V-145.1A 
pd 15. Daoji's368 most important comments about *amalavijnana/ninth consciousness 
are contained in a single extended passage.
"Question: Upon what sutras and sastras do Trepitaka Paramartha and th 
base themselves, in proving the tenet of ninth consciousness?
e Dharma Master Daoji
"Answer: In the
says:369
first [juan?] of [Daoji's] She lun zhang ["Treatise on the Mahayanasamgraha"], it
There are Dharma Masters who expound nine consciousnesses. For example, Trepitaka 
Paramartha cites [the line], "Various kinds of mind, eight- or ninefold" from the 
Lanmkdvatara sutra;370 [he] also cites the definitive exposition iAof nine kinds of mind 
JL A,L' from the Shiqi di lun ["Treatise on the Seventeen Stages"] as proof. From then, 
right down to the present, the controversy has not ceased, so that later generations have 
no way of deciding [what is correct].
'Here
, we will determine that it is correct to hold that: the sutras expound six [kinds of con-
sciousness]; some, however, say there are seven; the Lamkavatara expounds eight; and the 
Wuxiang lun has nine. Among these various theories, the Lamkavatara etc. expound only 
eight consciousnesses because they are expounding an abridged [version of the doctrine]
'On the other hand(
, the doctrines of the Wuxiang [lun] lay out the nine in full (? 
A WItJL). The "Chapter on *Pravrttivijiiana $CA os371 in the Wuxiang lun says, 'The 
[consciousness that is the] subject of perception is of three kinds: (1) Consciousness [aris-
ing] as a result [of karma] $Vpft (vipakavijniana), that is, alayavijnana V+1[ ;372 (2) Con-
368 We have already seen above that Daoji refers to *amalavijn"ana as wugoushi. He also refers to
it as jingshi l u . Like Huijun, Daoji says that P cited a discussion of "nine kinds of mind" At, 
,LN in Shiqi di lun to prove a theory of ninth consciousness.
369 These introductory passages are the words of Gyonen. 
370 See n. 296. Oman points out (2007d) that the precise wording of this quote does not match any
  transmitted Chinese translation of the text; see n. 287. 
371 On this reconstruction for the term zhuanshi in this context, see n. 127. 
372 The transcription of alayavijn'ana with the character V is unusual, and is only ever found in
the Xu zang jing, never in the Taisho. However, it is clearly a scribal variant of the transcription 























(a纏 ε伽 嬲.苑 魏a):Sobta1ned.”376Th1ssente簸cefrPfar輻n】eightconsc量ousnesses.Howev・
er,thesametreatisealsosays,”ltisthismind[,equatedwithThusness,]thatisexpounded












ZSL:能 縁 有 三 種:一 、 果 報 識 、 即 是 阿 梨 耶 識 。 二 、 執 識 、 即 阿 陀 那 識 。 三 、 塵 識 、 即 是 六
識,T1587:31.61cO8-09.
ZSL:境 識 倶 泯 、 即 是 實 性 、 實 性 即 是 阿 摩 羅 識,T1587:31.62c18-19;see§2.4above.
ZSL:就 此 識 中 、 具 有 八 種 異 、 謂 依 止 處 等 。 具 如 『九 識 義 品 』 読,T1587:31.62aO3―04.
MSA:轉 第 八 識 得 鏡 智 、 轉 第 七 識 得 平 等 智 、 轉 第 六 識 得 觀 智 、 轉 前 五 識 得 作 事 智,
T1604:31.606c29-607aO2.ThistextappearsinBhtotheversecorrespondtoSkt.9.67,LﾉVi
(1907,1911)1,46;2,88;however,nothingintheSanskritcorrespondstothisChinese.














(稷ambana)asconsciousness(P)但據 縁 境 為 識 【However,】intheWuxianglunandthe
Mah窕anasatr稷anakara,bothmindandobjectaretakenasconsciousness,andsoitex-









問:真 諦三藏、 并道基法師、依何經論、 建九識義?答:『 攝論章』 第
謚九識、 如真諦三藏、引 『楞伽經』 「八九種種心」、 又引 『十七地論』
證験。 自後諍論于










































據略但読八識。或復説云 、 『無相』 美具通陳其
一、 果報識、即梨耶。 二者、 執識、 即阿陀
復読阿摩羅識。故彼 『論』云:「 境識倶泯、 即是
復云;「 阿黎耶識、 有八種異、 如 『九識品』
復云 「如 『九識品』 中読」、明知、今者所詭
「轉八識得鏡智、 轉第七識得平等智、轉五識得觀
復云:「心真如、名之為心、即読此心為自性
?真 諦三藏、 雖引 『楞伽經』 「八九種種
雖云 「八九」、不 引列名、 『十七地論』
『無相論』文并 『大莊嚴論』説有九識、用
?答 日:『楞伽經』中、但據緑境為識、唯




 #cpti38° (Daoji disagrees with this doctrine, as we will see below). The She dasheng yi 
zhang (tA*, T2809), which was preserved in an ancient manuscript in Japan381 
and is probably by Daoji,382 also briefly mentions the "ninth consciousness".383
   Daoji's citations, from texts like ZSL, MSA, SWXL, AF and the 
Mahayanabhisamaya,384 are exceptionally accurate,385 and show that he is a scrupulous 
scholar. Daoji's testimony is also particularly valuable because of his critical attitude 
towards Paramartha (perhaps surprising, in a member of the Shelun school towards its 
ostensible founder). This shows him a cautious commentator, not ready to simply 
believe anything. For example, he says that Paramartha lists six alternative names for 
the "pure consciousness" (f17E, ,,,,.tfi, i IR). These names are found together in no
380 DZB 22, 371b. Cf. T226265:440c-441a. 
381 It is sometimes mistakenly said to be a text from Dunhuang. I am grateful to IKEDA Masanori
for allowing me to see unpublished work in which he traces some of the history of this 
manuscript.
382 On Daoji's probable authorship of this text, see KATrsuMATA 795. I am grateful to both Ching 
   KENG and IKEDA Masanori for pointing out KATSUMATA's arguments.
383 T2809:85.1036b28-c05. This passage is difficult to interpret. It apparently identifies 
*amalavijn"ana with an ultimate (paramartha) pure consciousness identical with the truth
--if 4z, whose substance is Thusness #201011  (which, as we have seen, Daoji consistently 
holds elsewhere). The true essence of this consciousness is supposed to exist aboriginally 
ti*A—, and is identified with a gnosis (jn"ana) that has no inception and cannot be cultivated
384 The *Mahayandbhisamaya satra (Tongxing jing, .CAfa7'lt#s, T673) was translated by 
Jnanayasas M. 564-572). The passage that Daoji cites (DBZ 12, 372a) in support of ninth 
  consciousness doctrine is an abridged version of T673:16.642c15-643a08 (the actual phrases 
  cited are found at 642c15-19, 643a06-08). In this passage, the Tathagata is discussing the 
  process of rebirth with the King of Lamka t 1)iU , and asserts that the "spirit-consciousness of 
  the sentient being" ~tiAA (that undergoes transmigration) is limitless in size, without visi-
  ble form (arupya), without characteristics (alaksana) etc.; it then states, in what is probably the 
  key link to *amalavijn`ana doctrine, that this consciousness is pure, and only obscured by ad-
  ventitious defilements, just as the pure element of empty space (akasadhatu) is obscured by 
  the "adventitious defilement" of the four elements. For links between Daoji's use of 
Mahayanabhisamaya (and WXL) and Kuiji s testimony, see below n. 433. Note that this is the 
  only echo in all the later literature of the connection (here very tangential) between
*amalavijn`ana and the old doctrine of consciousness as subject of transmigration and libera-
tion (see above p. 95).
385 Daoji cites SWXL (calling it, like ZSL, "Wuxiang tun") twice at 372a, citing T1617:31.872a05-07 
  and 872a11-12. Daoji also cites, in the course of this same long comment, AF and the 
Mahayanabhisamaya (for the latter, see n. 384 preceding).
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extant Paramartha text386 Daoji repeats twice that Paramartha cites the authority of no 
sutra or sastra for these names, and concludes, "My suspicions have not been allayed, 
and I cannot rely upon [this doctrine as Paramartha expounds it]"TA{;, *713i7 
1A.387 This critical attitude towards Paramartha is also evidenced in an explicit 
disagreement Gyonen reports that Daoji expresses with Paramartha's understanding of 
what comprises the "substance" 111 of consciousness.388
   Here, then, we see a Shelun scholar and direct "dharma descendant" of Paramartha 
himself, who is yet sceptical of the standard proof-texts used to support the doctrine of 
ninth consciousness and keen to find alternative, less vulnerable proofs. Nonetheless, 
Daoji apparently cannot find anything better than ZSL and the hot-off-the-press MSA. 
Moreover, he also does not seem to know any additional Paramartha texts since lost, ex-
cept the Shiqi di lun, which he knows only by hearsay and is sceptical of.
4.1.3.8 The *Vajrasamadhi sutra and Wonhyo's commentary (approx. 649-686)
   The *Vajrasamadhi sutra (VSS) T273389 and Wonhyo's GOA, 617-686) commentary 
on it, the Kumgang sammaegyong non (*Vajrasamadhi sutra lun, T1730), contain exten-
sive new developments in the doctrine of *amalavijnana. Here, *amalavijnana is given 
outright (apocryphal) warrant as buddavacana, and a creative synthesis is attempted be-
tween *amalavijnana and other concepts important to East Asian Buddhism.
386 These six alternate names of *amalavijnana are highly specific, however, and OTAKE has
  shown that at least some of them seem to have connections to P's ideas; see OTAKE (2007d). 
387 PO-J1 . 117 E.J J . h aA, ,EL r J o PAJIL ,  . T. jt*
i , tk 
k~tiJ~pPiR,1,1 ITY'/f~=10/J`'Y~arIIgAFix,J~~'7~'i—'PS~p~,{Py.,,/~,~MJIt~C~'CIk]CI~( Pr~~..c~a79_s.RTiJr'ol !stElP882r1f,~7.~L.'C7o(h{}VER,y''I~rl/I`1zPAE)I/J~eSLA-r'tlo.{,,-8,(H?)) ~C.~GAJ,~iPJ~'CIFR-.AJ®iii.T\PJ1L,iii.NEW./\1I7.I~/II~Ad1Gj0It IR 
to-FLAN-At, Tfsal!iSTR'(&, DBZ22,364a-b. In this passage, as 
above, *amalavijnana is identified- with prakrtiprabhasvaracitta n'I'jWi; and once again, 
Daoji relies upon WXL as his authority.
388 Daoji accepts, with P, that the "principle of Thusness" a: is the "substance" of 
  consciousness, but not that "wisdom of Thusness" UArity is also part of that substance: _ PR 
     —i p p p , Q, l .LELgo q ptcpt , ff7rT i etc., DBZ 22, 371b. For Daoji's enu-
  meration of consciousnesses from *amalavijnana as first, see Gyonen's interlinear note here, 
  and also the Shelun zhang passage cited at Gyonen 364a.
389 On evidence studied by Robert BUSWELL, we can surmise that VSS was composed sometime be-
  tween 649, when XZ translated the Prajn"aparamitahrdaya sutra (BuswELL [2007], 369-370 n. 
  284) and Wonhyo's commentary, which can have been written no later than his death in 686. 
  We saw that VSS uses the transcription itfg pl, which would seem to place it in some con-
  nection with Zhiyi.
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The VSS first mentions  *amalavijnana twice each in the following two passages:
(VSS<1>): "At that time, the Bodhisattva Non-Abiding asked the Buddha: 'Lord! Through revolu-
tionary transformation ($$ *para/vrt) by what inspiration 4.1139° do all the affective consciousness-
es --P31'11A4 of sentient beings undergo a revolutionary transformation $$391 so that they enter 
into the *amala[-vijiiana]?' The Buddha replied: 'All the Buddhas, the Tathagatas,392 constantly 
employ the one awakening J —t- to [effect a] revolutionary transformation in all conscious-
nesses, so that they will enter into the *amala[-vijnana]. This is because the original awakening 
VA of all sentient beings [works,] by means of the one awakening, to awaken those sentient 
beings, and [thus] to make the sentient beings all regain their original awakening, viz. to awaken 
them to the fact that all affective consciousnesses are empty, tranquil and unproduced. That is 
because it is an established fact that the original essence is originally without motion."393
(VSS<2>): "[The Buddha said:] 'One who is enlightened need not abide in nirvana 4TI%/A. 
Why is this? One who awakens to original nonproduction ,T,t. remains far removed from 
the maculations (mala, of sentient beings. One who awakens to the original lack of tranquil-
lity *,T,,fX remains far removed from the activity of nirvana A]t%9 . For one who abides T at 
such a stage, the mind abides nowhere. Free from both egress and access ,;1;,A-MX, it accesses 
the amala consciousness 1 1V, rtp0.C,.'394 The Bodhisattva Non-Abiding ,i!,11,441 asked: 'If the 
amala-consciousness C )ii has some place where it can be accessed, [does this mean it is] 
something that is attained ($!, upalabdhi) — that is, an attained dharma (AA-V~-t.$4%)?' The 
Buddha replied: 'No, it does not.">395
   The VSS goes on to relate a parable of a prodigal son (VSS<3>), who carries gold 
coins in his hands, but does not know it. For fifty years he roams in poverty and destitu-
390 I here follow BoswELL's translation. To my knowledge, he does not explain how he arrived at it,
  but equally, I cannot fully understand the sense of the Chinese, and defer to his judgement. 
391 I use the admittedly awkward translation "revolutionary transformation" because $$ here
recalls the doctrine of asrayaparavrtti, which, as we have seen, is absolutely central to P's 
original doctrine of *amalavijnana.
392 Translation modified. 
393 T273:9.368b13-18; BUSWELL (2007), 141, translation modified. 
394 The text here recalls the old prajnaparamita idea that the ultimate, the tathagata etc. "does not
   come or go". 
395 T273:9.368c26-369a01. I modify the translation in BUSWELL (2007), 155-157, which incorporates
in full his earlier translation of the root text of VSS published in his Formation of Ch'an Ideolo-
gy
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tion, before his father finally tells him he has been in possession of gold all along. The 
moral of the story is spelt out thus:
"It is just the same with the *amala [-vijfiana]. It is not something from which you have departed 
IT, and now, it is not 'accessed' X. Just because you were deluded in the past, does not mean 
you did not have it; and just because you have realised now [that you have it], does not mean 
you have `gained access' to it A."396
VSS also mentions "ninth consciousness" twice:
(VSS<4>): "The Buddha [said:] 'Those who recite the Pratimoksa precepts do so because of their 
unwholesome haughtiness, which is [like] waves and swells on the sea. If the sea, i.e. the 
ground of their mind in the eighth consciousness, is limpid, then the `[out ]flow' (7m, asrava/ 
ogha)397 will be purified from the ninth consciousness. Where no wind moves, waves cannot 
arise. The precepts are by nature uniform and empty (sunya) 4; [those who] hold fast to 
them are deluded and confused."39b
(VSS<5>): "[The Buddha said:] Thusness is empty (sunya) in its essence The fire of 
the gnosis [that knows] this emptiness of essence fi c.t 1k completely burns up all fetters (M, 
samyojana). All is utterly uniform , and the three stages of equivalent enlightenment 
FEW' and the three bodies of sublime awakening 1 iE ' are radiant, clear and pure within 
the ninth consciousness-A,11111 aA7, [so that] there are no shadows."'oo
396 T273:9.369a01-09; BUSWELL (2007), 157-159, translation modified. This parable is full of word-
play key to conveying its lesson: on the notion of "attaining" (T~, upalabdhi), which is the same 
word used for the son finally "getting" or "finding" the gold; on the notions of "coming to" and 
"going from" 
1$X, which BUSWELL translated "egress and access" above, which refer back to 
the old Prajnaparamita notion of "coming or going", and which are used to refer to gold and 
good fortune apparently deserting and then returning to the son. BuswELL's translation obscures 
these word plays somewhat.
397 A play on words: it (often asrava) is also used for ogha, 'flood", "flow", thus likening the 
asrava to the waves.
398 T273:9.370b22-24; BUSWELL (2007), 204, translation modified. 
399 Like the following concept of "sublime awakening", this concept derives from the Chinese
apocryphon the Pusa yingluo benye jing; BUSWELL (2007), 12. BUSWELL translates "virtual 
enlightenment", but I cannot understand what he intends by this translation. My alternative 
here is also tentative, but I hope, closer to the literal sense of the Chinese.
400 T273:9.371b14-16; BUSWELL (2007), 234.
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   There is much that is new here. Astonishingly, the VSS is the  first  time after Zhiyi401 
in the later evidence that we see even the faintest allusion to asrayaparavrtti, despite the 
centrality of it to Paramartha's doctrine of *amalavijnana.402 We also see here a connec-
tion of *amalavijnana to a kind of "other-power" doctrine, in which access to it is ex-
plained by the good works of the Tathagatas (VSS<1>). This is also the first time we 
have seen *amalavijnana associated with the doctrines of "non-abiding nirvana" (T,T 
apratisthitanirvana), "non-production" (anutpada), and "neither coming nor go-
ing" (BuswELL's "free from both egress and access"). It is also the first time we have 
seen *amalavijnana associated with "non-abiding" (VSS<2>). The parable (VSS<3>) is 
clearly modelled on the basic conceit of some of the nine parables of the 
Tathagatagarbha sutra, even though it matches none of those parables exactly403 — by 
this means, the association between *amalavijnana and tathagatagarbha is clearly fur-
ther strengthened. The metaphor of the "waves and the sea" (VSS<4>) derives from 
LAS404 and is, of course, by this stage in Chinese Buddhist history, famously associated 
with AF.405 This is the first time we have seen it used in direct connection with 
*amalavijnana. VSS<5> also draws an implicit connection between *amalavijnana and 
the "taintless stage" (wugou di 1!,f = *amalabhuma) of the path to buddhahood, as it 
was expounded in the Chinese apocryphon the Pusa yingluo benye jing (q R p *g, 
T1485).406
Wonhyo develops these rich ideas even further in his commentary. As BUSWELL 
shows in his translation and study of Wonhyo's commentary, Wonhyo picks up on these 
hints in the root text and elaborates them into a theory whereby *amalavijnana be-
401 Note that the transcriptions used for *amalavijnnana in VSS also seem to suggest a connection
  with Zhiyi. 
402 Even later, this connection is only hinted at a few times, by Dingbin, Dajue and Chengguan (see
  below). 
403 Several of the parables involved hidden gold (4, "gold in a cesspit"; 7, "dead traveller's gold"; 9,
"dirty gold statue"). In addition, Parable 5, of the poor family that, unbeknownst to themselves, 
lives on top of a treasure-trove for years, shares a basic similarity of plot conceit with this 
present parable. For these parables, see Rulaizang jing ttpcfs (Tathagatagarbha sutra) 
T666, and for an exhaustive study, see ZIMMERMAN.
404 E.g. T671:16.515a06-08, 523b25-c03, 523 c12-19. 
405 T1666:32.576c11-15. 
406 The "equivalent" 4*, awakening alluded to here is said in that text to belong to a "taintless (or
'immaculate') stage" (wugoudz)
, while "sublime" awakening k belongs to a stage called "sublime training" (miaoxuediW-b). It is easy to see how the author of the VSS could have 
associated this amala stage of practice with *amalavijnana.
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comes the key to a scheme of practice, by means of which the practitioner can progress 
from the ordinary to the awakened state. The key innovation and doctrinal goal in 
Wonhyo's commentary is the attempt to bring out an "active" dimension of 
tathagatagarbha, using a framework derived from AF ("original enlightenment" benjue 
VA, `acquired enlightenment" shijue ftq , etc.).407 The main way Wonhyo achieves 
this is to map *amalavijnana onto the path structure of the Pusa yingluo benye jing. 
Thus, "as Wonhyo interprets [the VSS], the enlightenment that is immanent in the mun-
dane world ... could actually be viewed as a practical catalyst to religious training.s408 
Wonhyo constructs "a comprehensive system of meditative practice, focusing on the six 
divisions of contemplation practice409 that lead to the experience of 'the contemplation 
practice that has but a single taste'," which constitutes "a practical way of actually culti-
vating original enlightenment, rather than just passively acquiescing to it" 41° On this 
reading, "the Vajrasamadhi-sutra provides a practical soteriology of original enlighten-
ment by shifting the Awakening of Faith's accounts of mind and enlightenment from on-
tology into the realm of actual practice."411
   The most important points in Wonhyo's exposition of *amalavijn"ana are as fol-
lows.412 In his introduction, Wonhyo says that as the result of the six practices413 advo-
cated by the sutra, the "ninth consciousness" appears by a revolutionary transformation 
$$ (para/vrt).414 He calls this resulting ninth consciousness wugoushi ,71!,t~psa, and identi-
fies it with the dharmadhatu.415 This is the first time we have seen *amalavijnana associ-
ated with the dharmadhatu since SBKL<1>.416 The process of realisation continues with 











BUSWELL (2007), 5-6. 
BUSWELL (2007), 13. 
BUSWELL summarises the six divisions of this practice, which are the focus of Ch. 2-7 of 
Wonhyo's text respectively, 14. 
BUSWELL (2007), 14. 
BUSWELL (2007), 15. 
Remaining passages where Wonhyo treats *amalavijnana (excluding citations from the root 
text), not discussed individually in the following, are: T1730:34.995a17-19, BUSWELL (2007), 
236-237; 1003b20-26, BUSWELL 284. See also n. 254 above. 
See n. 409. 
BUSWELL (2007) mistranslates this word as "in turn", 49. 
T1730:34.961b03-04; BUSWELL (2007), 48-49. 
It is possible that this might be a clue indicating that Wonhyo had direct access to SBKL, since 
we know of no other earlier source from which he might have derived this idea. It is also possi-
ble, however, that he arrived at the identification independently.
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four wisdoms  (adarsajnana, samatajfiana, pratyaveksajnana, anusthanajnana), and the 
attainment of the three bodies (trikyaya) of the Buddha. We have not seen the idea of 
the attainment of all three bodies connected to *amalavijn"ana before; the only place we 
have previously seen *amalavijnana connected with the four wisdoms is in Daoji's use 
of MSA.417 Wonhyo further says that in this state, gnosis and its object are nondual 4%1 
     418
   Later, Wonhyo states explicitly that "original enlightenment" is identical to 
*amalavijnana 4K ~ uiiltifia; he therefore glosses the notion of "accessing 
*amalavijn"ana" seen in VSS<1> as "attaining benjue" , -K,419 The ground for this 
move was obviously prepared for Wonhyo by the author of VSS in passage <1> above; 
Wonhyo is merely spelling out what is already there implicit. In glossing VSS<2>, 
Wonhyo explains that "accessing *amala[-vijn"ana] means "leaving behind the two 
extremes" Aft= 4, and he identifies the attainment of *amalavijnana with "returning to 
the fountainhead of the mind" 9611L,L,E.42° These claims reinforce the ties between 
*amalavijnana and the AF framework.
   In commenting on the parable of the foolish son, Wonhyo comments that the gold 
has the four qualities of permanence, bliss, self-identity and purity 'AIM The use of 
these four well-known t                   epithetsofatha„~atgarbh,.strengthensstillfurther i                         yuer i..~uiuguiVibu.Sueu~ulCtt~Stitl tfle associa-
tion between tathagatagarbha and *amalavijnana. He also assigns these epithets to ben-
jue.421 He goes on to employ the LAS/AF figure of wind, waves and water, associating 
the underlying tranquil substratum (the sea) with prakrtiprabhasvaracitta n r{~ i-,L, 422 
Mention of this concept puts Wonhyo in a line that includes Huijun, MSA and Daoji be-
fore him, and Chengguan after.
Finally, in one other text, the Niepan zong yao (, Wonhyo explicitly identi-
417 See p. 132. Note, however, that Kuiji's verse from the Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing also makes
this same connection (see p. 143), and we cannot be sure of the chronological relationship 
between Kuiji's and Wonhyo's pertinent works here.
418 T1730:34.961b03-06. He later repeats the assertion that benjue and "ninth consciousness" are 
  identical: *1 M f[ A 989b25, BUSWELL (2007), 205.
419 T1730:34.978a20-22 
420 T1730:34.980c08, BUSWELL (2007), 157. He also identifies the attainment of *amalavijn"ana with
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fies  *amalavijnana with Thusness, the substance of Buddha-nature '( 'rI, and, most 
interestingly, flexing flAtt.423 This last notion derives from Paramartha's MSg,424 and 
seems itself to have been the centre of a process of reinterpretation in line with 
tathagatagarbha doctrine as mediated by AF ideas.425 This is the first time we have seen 
this idea associated with *amalavijnana.
   In sum, in the VSS and Wonhyo, *amalavijnana is an important concept, and it un-
dergoes a number of striking new developments. It is elaborated into a basis for prac-
tice; it is associated with the path structure from the Pusa yingluo benye jing, it is linked 
to the four wisdoms and the three bodies; it is tied much more closely to 
tathagatagarbha, Buddha nature, and their four epithets of permanence, bliss, self-identi-
ty and purity; and it is associated still more with AF rubrics and concepts. These texts 
also seem to revert to some old and, from what the extant texts show us, authentic di-
mensions of Paramartha's doctrines, including the link to asrayaparavrtti, and the identi-
fication with the dharmadhatu, and the nonduality of perfect gnosis and its object.
   From this point in our analysis,425 as we venture into periods more distant from 
Paramartha himself, the testimony of authors who mention *amalavijnana/ninth con-
sciousness tends only to become more uniform, more removed from anything 
Paramartha himself said, and more derivate of intervening accounts. For these reasons, 
we will not treat individual the remaining authors to 800 so exhaustively, but rather, will
423 T1769:38.249b08. 
424 T1595:31.175a25-26. 
425 This concept has traditionally been understood as meaning something like "inherent nature
[disposing the sentient being] to liberation/gnosis". However, Ching KENG argues persuasively 
that this is not an accurate reflection of the term as it was used by P and the early Shelun 
school. See KENG's forthcoming Harvard PhD dissertation.
426 Remaining sources in the period down to the Faxiang authors, whose comments are too slight 
  to treat in detail, are: (1) A brief comment in Fali's (•{, 569-635) Sifen lii shu (l n~1a, com-
  posed between 618 and 626), which occurs in the context of a discussion of the Buddha's bod-
  ies, speaks of the "ninth pure consciousness [that is] Thusness, the dharmadhatu" IVAR-% 
JLx pfi. Upon the attainment of buddhahood, this instance, "originally hidden, is made mani-
  fest" *if R$ and "comprises the dharmakaya" a 4; X731:41.541b06-09. (2) Li Shizheng 
(+R C, d.u., fl. 626-649) mentions *amalavijnana in his Famen ming yi ji iAmz, T2124. 
  He uses the very unusual transcription P7N . Li, unusually, echoes Huijun in discussing 
*amalavijilana in terms of the distinction between ontological cause ® (karanahetu) and 
  epistemological cause T (jn`apakahetu); T2124:54.195b11-23; see n. 345. (3) Zhiyan very 
  briefly mentions *amalavijn`ana twice, T1870:45.543a18-21; T1869:45.522c18-26.
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only pick out the main trends in their accounts. There are two main groups of ideas we 
need to look at: those of the Faxiang school; and the beginning of a reaction against 
those ideas, as seen in the Vinaya authors Dingbin and Dajue, and in Chengguan.
4.1.3.9 Faxiang authors
   We turn first to Xuanzang's Faxiang school. During roughly the same few decades 
when the VSS and  Wdnhyo's commentary were composed, Xuanzang and his team 
would have been busy on their massive translation projects, and his disciples would 
have been producing the first of their significant body of commentarial literature. In this 
literature, they occasionally commented on Paramartha's doctrines, including 
*amalavijnana . The three most important Faxiang authors to comment on 
*amalavijnana and ninth consciousness are Kuiji, Wonch'uk and Tunnyun. We will here 
take them as representative, noting additional information supplied by other authors as
necessary.427
   The battle against the notion of the so-called "ninth consciousness" was a key part 
of the struggle of the Faxiang school to roll back the ongoing synthesis of Yogacara and 
tathagatagarbha thought, which it saw as heterodox. This polemical setting exerts a sig-
nificant distorting influence over their presentation of the doctrine. This bias notwith-
standing, the massive historical influence of the Faxiang position in the interpretation of 
Yogacara/Vijnaptimatra doctrine in East Asia has arguably exerted an excessive influ-
ence over our understanding of *amalavijnana, right down to modern scholarship.
427 Zhizhou (vital, 668-723) comments very briefly in his hpp aAif;, but merely echoes
standard Faxiang opinion, T1833:43.819b16-17. The other pertinent Faxiang authors, both late, 
are Taehyon (t-, jct, fl. c. 742-765) and Tankuang (mg, , c. 700-788). Taehyon discusses 
the doctrine in his "Study Notes" *-2 on the Cheng weishi lun, discussing the same passage 
that occasions Kuiji's first comment. He is entirely reliant on his Faxiang predecessors for any 
information about the doctrine, and does not add any fresh information to our picture; 
X818:50.64c01-07. Tankuang's account is also entirely derivative. He uses only the transcrip-
tions P7 Mp , found only Faxiang writers, and P71,t'A d, otherwise only in Li Shizheng. 
*Amalavijnana is supposed to be a ninth consciousness, and derive from a jiushi lun ji p 
by P, and also LAS. His account is resonant of AF; T2810:85.1050b21, 1051b09-14; 
T2812:85.1075a19-23.
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Kuiji42s discusses *amalavijnana in the context of a larger discussion of various ru-
brics numbering consciousness various ways. He begins by citing the LAS passage say-
ing consciousness can be eightfold or ninefold. He then says:
"On the basis of the Wuxiang lun and the Mahayandbhisamaya sutra
, this [verse, i.e. from LAS42s 
is interpreted to] [mis-]take gz43° Thusness for a ninth consciousness, because it expounds the 
combination of two aspects,one true [consciousness] and eight worldly [consciousnesses]. 
Thus, [this interpretation] [mis-]takes I& the eighth, fundamental consciousness 2pfi, when it is 
in a state of purity, for a ninth, expounding a distinction between the defiled and pure / fun-
damental consciousness. The "Sutra of the Adornment of the Tathagata by Merits" imvift 
f` says:
`The taintless consciousness ,.,trpA of the Tathagata 
Is the pure 7 element/realm without 'outflows' (anasravadhatu AM M; 
It is liberated from all obstructions (sarvdvarana —tJJI ); 
It is conjoined with (*sa,nyukta MAO,) the cognition that is like a perfect mirror (®fifi°,
adarsajnana) .'43'
"Since
, here, the text speaks of "taintless consciousness" w,ifila and "cognition that is like a per-
fect mirror" together, and since, further, the ninth is called *amalavijn"ana piis ri" ', we [there-
fore] know that [the text] is expounding a distinction between the defiled and pure [aspects of
428 As we have already seen above, Kuiji (OA, 632-682) uses a variety of transcriptions for
*amalavijn"ana:pfi , -4taa, and VI ;~itpi (this last seen for the first time here and in 
Wonch'uk). He also calls it wugoushi ,;!,1)apfi. Kuiji also refers to *amalavijn"ana as a "ninth 
consciousness" — indeed, for him, the fact that it is counted as a ninth is a major bone of con-
tention.
429 Kuiji cites the verse on "eight or nine consciousnesses" from LAS (see n. 296; Kuiji cites the 
  Bodhiruci translation, T671:16.565b24) immediately before the passage Tunnyun quotes here.
430 "Mistakes for" in the sense that it "apprehends" it as such, but this apprehension is a kind of 
  ignorant clinging Ja.
431 p*,;,;,f p / i .;,7 / Ji —LA / ®€ a #u . This verse is quoted (from "a sutra") in 
  the third juan of Cheng weishi lun T1585:31.13c23-24. The provenance of the verse is identified 
  in Kuiji's commentary, T1830:43.344c21-22. The text seems only to have been known in the 
  East Asian tradition for this one verse. In CWSL itself, this verse is only identified as from "a 
  sutra"; commentators from Kuiji on seem to follow Kuiji here in identifying the source text, e.g. 
  Huiyuan (MX, 673-743?): X221:3.833b21-23 ; Chengguan: T1735:35.878a17-18; Yanshou ( , 
  Song dynasty): T2016:48.584c08-10; etc. LA VALLEE PoussiN (1928-1929) 1, 167, reconstructs the 
  title of the sutra as Tathagatagundlarnkara, but does not give any information about the text.
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the] eighth consciousness, and taking [the latter]   , for the ninth.
,432
   This passage was the key point of reference for later Faxiang writers discussing 
*amalavijnana. We see here a number of hints that suggest Kuiji's understanding is 
based quite closely on Daoji.433 Kuiji also adduces a new proof text for the concept, com-
ing to him via none other than the (for his school) immensely authoritative Cheng weishi 
lun (the only source for the Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing verses) .
   In keeping with the Faxiang attempt to assert their orthodoxy over Paramartha, we 
see here for the first time the outright assertion that there is something wrong with the 
concept of ninth consciousness: it is based upon (grasping) misapprehension T .. Kuiji 
was elsewhere even more forthright about criticising this notion: "A former master set 
up [wugoushi] as a ninth consciousness. This is an error---Mitz_ZZANZ-4Pth."434 In 
his commentary on the Cheng weishi lun (the Shuji 't pd), he again cites the LAS verse, 
and then explains the nature of the error:
"To say there is a ninth consciousness is superfluous feV. It is manifest that the other-depen-
dent consciousness (*paratantra-vijn`ana, lAfth11) includes three types [of consciousness], 
when considered in general N., and only Pft eight, when considered in detail J. It is beyond in-






It is significant that both WXL and the Mahayanabhisamaya are used by Daoji as key proof-
texts for the discussion of *amalavijnana. For Daoji's use of WXL, see §4.1.3.7 above; for his 
use of the Mahayanabhisamaya, see n. 384. The fact that Kuiji mentions these two texts in tan-
dem, in addition to the fact that Daoji was a teacher of XZ, suggests that the 
Mahayanabhisamaya passage Kuiji is thinking of here is most likely the one quoted by Daoji. 
Further, Daoji's citation of MSA passages about the transformation of various kinds of 
consciousness by paravrtti (see p. 132) is also the main precedent to the link Kuiji makes (via 
the Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing citation) between *amalavijn"ana and adarsajniana. The fact 
that the present passage alludes to these source texts is a strong indication that the Faxiang 
school's understanding of the doctrine was derived via Daoji's Shelun zhang, or at any rate, 
from Daoji. In this connection, it is perhaps significant that Kuiji also mentions WXL and 
Mahayandbhisamaya once more, where he also ascribes to them certain ideas about "taintless 
consciousness" — namely that it is "consciousness or mind in its essence, viz. the principle of 
Thusness" ,'ri. J i i. i 'r p L , 111.1A-PP, T1831:43.634c08-09. (The only other places this 
phrase occurs are when later authors cite Kuiji.) This, too, is a clear echo of ideas from Daoji's 
Shelun zhang, for which see n. 388. 
T1830:43.344c09-13. 
Note that this is the "only" of weishi, Chinese for vijnaptimatra, "consciousness only", the
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doubles up in its exposition[, saying] that if we take the eighth as defiled, and separate out its 
pure [aspect], we can speak of a 'ninth consciousness'. This does not mean that there are nine 
[consciousnesses] in the substance of the other-dependent consciousness I-A9tk , and it also 
does not mean that in terms of substantial kinds ME, there is a separate ninth conscious-
ness."436
  Apart from these passages, Kuiji only comments briefly and inconsequentially on 
*amaaavijnana/ninth consciousness."'
   In his famous commentary on the Samdhinirmocana sutra, Wonch'uk438 also uses 
the term wugoushi in a manner that clearly attempts to recuperate the term as merely 
another name for alayavijn"ana.
"The Trepitaka Paramartha asserted a doctrine of nine consciousnesses on the basis of the 
Jueding zang lun. "Nine consciousnesses" refers to: six consciousnesses (of the eye, etc.) ... the 
seventh adana ... and the eighth, alayavijnana, which is of three kinds ... The ninth is 
*amalavijn"ana Vark, which here [in China] is called `taintless consciousness' ,1,4,Wpa. It 
takes Thusness for its substance t, such that, in the same Thusness, there are two aspects : 
(1) the object [of gnosis] (`noema', *if"), which is termed Thusness, or the 'limit of reality' 
(bhutakott); (2) the subject [of gnosis] OM, `noesis'), which is termed `taintless consciousness' 
,.r.,ffipic, and is also termed 'original awakening' (benjue,c~). This is as is explained by the 
Jiushi zhang, citing the "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" of the Jueding zang lun R #t i JLi* I i- 
-±7 ait.31l r }."439
   Later, Wonch'uk returns to the topic, arguing that wugoushi is correctly just another 
name for alayavijnana:
  subject of the eponymous Cheng weishi lun. 
436 T1830:43.239a12-16. 
437 In one brief passage, Kuiji says that *amalavijnana is only found at the stage of "the fruition of
buddhahood" ty*; T1829:43.179a04-05. Other passages in which Kuiji comments are 
T1782:38.1001c26-29 and T1861:45.282c19-25.
438 We have seen that Wonch'uk (Ili]i9, 613-696) (who is Kuiji's senior in years, but as we shall 
  see, depends upon him in the explication of *amalavijnana), uses the transcription [i7,ifri 
  (seen for the first time here and in Kuiji), as well as the standard F7VEp . He also uses the 
  term wugoushi to refer to *amalavijn"ana. We also saw already that he refers to a specific text 
  by P on the "nine consciousnesses", which he calls "Essay on Nine Consciousnesses" (Jiushi 




"[Alayavijn"ana] is also  called  'taintless consciousness' (wugoushi), because it is utterly pure, and 
the basis for all dharmas 'without outflow' (anasravadharmas,Ini,7PtP). To explain: the San-
skrit word [for this term] is *amalavijn"ana P7aa, which here [in China] means 'taintless 
consciousness' (wugoushi). This is the state of [alayavijniana in?] sublime awakening i~T1,. 
The substance of mind when it is conjoined tHE with wisdom that is like a mirror (adartajilana) 
is called wugoushi. It is utterly pure; all the dharmas of the path that are without 'outflow' 
(*anasravamargadharma),440 [such as] wisdoms (jnana), states of absorption (samadha) etc., 
take it as their basis. Thus the 'Sutra of the Adornment of the Tathagata by Merits' (Rulai gongde 
zhuangyan jing) says: The taintless consciousness of the Tathagata/ Is the pure element without 
'outflows';/ It is liberated from all obstructions;/ It is conjoined with the cognition that is like a 
perfect mirror.'"' This is explained in detail in the third juan of the commentary on the 
[Cheng]weishi [lun] n .”442
   This explanation applies purely to the alayavijnana, even though it accepts (or 
speculates) that *amalavijnana was the original term for wugoushi as cited in the Cheng 
weishi lun.
   In one other brief comment in his commentary on the Sutra of Humane Kings 1T 
f`e Wonch'uk overtly addresses a doctrine he ascribes to Paramartha:
"Further, Trepitaka Paramartha propounded a total of nine consciousnesses, adding 
"amalavijnana which has as its essence Thusness-cum-original awakening AO 
While it is in [a state of] bondage, it is called tathagatagarbha; when it escapes bondage, it is 
called the dharmakaya TEINVC : fJ -`t',1 '• Here [in China,] we call it 'taintless conscious-
ness' jff: ,i;, M. This is as [it is expounded] in the Jiushi zhang km*. The remaining eight 
consciousnesses are roughly the same as in all the masters."'
   The distinction here adduced between "in bondage" and "free from bondage" de-
rives from a new proof-text in the history of *amalavijnana doctrine, the seminal 
tathagatagarbha scripture, the grrmaladevisirrchanada sutra,444 though the exact wording
440 This is one of the very few times we have seen *amalavijn"ana associated with what is "without
'outflows"' (anasrava) since P himself. 
441 This verse was already cited by Kuiji, above p. 143. 
442 X369:21.246c24-247a05. The reference at the end of this citation is to Kuiji; see n. 431. 
443 T1708:33.400b26-29. 
444 In Gunabhadra: ^,r:,RIE[; PfNta `cTM Z-. ^f':,k)Af a`c( 471s.,'r. ,
T353:12.221b17-18; in Bodhiruci almost identical, T310(48):11.676c26-28; Skt. is known be-
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used by Wonch'uk appears in no Chinese sutras, but rather, first in the writings of this 
Faxiang generation and their successors. This is a new link between *amalavijnana and 
tathagatagarbha doctrine. Unfortunately, it does not seem there is any way of knowing 
whether Wonch'uk had it from some earlier text, and if so, what; or whether he perhaps 
added this flourish himself.
In his Yuqie lun Tunnyun445 provides us more new information:
"Here, [Hui-]Jing [S]re' follows gi Master Paramartha in establishing the doctrine of nine 
consciousnesses /LAM on the basis of a citation from the 'Ninth Consciousness Chapter' ?'Lft 
a of the Jueding zang lun. However, in the portion of the Jueding zang lun corresponding 13[J to 
the second part i- of the present sastra, there never was any 'Ninth Consciousness Chapter'. 
Further, Master [Wen-]Bei [ ]]447 says that an old tradition f3'14 cites the [notion of] 
*amalavijngana F7J.rgafrom the Wuxiang lun ,,,,,f11 At to prove that there are nine conscious-
nesses.44s The Wuxiang lun corresponds to the 'Chapter on Absence of Essence (nihsvabhavata) 
,mfq' from the Xianyang [shengjiaol lun 41444 , but in that chapter, the term *amalavijnana 
does not feature. Now, based upon the doctrine that there are nine consciousnesses from the 
Lamkavatara sutra etc., [we can say that] the ninth is called *amalavijnana, which here [in Chi-
na] would be said, 'taintless' ift 11!,±fi. Master Ji [i.e. Kuiji] says [of this]:
[Tunnyun here quotes in full the long Kuiji passage translated above, p. 143.1
"Divakara (A4P
,OTE, fl. 676-688) says that there is also an interpretation frfi, in Western lands 
  that holds that a separate aspect of the sixth consciousness R [i.e. manovijnana] is called 
*amala Rita , because it has the excellent function of eradicating ignorance and realising
cause it is cited in RGV: yo bhagavan sarvaklesa-kosakoti guclhe tathagatagarbhe niskanksah 
sarvaklesa-kosa-vinirmuktes tathagatagarbhakaye pi sa ni$kanksa iti, JOHNSTON 79, 147; WAYMAN 
and WAYMAN 96.
445 We have already seen that Tunnyun (, d.u., Silla monk of the eighth century) uses the 
  transcriptions la, I7pai (citing Kuiji), and *a& (citing Kuiji) as well as the 
  ordinary P71gi. We also saw that he reports that Huijing traced the doctrine back to a 
  "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" of JDZL.
446 Wenbei and Huijing were apparently late Shelun school figures; YOSHIMURA (2002), 234. 
447 See n. 446. 
448 Given that Wenbei was a Shelun school figure, we can speculate, on the basis of the evidence
to hand, that this is most likely a reference to Daoji.
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cessation  ORNEA.449Dharma Master [Won-11yo of Silla says that praki-tiprabhasvaracitta n tt 
h( Jb is called *amala VIIiVE,45° and that it is of one substance with the eighth [conscious-
ness], alayavijn"ana, but different in aspect AR. Here, I follow (`retain', 4) this interpretation, 
which accords well MR with the sutra [quoted] above."
   Tunnyun's comments451 here stand out for the scholarly care with which he reports 
and evaluates various positions and traditions. He has also clearly taken pains to gather 
all the relevant information he could; but he is still entirely reliant upon relatively late, 
second-hand information. It also seems he could only base his assessment on parallels 
to Paramartha's texts in translations by Xuanzang; he apparently did not refer to 
Paramartha's own works on the topic.
   Perhaps the most significant thing about the treatment of *amalavijn"ana and ninth 
consciousness/nine consciousnesses in these Faxiang authors is the overtly critical 
tone they adopt. Where early Sanlun authors (Jizang and Huijun) were also critical of 
Paramartha, this was in a context in which they were critical of a number of schools, and 
for reasons somewhat tangential to Yogacara concepts. Here, however, we encounter a 
head-on attack precisely on the concept of ninth consciousness itself, and the discussion 
is almost entirely governed by this polemic; such authors mention only those aspects of 
the doctrinethenecessarytoInpolemical1           atar~...,soary.,refuteit.this pv.c~~~,~a~context, we should  be alert 
for possible distortions of the doctrine, to make of it a straw man or a sitting duck.
   Faxiang authors adduce a new proof text, the otherwise entirely unknown "Sutra of 
Adornment of the Tathagata by Merits". Moreover, Faxiang authors implicitly also use 
Cheng weishi lun as a proof text (since their comments are often occasioned by pertinent 
passages in that text); the conjunction of the Mahayanabhisamaya and WXL as proof-
449 It is difficult to know what to make of this tantalising comment. Divakara may have made some
remark in connection with his translation of the Ghanavyuha sutra, which Dingbin and 
Chengguan cite (see below) as a proof text for the notion that mind can be eightfold or 
ninefold, and that the pure garbha of the Tathagata is called *amalajn"ana; see n. 459, 473. On 
manovijn"ana as the only consciousness to which the elimination of desire (corresponding here 
to huo, "confusion, ignorance") pertains, see AKBh 3.42a-c, vairagya ... manovijnana eva ista; 
VP 2, 131, PiADHAN 155.19-20, P T1559:29.213b07-08. My thanks to OFAKE Susumu for pointing 
this passage out to me.
450 Presumably referring to the passage cited above n. 422. 
451 One other mention of *amalavijn"ana in Tunnyun's corpus is also a simple quote from Kuiji,
T1828:42.605b22-23.
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texts imply they are probably reliant upon Daoji;452 and authors after Kuiji refer to Kuiji 
himself as an authority on the question. In addition, Faxiang authors refer to the follow-
ing texts already referred to by their predecessors: LAS, WXL, and the 
Mahayanabhisamaya. The transcriptions they use seem to indicate that they have en-
countered the idea of *amalavijn"ana in part through the writings of Tiantai Zhiyi.
   By contrast, Faxiang authors make very little reference to Paramartha's own works: 
they only refer to the supposed Jiushi zhang, and to JDZL (with no signs that they had 
actually read JDZL itself). Given the reasons for caution in believing the traditional as-
cription of a jiushi zhang to Paramartha, there is very little to give us confidence that the 
Faxiang authors were engaging with a textually grounded version of *amalavijnana, 
traceable to Paramartha himself.
   This paucity of firm information is reflected in the contents of the doctrine the Fax-
iang authors describe. They are more concerned to tell us what it is not, i.e. the "cor-
rect" understanding that in their view should be substituted for its mistakes; and what is 
wrong with it by contrast. They have very little to say about the actual content of 
Paramartha's doctrine: only that it counts *amalavijnana as a ninth consciousness; that 
it associates *amalavijnana with Thusness; (in Wonch'uk only) that it has two aspects, 
as object (Thusness etc.) and subject (benjue etc.); that it is the basis for 
anasravadharmas; and that it has two states, after the manner of tathagatagarbha, i.e. in 
and out of bondage.
   Now, it seems highly likely from his citation of WXL and the Mahayanabhisamaya, 
and perhaps the reference to adarsajnana, that Kuiji is deriving his information about 
*amalavijnana/ninth consciousness from Daoji.453 It is also apparent that Wonch'uk, al-
ready, is in part following Kuiji in his interpretation of the problem.454 We recall that 
Daoji was a teacher of Xuanzang,455 and also a student of Jingsong, to whom is ascribed 
a jiushi xuan yi.456 These facts in combination make it possible that a Jingsong-Daoji ver-
sion of the doctrine was the proximate source of Faxiang information about it, and the 
most immediate target of the Faxiang polemic.
452 See n. 433. 
453 See n. See n. 433. 
454 See his reference to Kuiji at the end of the second passage translated above, p. 146, and n. 442. 
455 See n. 366. 
456 See p. 113.
149
MICHAEL RADICH
   Further, we have seen that an almost riotous variety of various ideas about 
 *amalavijnana/ninth consciousness was current in the century between Paramartha 
and the Faxiang authors. By contrast, looking ahead towards the eighth century, we see 
that after Kuiji and Wonch'uk, the range of ideas we encounter is significantly impover-
ished, and very often dependent on the Faxiang authors themselves.
   It thus seems that we encounter here a bottleneck in the transmission of "ninth 
consciousness" lore: ideas possibly acquired via Daoji's Shelun-school lineage are recast 
in a form most suitable for their treatment as the targets of a polemic, and this then be-
comes the dominant guise in which the lore is known to later generations.
4.1.3.10 Two Dharmaguptaka Vinaya authors in the early eighth century
  We turn next to Dingbin's (ZA) Sifen lii shu shi zong yiji IN5jRPad (c. 
703-705) 457 and Dajue's tR Sifen lu xingshi chaopi 1A1 (7-Yf T7'~(712) ,458 both in the 
Dharmaguptaka Vinaya1111lineage. The main significance of these two authors is 
that they disagree with Faxiang authors and side with Paramartha. In so doing, however, 
they show that even scholars after the Faxiang authors but outside that school were 
heavily influenced by them in their understanding of the doctrine.
   Dingbin cites a new proof text, translated only after the time of .....and  Wvnch'uk: 
the Ghanavyuha sutra (Dasheng miyan jing jC:°tcf=, T681), which held, in a manner 
reminiscent of LAS, that mind could either be of eight or nine kinds.459 He then cites an 
explanation of the ninefold system of consciousnesses, ostensibly from Paramartha but 
most likely at best derived second-hand from the Wonch'uk passage above.46o This de-
scription begins with the six Abhidharmic consciousnesses, and then goes through sev
457 As FUNAYAMA Toru points out, this text is ascribed to the later Kaiyuan period (713-741) in the
Song gao seng zhuan, but passages in the text make reference to "the present third year of the 
Chang'an era of the great Zhou (dynasty) t Ae z = (703 C.E.)" (X733:42.36c15-21), on the 
one hand, and to the ascension to the throne of the Tang Emperor Zhongzong Fp in 705 C.E. 
In addition, the text is cited by Dajue writing in 712 (on the date of Dajue's text, see n. 458 fol-
lowing). These facts allow us to date the present text more precisely. See FUNAYAMA (2000), 352 
n. 11.
458 This text is dated from its colophon, which dates it to the first year of the Daji/Taiji era of the 
  Tang IA tfiNc , i.e. 712 C.E., and says that it was written at Dazhuangyan si Mta4 in Xi-
  jing (mod. Hangzhou), X736:42.1063c07.
459 ,i,,A-Aft, I'A'A, citing T681:16.734a24; rnam brgyad rnam pa dgu yi sems etc., P. Cu 31b3, 
  cited in OTAKS (2007b), 3. The Ghanavyuha was translated by Divakara between 676 and 688.
460 See p. 145.
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enth adanavijn`ana and eighth alayavijnana. It then comes to the ninth:
"The ninth is called *amalavijilana
. The Tang Trepitaka says that here [in China], this is trans-
lated 'taintless' (wugou). This is also another name for the eighth consciousness. When one be-
comes a Buddha, the eighth consciousness undergoes a revolutionary transformation (N, para/ 
vrt), and becomes taintless. There is [thus according to Xuanzang] no separate ninth conscious-
ness. [This is explained] in detail in the *Vijnaptimatra Mk, i, prob. Cheng weishi lun), the 
Mahayanasamgraha etc."46i
   Dingbin goes on elaborate further on how Xuanzang and his schoolmen disagreed 
with this doctrine. However, he then refers to the Ghanavyuha again, as proof that it is in 
fact the Faxiang understanding that is incorrect: "The ninth here is what is described in 
the last juan of the Ghanavyaha as follows: `The pure garbha of the Tathagata/ Is also 
called *ainalajnana ,,t~tY .i462 Thus we can see that [Paramartha's understanding] is 
not in errorT."463 He then goes on to describe the concrete contents of the doctrine
of ninth consciousness thus:
"Trepitaka Paramartha says that there are two kinds of *amalavijnana: (1) as object of gnosis 
(noema, Pf?N), meaning Thusness; (2) "original awakening" q*, i.e. *tathatajnana, 
[This] subject of gnosis (noesis, f) is identical with the "non-empty" (agunya) [facet of the] 
matrix ([tathagata-] garbha); the object (noema) is identical with the "empty" (gunya) [facet of 
the] matrix ([tathagata-] garbha).464 According to the same (?4, ? for iA]) treatise, both facets 
take Thusness as their substance ."465
This characterisation of *amalavijn"ana as of two kinds is clearly derived from simi-
461 X733:42.44a18-21. 
462 Citing T681:16.747a15. I am grateful to ()TAKE Susumu for pointing out that where Divakara has
      Tib. Ghanavyaha has sprul pa'i ye shes, *nirmanajn"ana; see Peking no. 778, Cu 62a8. 
By contrast, Divakara's Chinese would seem to correspond to an underlying *nirmalajn"ana 
(personal communication, November 2008).
463  An -4.1 J X733:42.44a22-24. 
  Dingbin here may be responding directly to a comment by Wonch'uk, cited by Taehyon but to 
  my knowledge unattested elsewhere: "This [interpretation found in the] Wuxiang lun is 
  Paramartha's error" A ET.t5 pt3j ANN, X818:50.64c04 (my emphasis).
464 Referring to the Srrmaladevr sutra, T353:12.221c16-18; .funyas tathagatagarbho vinirbhagair 
muktajn"aih sarvaklegakogaih/ agunyo ganganadrvalikavyativrttair avinirbhagair amuktajn"air 




lar comments made by  Wonch'uk,466 or from the same source Wonch'uk relied upon. 
However, it is not entirely derivative; it is the first time we have seen *amalavijnana as-
sociated with the concept of what is "non-empty", another epithet of the tathagatagarbha. 
In implicitly adducing the Sramaladeva as a proof-text, however, Dingbin may also be tak-
ing his cue from Wonch'uk, who we saw above refers to other concepts from the same
text.46'
   Dajue explicitly says he gets his information from "the Tang Trepitaka" Off Ec, i.e. 
Xuanzang). He links *amalavijnana to adarsajnana (like Kuiji's Rulai gongde zhuangyan 
jing, probably following Daoji's use of MSA), and says that ninth consciousness is called 
*amalavijnana PiTgira in the "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" of JDZL (thus following 
Wonch'uk). Echoing Dingbin and Wonch'uk, he then says,
"Paramartha explains: 'This [ *amalavijnana] is of two kinds: (1) as object of gnosis (noema, Pff 
 ), meaning Thusness; (2) what is termed `original awakening' (benjue), which is the gnosis it-
self (inana) qua subject of gnosis (R M, noesis). The manovijn"anap468 and this [amala] con-
sciousness unite noema and noesis, which thus, in their unity, comprise the substance of this 
consciousness ^~,, WV'
466 See above p. 145. 
467 See above p. 146. Dingbin also refers to *amalavijnana in one other passage of marginal inter-
est. "Trepitaka Paramartha says that all sentient beings have an originally awakened nature 
(benjue xing 4cW), which is the ninth [consciousness, viz.], *amalavijnana, and practice is 
only an expedient. The Buddha Jewel functions to make this original awakening (benjue), 
which was originally hidden, become manifest. The Dharma Jewel is intended to provide 
guidelines allowing one to conform to this original awakening (?13p**-_.7tj(, ljajj, ). 
The Samgha Jewel is intended to prevent discord and strife ,.,rZ1,. The Tang 
Trepitaka said that the essence of the Three Jewels is nothing other than Thusness;" 
X733:42.191a14-18.
468 I cannot understand exactly what Dajue is saying here. It may be relevant that in places P 
  seems to understand that at least at one stage in the process of the realisation of 
vijniaptimatrata/weishi, manovijnana can be taken as the subject of something like fangbian 
  weishi, but is understood to itself be obviated in zhengguan weishi; cf. FXL T1610:31.809b26-c06, 
SBKLT1616:31.864a2428, and discussion in OTAxE (2007a), 390-394. Further, as we saw above, 
  according to Tunnyun, Divakara associated manovijnana with amalavijn"ana in some capacity; 
Divakara's doctrine may have been connected to the Abhidharma identification of manovijnana 
  as the consciousness that undergoes the elimination of defilement/ignorance/desire; see n. 
  449. There, too, we see possible parallels with this passage. I thank OTAKE Susumu for help 
  with this difficult point (personal communication).
469 Ain pfn  ULi JI. /L I'"ii -p:i io p P T-a rkhAllft. —E3. Pfi
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   The last (very cryptic) sentence here is new, but otherwise, Dingbin's comments 
are entirely derivative of either the Faxiang authors or Dingbin's use of Faxiang charac-
terisations. Elsewhere, Dajue repeats verbatim a lengthy passage from Dingbin, show-
ing that he was certainly aware of what Dingbin had to say about *amalavijn"ana.470 It is 
thus difficult to be sure to what extent Dajue worked directly from Wonch'uk and Kuiji, 
and to what extent he had even their ideas indirectly via Dingbin.
   The most important of these two scholars is clearly Dingbin, whose comments are 
more detailed, and earlier. Although Dingbin disagrees with the Faxiang position, he 
clearly has much of his information from Faxiang scholars, and reads Paramartha's doc-
trine through the lens of Faxiang views. It is also noteworthy that he has to fall back, for 
a proof text, on the Ghanavyuha, a new text translated even after Xuanzang's era. Nei-
ther Dingbin nor Dajue seem to have direct access to Paramartha's texts.
4.1.3.11 Chengguan
   Later comments by Chengguan (, 738-839) echo Dingbin and Dajue closely. 
Chengguan also sides quite openly with Paramartha (as he perceives him) against Xuan-
zang.
   In a first extended discussion,471 Chengguan says that Paramartha called the pure 
aspect of eighth consciousness, which Chengguan refers to as "the pure consciousness 
of the Buddha" itifilk,472 a ninth consciousness, and named it *amalavijnana Plit aa. 
Xuanzang said that this term should be translated wugou, and that it results from the 
revolutionary transformation (I, para/vrt) of the eighth consciousness into a taintless 
consciousness (wugoushi) upon the attainment of buddhahood; but that it is not a ninth 
consciousness. Chengguan then gives the two Ghanavyuha-sutra citations first seen in 
Dingbin,473 saying they support Paramartha in establishing a ninth consciousness. 
Chengguan then repeats verbatim Dingbin's assertion, which says that *amalavijnana 
is of two kinds, corresponding to the "non-empty" and "empty" aspects of
  T-`I,/AYo. migG Bo Agfifi*, A IELTAQt,O J 
X736:42.876b19-22.
470 X736:42.1019b20-23; passage discussed n. 22. 
471 T1736:36.323c03-17. 
472 This rare term would seem to derive from XZ's translation of the *Buddhabhumi satra sastra:
T1530:26.293a29, 311b01, 327c24-25. (Perhaps Chengguan is trying to hoist XZ with his own 
petard ...)
473 See above n. 459, n. 463.
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 tathagatagarbha  474 Chengguan relates this doctrine to the two aspects 11 of mind from 
AF, i.e. the Thusness aspect AO M and the sarnsaric aspect tAr9,475 quoting as a 
proof-text a section of AF saying that mind is only one, and is Thusness.476 He then says 
that whatever we call the mind in this liberated state, there are important differences be-
tween it and ordinary consciousness Jut namely that pure consciousness iwicreates 
the four wisdoms and the three bodies (probably following Wonhyo) .47
   Later in the same text,478 Chengguan returns to the topic, in the course of glossing 
the notion of rushi xin (tp L , *yathabhutacitta, "mind that is adequate to reality", ap-
parently a close relative of yathabhutajnana, A ).479 He identifies this concept with 
prakrtiprabhasvaracitta "aboriginally luminous mind"), for which he refers 
again to the Srrmaladevrsirnhanada sutra and AF, and also cites a passage from MSA 
comparing prakrtiprabhasvaracitta with pure water that has been tainted by mud and 
dirt, which returns to its original purity when the taints are removed.480 He then argues 
that there can be no essence of mind separate from the Thusness of mind, and there-
fore, that purity of mind is merely a matter of removing adventitious defilements. Thus, 
mind is identical with Thusness, and prakrtiprabhasvaracitta is identical with 
tathagatagarbha, and also with original pure consciousness * l-ll. Having thus pre-
pared the ground, he introduces Paramartha's notion of *amalavijnana, which he calls 
a ninth consciousness. The remainder of this passage repeats much of the argument he 
already laid out in the first passage cited above.481
474 See above p. 151. 
475 T1666:32.576a06, 
476 Citing T1666:32.576a12-13. 
477 Cf. VSS and Wonhyo's commentary, which are the only other places we have seen the four wis-
  doms and the three bodies linked with *amalavijnana (see p. 140). 
478 T1736:36.336b04-26. 
479 Mp ,%' is a rare enough concept, but found once in iksananda's Avatarnsaka sutra
  T279:10.105b01-02, which is certainly enough to account for Chengguan's interest in it. 
480 Chengguan is apparently citing from memory: his citation differs in details from MSA itself,
but corresponds to scattered portions of Ch. 14 of the Chinese, T1604:31.622c14-623a04, i.e. 
immediately preceding 623a09, where Prabhakaramitra's text uses the term *amalavijnana; 
corresponding to Skt. 13.17-13.19 and Bh, where the text is already discussing 
prakrtiprabhasvaracitta; LEvi (1907, 1911) 1, 88; 2, 157-158; JAMPSAL et al. 171-172.
481 Specifically, he repeats that XZ says the term is translated as wugou, but it is not a separate 
  ninth consciousness, rather what results from the revolutionary transformation of eighth 
  consciousness on attainment of buddhahood; he then repeats the two citations from the 
Ghanavyuha; the assertion that *amalavijn"ana was expounded in a special chapter of JDZL;
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   There is much that is new in Chengguan's discussion here. We have not seen 
*amalavijn`ana related to "the pure consciousness of the Buddha". We have seldom 
since Paramartha seen such a close association between *amalavijnana and 
prakrtiprabhasvaracitta, though the link does appear in Huijun, MSA and Daoji, and 
again in Wonhyo. It is also, to my knowledge, the first time since Paramartha that any-
one has said so directly that *amalavijn"ana is obscured by adventitious defilements. In 
some respects, then, it is as if Chengguan is returning to aspects of Paramartha's origi-
nal doctrines; and yet, despite the meticulous way he specifies his sources, we have no 
indication that he has direct knowledge of Paramartha's works.
   In Chengguan, then, it seems we see a strengthening of an initial reaction against 
the Faxiang rejection of Paramartha's ideas seen first in Dingbin and Dajue. However, 
Chengguan elaborates this understanding in a creative way that is most reminiscent, if 
anything, of the mode of doctrinal development that we see begun in VSS and built upon 
by Wonhyo in his commentary. The *amalavijnana/ninth consciousness as articulated 
in these texts has little to do with Paramartha's own doctrine. If *amalavijnana, now 
firmly identified with a ninth consciousness, is by the time of Chengguan on the verge 
of winning for itself a secure place in East Asian Buddhism, it is in a form that has de-
clared almost complete independence from its original author.
   The Faxiang authors articulated a very influential vision of *amalavijnana doctrine, 
as we have seen. At the same time, they made the conflict with Paramartha so sharp it 
was almost a matter of "you're either with us or against us". In the long run, this may 
ironically have hastened the demise of the doctrine they opposed to Paramartha's. Ap-
parently scholastics began to decide that they were "against them" — the ideas ascribed 
to Paramartha, even as Kuiji and Wonch'uk (inaccurately) described them, proved too 
attractive to reject entirely, and too well supported in a range of proof texts (none of 
them, by this stage, Paramartha's own!). Perhaps, then, we hear here one stroke of the 
death knell of Xuanzang's "orthodox" Faxiang line against the "sinified" line represented 
by the Yogacara-tathagatagarbha-Buddha nature AF synthesis that eventually won out in 
mainstream East Asian Buddhism.'$'
the passage shared with Dingbin on the two kinds of *amalavijilana, relating to the non-empty 
and empty aspects of tathagatagarbha; and the reference to AF's two aspects of mind.
482 For the sake of completeness, we should note that this survey has omitted the following later 
  evidence of relatively marginal importance: (1) The Da foding rulai miyin siuzheng liaoyi zhu-
  pusa wanxing shoulengyan jing MtiatzP '! liltpsf T p A R XT7 1 `s T945, translated 




   Before we compare  *amalavijnana doctrine in later witnesses with that of 
Paramartha himself, it will be helpful to identify some general trends in this later materi-
al.
   First, the materials seem to fall into two main periods. A first period lasts from ap-
proximately the 580s, or the early Sui, to the formation of Xuanzang's Faxiang school. In 
this period, we see quite various impressions of *amalavijnana doctrine, with little ap-
parent centre of gravity. A second period lasts from approximately the middle of the sev-
enth century, when Xuanzang's school became active, until around the end of the eighth 
century, when we ended our survey. Understanding of *amalavijnana from this period 
is dominated by the Faxiang authors, and their preoccupation with proving that eight, 
not nine, is the correct count for kinds of consciousness. In this same period, however, 
we see a second strand of material, represented mainly by VSS, Wonhyo, Dingbin and 
Chengguan, in which the gathering tendencies are to accept *amalavijnana, sometimes 
by overtly rejecting the Faxiang position; to associate *amalavijnana more and more 
overtly with tathagatagarbha; and to creatively connect *amalavijnana to a range of oth-
er ideas and texts.
contains one very brief reference to *amalavijn"ana J,pR; T945:19.123c15. This is primari-
ly of interest only because it is another instance of the term finding its way into a sutra (cf. 
VSS) or Indic text (cf. also MSA). (2) Li Tongxuan ( t, 635-730) apparently mentions 
*amalavijnana in his Xin Huayan jing lun lrI-°xgz T1739, but his comments are notable 
mostly for their outlandishness. Li mistakenly refers to this consciousness as adanavijn"ana or 
"ninth consciousness". According to Li, this doctrine is taught in the Samdhinirmocana satra! 
ffiTi '*r (T676:16.692c02-04, referring to XZ T676), but the actual content of this doctrine 
sounds more like a cross between LAS and rumours of P; T1739:36.722c22-23, 723a06-14, 
723a23, 723b05-09, 723b12, 736a20-b02, 741b29-c01. (3) The Shi moheyan luna(a 
commentary on AF, probably written sometime in the late seventh or eighth centuries; see 
YYMnao'ro Kazuhiko Lu*fna, "Shaku makaen ron", s.v. Daizokyo zen kaisetsu daijiten) men-
tions *amalavijnana newca in discussing a ninth consciousness, and quotes part of the 
passage I called "VSS<1>" above; T1668:32.611c22-27. (4) The She Moheyan lun shu fJp7Tii 
p aN, (said to have been compiled by ( Famin [579-645], but this seems a clear 
anachronism), a sub-commentary on T1668, quotes T1668 quoting the same VSS passage; 
X771:45.800c18-22. (5) We see brief mentions in ubhakarasimha (o !.!, A, 637-735, arrived in 
China 716), Amoghavajra (Tllil, 705-774) and Amoghavajra's disciple Huilin (,3, d. 
820); T906:18.913c07, T1177a:20.757c14-18, T2128:54.604c20. (6) Zhanran (An, 711-782) dis-
cusses alayavijnana as j ® (inapakahetu) and "*amala Vlgar as direct cause IE® 
(karanahetu?) (see n. 345), thus echoing Huijun and Li Shizheng (see n. 426).
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   Moreover, as we move further away from Paramartha, the trail runs cold in the 
hunt for genuine new information. In the earliest references to Paramartha, it is difficult 
to be sure whether we are seeing the result of accurate doxography, creative endeavour, 
or inaccurate hearsay. Later, however, we find authors clearly repeating their predeces-
sor's views. This suggests strongly that over time, *amalavijnana lore became increas-
ingly like a chamber of echoes or a game of "Chinese whispers".
   Throughout the period we have surveyed, our authors very seldom refer to any 
works from the extant Paramartha corpus as evidence for their characterisation of 
*amalavijnana/ninth consciousness: only Huijun, T2805 (whose direct knowledge of 
JDZL is established by its quote therefrom),483 T2807, Daoji, Kuiji (whose reference 
however seems possibly second-hand via Daoji), Wonch'uk as reported by Taehyon,484 
and Wenbei as reported by Tunnyun. Verbatim citation of a known Paramartha text in 
the discussion of this doctrine is even rarer, only occurring in Huijun, T2807 and Daoji.
   Otherwise, where authors purport to refer to works by Paramartha, they refer 
mostly to the mysterious special work on nine consciousnesses he is supposed to have 
composed. However, as we have seen, confusion seems to reign supreme over the exact 
title, location, nature and contents of this work, and there is little sign that any of the au-
thors who refer to this work had themselves seen or read it. Apart from the supposed 
treatise or chapter on nine consciousnesses/ninth consciousness, the other main sup-
posedly Paramarthian source authors refer to is the apocryphal AE
   Instead of making reference to Paramartha's works, extant or otherwise, authors 
reach for many other sources to piece together a picture of the doctrine, and 
*amalavijn"ana gradually gets woven into a fabric of allusions to an ever-shifting range 
of new proof-texts. Thus, authors claim to find the origins of the doctrine in MSg, the 
Vimsatika, LAS, the Mahayanabhisamaya, the elusive Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing, the 
Cheng weishi lun, the Pusa yingluo benye jing, the Tathagatagarbha sutra, MSA, the 
Srrmaladevr, the Ghanavyuha, and even, in the singular case of Li Tongxuan, the 
Samdhinirmocana sutra. Of course, it is the usual task of exegetes to find or forge links 
like these between texts and doctrines they interpret and doctrines in other texts. At the 
same time, we are certainly justified in wondering why such diligent textual scholars 
would almost uniformly turn to such sources, and almost entirely overlook Paramartha
483 See n. 276. 
484 Taehyon has Wonch'uk refer to WXL; see n. 463.
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himself, if they had the choice of consulting Paramartha's own works directly.485
   Parallel to this process of weaving  *amalavijnana into a larger intertextual fabric, 
the doctrine also progressively becomes associated with more and more concepts. 
These include: dharmakaya; the "Thusness aspect of mind" of AF; Buddha nature; "nei-
ther increase nor decrease"; "not coming or going"; "original awakening" (benjue); 
flexing; "non-abiding Nirvana" (apratisthitanirvana); the LAS/AF figure of the wind, the 
waves and the water; the epithets of tathagatagarbha "eternal, blissful, self-identical, 
pure"; the dharmadhatu; wugoushi ,i,,,Whpi; the "gnosis that is like a mirror" 
(adarsajnana); the tathagatagarbha idea of "in bondage" and "free from bondage"; the 
non-empty and empty aspects of tathagatagarbha; "Buddha consciousness"; various 
technical doctrines of causation as it relates to liberation; the "pure Buddha conscious-
ness"; the "pure garbha consciousness of the Tathagata"; and, of course, tathagatagarbha 
itself.
   This lengthy survey (§4.1) has thus shown that there is very much about 
*amalavijnana in later sources that is never found in Paramartha's extant works. On the 
other hand, then, how much overlap is there with Paramartha's documented doctrine of 
*amalavijn"ana?
4.2 What later sources say that agrees with Paramartha
   We saw above (§3) that there seem to be two quite distinct doctrines of 
*amalavijn"ana in Paramartha's corpus. Here, however, I will treat all these text as a 
single unit, for purposes of comparison with later texts.
   We find that there really is very little overlap between *amalavijnana in 
Paramartha and in later authors. This is in part a function of the wide variation of later 
authors among themselves. However, even if we take all the later sources as a unit for 
the purposes of comparison, it is remarkable how seldom they concur with our extant 
evidence about the doctrine they were ostensibly discussing. The only areas of frequent 
overlap are:
   1) The term *amalavijnana itself. However, some later sources only use the term 
"ninth consciousness"
, or wugoushi, both terms that are not used in association with
485 YOSHIMURA also observes the great fluctuation of proof texts adduced in support of the doctrine; 
  (2007a), 180; so too Yalu 32-35.
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*amalavijnana doctrine in Paramartha himself; and transcriptions widely diverge from 
Paramartha.
   2) Discussion is at least about some kind of "pure" consciousness, as the term 
would lead us to expect.
   3) *Amalavijnana is a state of consciousness that attends liberation, and is attained 
through some transformation or purification of alayavijnana.
   4) The connection between *amalavijnana and Thusness.486 However, Thusness 
also features prominently in AF, whose categories loom so large in the attempts of later 
authors to come to grips with *amalavijnana. It is difficult to determine, therefore, 
whether this agreement is a function of accurate reporting of Paramartha's ideas from 
the later authors, or of the application of the AF lens.
   5) The identification between *amalavijnana and prakrtiprabhasvaracitta is 
touched upon in Huijun (actually citing SBKL), MSA, Daoji, Wonhyo (also reported 
second-hand by Tunnyun) and Chengguan. This link is thus the specific component of 
Paramartha's actual doctrine that most frequently recurs in later authors. It suggests 
that to the extent that the later tradition did base itself upon accurate information, it was 
working not from (reports of) JDZL, but SBKL. It is interesting to note that no Faxiang 
author notices this aspect of the doctrine.
   There is also some reference in the later tradition to the following dimensions of 
Paramartha's doctrine, but it is slender. In many cases, we find ourselves in a grey zone, 
where agreement could be a result of coincidence:
1) The idea that *amalavijnana is related to asrayaparavrtti is only mentioned 
explicitly by Zhiyi. It is also hinted at slightly in some authors.48'
   2) The association between the attainment of *amalavijnana and the realisation of 
a state "without `outflows"' (anasrava), or the association between *amalavijnana and 
anasravadharmas, features briefly in the Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing verse cited by 
Kuiji, Wonch'uk and Tankuang.
   3) The statement that *amalavijnana is "permanent" appears only in Jingying 
Huiyuan, and does not then reappear in later sources until the loose association of
486 *Amalavijn"ana is associated implicitly with Thusness in SBKL<1>, and explicitly in SKBL<2>.
This theme is found, in one form or another, in Zhiyi, Jingying Huiyuan, Daoji, T2807, VSS, 
Wonhyo, Kuiji (where the identification is criticised as a misapprehension), Dajue, Dingbin 
and Chengguan.
487 By the use of the word zhuan $$ to refer to the transformation in consciousness that brings it 
  about: VSS, Wonhyo, Dingbin, Chengguan.
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 *amalavijnana with the four epithets of tathagatagarbha in Wonhyo. (The related 
Paramarthian notion that *amalavijnana is "true" because free from change [SWXL<1>] 
is never found later.)
   4) The association between the attainment of *amalavijnana and the attainment of 
power over body and lifespan is only weakly echoed in the identification of 
*amalavijnana and dharmakaya in Jizang, Fali, Li Shizheng and Wonch'uk; and in the 
association between the attainment of *amalavijnana and the three bodies (trikaya) in 
VSS<5>, Wonhyo, and Chengguan.
   5) The identification of *amalavijnana and the "perfected nature" 
(parinispannasvabhava) is only weakly hinted at in Jizang.
   6) The idea that *amalavijnana is obscured by adventitious defilements is only 
found in Huijun; by association in MSA; and in Chengguan.
   7) Very little is made of the notion that *amalavijn""ana is characterised by a 
nondualism of subject and object. We find this notion reflected directly only in Wónhyo. 
In Jizang, Dajue and Dingbin, the nondual also seems to feature, but it has a curiously 
different emphasis.
   8) The relationship between delusion and language, or the relationship between the 
attainment of *amalavijnana and the escape from language, is only reflected in Huijun 
and Jingying Huiyuan. (We also do not find much emphasis on Paramartha's related as-
sertion that *amalavijnana is free from error.)
4.3 What Paramartha says that later sources do not
   Comparing Paramartha's extant corpus our later sources, 
aspects of Paramartha's doctrine are never mentioned at all:
we find that the following
   1) The association or identification of *amalavijnana with the counteragents 
(pratipaksa) of alayavijnana.
   2) The idea that attainment of the *amalavijnana entails a transformation of the 
relationship to the skandhas.
   3) The association between the problematic of the attainment of *amalavijn"ana, 
and liberation specifically understood as a process of evading rebirth, and thereby 
escaping future suffering.
   4) The related overtones, found in Paramartha, of the old Nikaya/Agama doctrine 
of consciousness as the subject of transmigration and liberation; and indeed, any sign of 
a relationship between *amalavijnana and the vijiianaskandha.
   5) The identification of *amalavijnana with a "higher" stage of Vijnaptimatrata/wei-
shi (weishi as the object of "perfect insight", zhengguan weishi etc.), beyond the weishi "in 
practice" (fangbian weishi) that obviates only external objects but not the ordinary
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perceiving consciousness.
   6) The notion that  *amalavijnana is free of "badness" (dausthulya), which, as we 
saw, is connected to its close association with asrayaparavrtti.
7) The idea that *amalavijnana is a basis for transcendent (lok8ttara) dharmas. 
8) Any association whatsoever between *amalavijnana and the idea of the
"continuum" (samtana), either the ordinary continuum of the prthagjana before 
liberation, or the "continuum produced by lokottaradharmas" of JDZL<3>.
   9) The idea that *amalavijnana is without a basis (IA, asraya), or even the very 
question of its relationship to a basis.
   10) The "Mahayana Abhidharma" framework that is so key to the exposition of 
*amalavijn`ana in JDZL.
11) The identification of *amalavijnana with emptiness (SBKL).
   I argued (§3) that there are two separable *amalavijnana doctrines in Paramartha, 
and that JDZL probably preserves the version closest to the original. We see here that 
some details of the version of the doctrine reflected in the other group of texts (SWXL, 
SBKL, ZSL) are reflected, if weakly, in later texts. However, the JDZL doctrine sinks al-
most without a trace.
   This almost total silence on the actual content of JDZL forms a striking contrast to 
the fact that so many of the later sources claim to trace the notion of *amalavijn"ana 
back to a putative "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" found precisely in JDZL.
5. Conclusions
   There are very few areas of real overlap between *amalavijn"ana doctrine in extant 
Paramartha texts and in later sources. Of course, traditional bibliographies report that 
Paramartha wrote many more texts than we have received. At least on the evidence of 
the extant texts, however, it seems that the tradition inherited from Paramartha only a 
very basic idea of a pure, post-liberatory consciousness, in some relationship of contrast 
to alayavijnana, which had a close relationship or identity with Thusness.
   Recognising the virtual certainty that some of Paramartha's texts and ideas have in-
deed been lost to our record, the possibility cannot be ruled out that some of what the 
tradition reports was in fact part of the doctrine of Paramartha or his group. In particu-
lar:
   1) We saw (§4.1.2.2, §4.1.2.3) that we cannot be sure that Paramartha did not author 
a text especially on "ninth consciousness" (Jiushi zhang etc.), or that he did not teach a
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ninth consciousness or a system of ninefold consciousness.
   2) We cannot be sure that he never associated  *amalavijnana with tathagatagarbha, 
and may indeed therefore have been attempting thereby to effect some kind of rap-
prochement between Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha thought.488
   Testimony that Paramartha's teaching had these features is early and widespread. 
We have no contradictory evidence intervening between the earliest witnesses and 
Paramartha's group, which might allow us to cast doubt on this testimony. Thus, it is en-
tirely possible, if not certain, that Paramartha taught that *amalavijnana was a separate, 
ninth kind of consciousness, associated with tathagatagarbha. If such important aspects 
of Paramartha's original doctrine may indeed have been lost, it reminds us that we must 
also be aware of the possibility that we have an incomplete picture when we attempt to 
study and characterise Paramartha's thought more generally.
   However, the fact remains that later authors only received a very vague and pared-
down version of Paramartha's doctrine. Subsequent authors then often took the concept 
as raw material for their own constructive projects, or, in the interests of attacking or de-
fending the notion, wove it into complex new networks of proof texts and various con-
cepts. The result, as we have seen, is that the bulk of what was said about 
*amalavijnana by later authors was new. We have little grounds for confidence that 
these authors were well acquainted with any works by Paramartha, upon which they 
based their comments.
   Despite some excellent studies, modern scholarship has still tended to accept too 
readily the image of *amalavijnana found in the later tradition, rather than to examine 
closely what Paramartha's texts had to say about it. I hope that this study has shown 
that those sources reveals a surprising profile of Paramartha's genuine attested doctrine 
of *amalavijnana.
To summarise, the major findings of this study were:
1) It is reasonable to think that Paramartha coined theterm amoluoshi at least in
488 We see *amalavijn"ana or "ninth consciousness" associated with tathagatagarbha (or Buddha
nature) in witnesses as early and apparently reliable as Huijun and Jingying Huiyuan. This as-
sociation then recurs in Zhiyan, VSS, Wonhyo, Wonch'uk, Dingbin and Chengguan. Notably, 
however, no Shelun school witnesses are found in this list (Dunhuang texts, Daoji).
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part on the basis of the term amalavijnana in AK 5.29.
   2) Paramartha's extant works contain not one but two separable doctrines of 
*amalavijnana: one in JDZL, and the other in ZSL, SWXL and SBKL. The JDZL doctrine 
is most likely earlier, and more likely to be authentic (though the other version of the 
doctrine may also be authentic).
   3) The rich details of these original doctrines have been insufficiently known in 
modern scholarship. They were also almost unknown to later authors in the tradition.
   4) Later authors propose a riot of extremely varied ideas about *amalavijnana and 
ninth consciousness, little of it traceable with any confidence to Paramartha or his 
group.
6. Directions for future research
   If we have tended to overlook the original content of Paramartha's own 
*amalavijnana doctrine, that implies at least three agendas for further research.
   First, it is important to look for the sources of Paramartha's attested *amalavijnana 
doctrine.489
   Second, what has proven true for *amalavijnana may prove true of Paramartha's 
thought more generally. Paramartha's actual ideas may have been buried under what 
was made of them by his successors — enthusiasts as much as enemies. Those ideas 
may therefore constitute a missed chapter the development of East Asian Buddhism. We 
may need to bracket out what we think we "know", from the image of Paramartha con-
structed by the later tradition, and study Paramartha's own texts more carefully.
   Finally, Paramartha's ideas are significant in part because of the place they hold in 
our usual narratives of the so-called "sinification" of Buddhist concepts. If the general 
image of *amalavijnana has been inaccurate to date, then part of the general under-
standing of the process of sinification may have been built on sand. It will also be impor-
tant, therefore, to reassess the place of *amalavijnana in relation to the problem of sini-
489 I am currently preparing a study in this direction entitled "Sources of Paramartha's 
   *Amalavijn"ana".
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490 With reference to Buddhism, the term "sinification" may broadly be taken in two senses, "weak"
and "strong": "weak" sinification is any change that results in a Buddhism unique to China, re-
gardless of the cause of that change (thus including changes resulting from chance vicissi-
tudes of the translation process, translation errors, and a host of other factors); "strong" sinifi-
cation refers to change resulting in aspects of Buddhism unique to China, caused by factors 
themselves already unique to China or characteristically Chinese (most typically, Chinese cul-
ture, thought or a Chinese "worldview"). To simplify, Paramartha's *amalavijnana has often 
been regarded as a part of an increasing emphasis on tathagatagarbha/Buddha nature, culmi-
nating in its eventual ascent to centrality and orthodoxy, supposed to be typical of East Asian 
Buddhism. This process is regarded as sinification in the specific sense that it is thought, in a 
quasi-Weberian mode, to have been the product of "this-worldly" and "optimistic" tendencies 
fundamental to the Chinese tradition. I disagree with this interpretation of *amalavijn`ana. I 
am currently preparing a study of these problems entitled "Paramartha's *Amalavijn"ana as 
a Case Study in the So-called `Sinification' of Buddhist Concepts", in which I hope to 
demonstrate the relationship of important received interpretations of *amalavijnana and 
Paramartha's thought with "sinification" so understood, and argue that, for the case of 
*amalavijnana, it is a misinterpretation.
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